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Abstract 
This thesis explores some of the fundamental notions motivating mathematical 
realism, in particular the idea of a separate, independent mathematical realm. This 
notion, which at its core is the concept of an 'other', forms the work's primary focus. 
Various versions of mathematical realism are explored, including structuralism, 
naturalism and a transcendental approach - all of which attempt to incorporate or 
engage with an 'other' mathematical realm. Arguing that none of these approaches 
retains the original intuitive notion of a truly separate 'other', an alternative account is 
offered, drawing inspiration from Husserl's phenomenology and Derrida's analysis of 
metaphysics as theology. The account proposes that, in order to retain the concept of 
an 'other', the independent mathematical realm must be uncircumscribable by any 
account, and literally beyond comprehension. But, in order to preserve mathematical 
realism as a philosophy, and in accordance with its fundamental optimism (that the 
mathematics we access somehow is the mathematical realm and other than us), 
mathematics must also be within our grasp and able to be fully seen as it is in and of 
itself. So mathematics must be fully within and fully outside of our grasp (or 
consciousness). It is argued that this paradox is unavoidable and irreducible, but not 
necessarily a drawback for realism. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is about mathematical realism. 'Mathematical realism' will for now serve 
simply as a cover term for the host of versions of the idea that mathematics is 
somehow real (or perhaps, given the vagaries of words like 'real', that mathematics is 
not 'unreaO, rather than a construct of our making, or a product of our imagination. 
Just as most of us comprehend and live in the physical world apparently believing (or 
at least acting and thinking as though) it is not unreal, so most mathematicians and, I 
would venture, all mathematical realists, comprehend and interact with the 
mathematical world. 
The idea that the mathematical realm is no more unreal than the physical realm is an 
attractive one - inviting the belief that mathematics is another reality or part of a 
broader reality; as interesting, as inviting and as separate an entity as we could hope 
to encounter. Among other things, this idea presents mathematics as a still largely 
uncharted realm of infinite possibility - a place to explore and discover; something 
other - the encountering of which is potentially able to teach us about more than 
ourselves; something to learn. 
But can anything like this idea - which at this stage is just the loose, intuitive concept 
of an intriguing, entirely separate 'other' - be translated into a set of principles and 
incorporated into a coherent philosophy? The same question can be asked of quite a 
number of features of (versions of) mathematical realism, such as the idea that 
mathematical reality is unique, or fixed, the idea that its objects are abstract, and so 
on. 
In fact, it turns out that most of the features of mathematical realism (perhaps of any 
philosophy) - including its attractive qualities, or apparent strengths - are notoriously 
hard to pin down. There are good reasons for this. In the first place, articulating the 
precise nature of each quality is not easy. The concept 'real' is itself a good example. 
Where one person can use the term 'real' to indicate a reality strictly separate from 
ourselves, others can understand the same term as representing a belief\x\ some sort 
of external realm, as a linguistic tool whose function does not depend on the existence 
of anything whatsoever, or even as a sort of shorthand for an internal reality, entirely 
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the construct of our imagination. Similar ambiguities exist for terms like 'independent', 
'metaphysical' and 'abstract'. Even the term 'other' is not without its subtleties, as any 
theologian will testify. 
Secondly, there is the problem of deciding just what counts as a quality or a strength, 
and what counts as a weakness of mathematical realism. For example, one realist 
might see uniqueness as a vital aspect of the realist's mathematical realm - believing 
perhaps that any relativity with regard to mathematical reality itself threatens the idea 
of, and our drive to discover 'the truth'. On the other hand, another mathematical 
realist might dismiss the notion of a fixed universe altogether, favouring instead the 
notion that no single model or structure can fully represent everything we would want 
to call a mathematical truth. But regardless of which feature of mathematical realism 
is highlighted, all either stem from, or have some kind of important interplay with, the 
concept that mathematical reality is something other than ourselves - something else. 
For this reason, the concept of an 'other' is considered in what follows to be one of the 
most important aspects of mathematical realism and, as such, its overt incorporation 
is counted as a desideratum for mathematical realist accounts in general. 
The claim that all features of mathematical realism stem from or interact in an 
important way with the notion of an 'other' can be illustrated by many scenarios, 
including the following. Whether or not the mathematical realm is seen as unique can 
depend on whether or not that realm is seen as a reality whose existence is separate 
from our own. If our existence does not influence the existence of that realm, to ask 
just what it\s seems a legitimate question, and so the belief that there is a single 
correct description of that reality naturally attaches to, indeed perhaps relies upon, the 
idea that that reality is independent of, or other than ourselves. Other instances 
reasoned along similar lines are easily imagined. 
Given the centrality of the concept of an 'other' for mathematical realism, the central 
aim of this work is to flesh out and examine just what it takes to articulate the notion 
of an entirely separate reality in a philosophy of mathematics. Note that the fleshing 
out of an 'entirely other' reality is opposed to the fleshing out of some derivative of the 
same intuitive notion. That is, the following is not an attempt to accommodate various 
versions or degrees of independence, or 'otherness'. It is an attempt to better 
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understand and explicate the most extreme concept conceivable (and, perhaps, 
inconceivable) of an 'other'. This work, therefore, is about a particular realism - one 
which posits a reality whose existence is as separate from our own as a person could 
desire. The most extreme position is taken for two reasons. The first is simplicity. The 
task of pinning down the intuitive notion of an 'other', it seems to me, is best 
accomplished by examining this notion at its most extreme, where the various 
components and implications of such a notion are as stark as they get. 
The second reason is another of the primary motivations for this work. The realism I 
want to explore is this particular realism at its most extreme. The question I am 
seeking to answer is how a philosophy of mathematics can incorporate the 
(apparently) cut-and-dried realist beliefs underpinning the practice of mathematics 
and, analogously, the realist beliefs underpinning our interaction with the physical 
world. In particular, how a philosophy of mathematics can incorporate the belief or 
presumption that the reality that mathematics deals with is a reality entirely separate 
from ourselves. 
That is, the primary task of this work is not to present the most acceptable realist 
model, nor to justify realism in general, but rather to ask what it takes for a particular 
(cut-and-dried, black-and-white, or 'ideaO realist model to work, or even just to be 
expressed philosophically. This question does, I believe, have important implications 
for other realist models as well, especially if they derive from, or are informed by this 
'ideal'. I hope also to show that the account I put forward - an account incorporating 
the ideal or 'strong' versions of various beliefs that other models also incorporate -
ultimately has no more problems, or is no less acceptable than those other models. If 
this is indeed the case, then there needs to be some further argument weighing the 
possible advantages of the ideal against derivative or relative versions of the same 
realist beliefs and ideas. 
Put negatively, the main problem I try to avoid here is the problem of not 
incorporating or addressing the notion of a fully independent other in a realist 
philosophy of mathematics. It is in accordance with this aim that I identify this «55a 
problem for the other accounts I address. The first few chapters aim to show that less 
than the idea of independence is addressed in the accounts I discuss - which simply 
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means that these accounts have not avoided my main problem. The rest of the work 
is an attempt to show that the problems that are encountered by my own account are 
no greater than those surrounding the question or problem of our relationship to the 
physical \Nox\± 
Some other desiderata for my realist philosophy of mathematics are likewise 
motivated by the aim to articulate commonsense or everyday background realist 
beliefs regarding everyday objects. These include: (1) that the mathematical reality is 
analogous with the physical world's reality; (2) that our understanding of 
mathematical reality depends on that reality; (3) that mathematical reality existed 
before we came to know it; (4) that mathematical reality is 'metaphysical'; (5) that 
mathematical reality is 'non-arbitrary'; (6) that mathematical reality is unique; and (7) 
that meaning is objective, and so determinate. But, as all of these notions depend on 
the notion of a reality independent from ourselves, the first item on the list remains 
the most important. The concluding chapters argue that in order to incorporate an 
'other' reality, a considerable degree of mystery must be written into or 
accommodated by a philosophy of mathematics; akin in many ways to the mystery 
inherent to many theologies. Whether or not this conclusion weighs in favour of or 
against the mathematical realist's agenda is left as a matter of interpretation. 
One could see such a conclusion as a vindication of the view that mathematical 
realism is ultimately no more comprehensible, workable, nor logical than a simple leap 
of faith. On the other hand, one might view the overt incorporation of a 'leap of faith' 
as a long overdue acceptance that faith is an unavoidable part of any philosophy 
whatsoever, particularly a realist philosophy - and hence as the beginning of a more 
concerted effort to understand a crucial component of the philosopher's work that has 
hitherto been pushed out of sight. I hope this work ultimately encourages the latter 
rather than the former interpretation, but whether or not it does is not as important in 
the agenda as is the achievement of a more modest aim: that of simply introducing 
the option, for the mathematical realist, of a favourable interpretation of an otherwise 
apparently unfavourable conclusion. Such an option introduces the possibility of 
further cross-pollination between philosophy of mathematics and other studies, such 
as theology, that deal overtly with belief systems and faith. Taken in concert with the 
more traditional bounds of analytic philosophy, the new boundaries offer new 
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possibilities for the philosophy of mathematics and consequently for our understanding 
of our relationship with the objects and the realm of our mathematical knowledge. 
A Note on Structure 
The program, to acknowledge and articulate the beliefs underpinning the sort of 
mathematical realism inspired by, or attempting in some way to incorporate, the 
idea of a completely independent mathematical reality, falls into two sections. The 
first section begins to outline, in broad strokes, the theories presented in more 
detail in the second section. So, while some seemingly obscure or specific terms 
(e.g. 'filled intention', 'embodied reality' and 'independent' versus 'other' reality) are 
used in the first section without full definitions or explanations, these are revisited 
and clarified in the final few chapters. 
The first section looks at various versions of mathematical realism - all of which 
can be seen as taking some kind of positive approach to the idea that mathematical 
reality is independent. This is done in order to more specifically identify some of the 
problems or difficulties encountered when attempting to incorporate the notion of 
an 'other' in mathematical realism. There are, of course, a great many more 
philosophies of mathematics that are relevant in some way to this work. Notably 
absent are Richard Tieszen's Husserlian approach, Hartry Field's anti-realism, and 
Crispin Wright's realism.^  Rather than discuss each relevant philosophy of 
mathematics, though, I have taken the few I believe to be in some way 
representative of a particular approach. Also, the philosophies most relevant to this 
work are self proclaimed realist philosophies (with the exception of Folina's), or 
more overtly realist than those listed above. Further, of the host of realist 
philosophies, I discuss only the few that need to be discussed in order to gain an 
overall view of the sort of problems I hope to identify in the expression of and 
approach to mathematical realism in general. 
The second section of this work is my own attempt to deal with the problem of 
incorporating an independent reality into a mathematical realist account. 
11 refer here primarily to Wright [1987], Tieszen [1989] and Field [2001]. All are relevant to this thesis, but 
not especially needed in order to establish its main points. 
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Citations 
Author/date references are provided in the first instance of citing an external 
source. If subsequent references to the same work are made immediately 
following this first citation (i.e. before any other work is cited), only author 
and/or page number are provided. 
Square brackets within a quotation indicate my additions unless otherwise 
stated. Double square brackets within a quotation are part of the quoted text. 
Parti 
Chapters one through four all deal with versions of mathematical realism that seem 
to include a significant degree of independence in their account of mathematical 
reality. 
Chapter One 
In chapter one, I look at Shapiro's structuralism, and argue that the sort of 
reality that Shapiro ascribes to structures is ultimately too vague to enable them 
- as the reality posited - to escape some of the problems more commonly 
associated with anti-realist accounts. In particular, I argue that it is not clear just 
how independent Shapiro's structures are from the epistemic routes by which 
they are accessed. That is, I argue that along with not escaping anti-realist 
problems, in the end Shapiro's structuralism is no less problematic than the 
traditional platonism upon which he seeks to improve. This is important since at 
least part of his program is an attempt to overcome what he sees as the more 
serious problems with traditional platonism. I try to show that his ante rem 
independence for structures does not set his account far enough apart from 
anti-realist accounts or eradicate their pitfalls.^ That is, the independence of the 
^ According to Shapiro [1997], the term "ante rem" applied to universals is the notion that "universals exist 
prior to and independent of any items that may instantiate them" (p. 84). For Shapiro "[t]he important 
distinction is between ante rem realism and the others ... [his question] is whether, and in what sense, 
structures exist independently of the systems that exemplify them. Is it reasonable to speak of the natural-
number structure, the real-number structure, or the set-theoretic hierarchy on the off chance that there are 
no systems that exemplify these structures?" (p. 85). In fact it is the centrality of this question that motivates 
my later examination of the notion of dependence. If indeed the structures and the systems that exemplify 
them are two different things, what is the relationship between these two things? Without some other 
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reality he proposes (structures) is not strong enough, or not obviously so, to set 
that reality apart from the mechanisms by which we perceive it. Nor, I argue, 
are these structures (i.e. those arrived at via the mechanisms of our perception) 
simply identifiable with fully independent structures. And they cannot be, at least 
not without this identity being an ad hoc or somehow unnatural stipulation. 
To support these claims I argue that Shapiro does not distinguish, nor does his 
account have the tools to distinguish, between the object of our perception 
(accessed via pattern recognition and abstraction) and the independent objects 
he proposes (the ante rem structure that existed prior to our perception - or to 
our act of perception). Ultimately, Shapiro simply stipulates the independence of 
his structures and this stipulation is opposed to one of the main aims of this 
work - the incorporation or addressing of independence in a philosophy of 
mathematics as a fundamental principle. I argue that Shapiro's independence is 
not fundamental, or at least that its role is ambiguous and therefore his 
stipulation is still more ad hoc than fundamental. 
I argue that in order to incorporate the idea of independence in a 'non ad hoc' 
fashion the retention of the Caesar problem is required. That is, the Caesar 
problem remaining a problem is a necessary pre-condition for the incorporation 
into a philosophy of mathematics of the idea of an 'other' mathematical reality. 
The retention of this problem as a problem amounts to the belief that the 
problem has a determinate solution, regardless of whether or not we can 
discover it (which in turn amounts to the preservation of the idea that there is 
an independent other with its own determinate nature, and so on!). In other 
words, without this open-ended statement of belief, realism loses the possibility 
of proposing a fully independent reality. 
Finally, I argue that two notions central to Shapiro's account undermine each 
other. The first is that we discover structures. The second is that structures exist 
ante rem. These ideas are undermined in Shapiro's account simply because each 
is defined and defended in terms of the other. This leads to the problem of 
distinguishing feature, can the difference between the two be maintained? I answer this question negatively, 
and go on to suggest the idea that the systems depend on the structures as one such feature. 
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establishing the difference between an inherently circular (but nonetheless 
useful and insightful) foundation for mathematics such as that offered by 
Shapiro's ante rem structures, and the more metaphysical appeal to an external 
reality proposed in my own account. Just what this difference amounts to is a 
major focus of the following chapter. 
Chapter Two 
Chapter two discusses the difference between an external and an internal 
justification for mathematics, and argues that for the realism I am interested in 
exploring only an external justification counts. The case for an internal or set-
theoretic justification is presented through Maddy's naturalistic interpretation of 
Godel's realism, while the case for an external justification is presented through 
my own interpretation of the same. 
This chapter explores the importance for mathematical realism of philosophical 
or metaphysical issues and asks just what, for my mathematical realist, would 
constitute a ground for mathematics. In other words, it asks just what could 
count as a solution to the problem of justifying mathematics and what could not, 
once even the most basic tenets of the mathematical realism under discussion 
are granted. 
The case for external justification begins with the observation that Godel's work 
can be interpreted as both in favour of, and against, its necessity. This is 
possible, I believe, because of an ambiguity in Godel's use of the term 
'meaning'. It seems that for Godel, 'meaning' refers to different things in 
different contexts. That is, in some contexts it seems that Godel uses the term 
to refer to an independent mathematical reality, but in others he appears to use 
the term to refer to our understanding of mathematical reality. I suggest that 
this is because, to Godel, the two possible referents are, ideally at least, 
identical. 
Which of the two referents is favoured will depend on the interpreter's own bias: 
Maddy reads Godel as privileging internal meaning over external. In other 
words, she reads Godel as locating meaning on the level of our understanding of 
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mathematical formalisms rather than on any independent abstract plane. I read 
Godel as privileging external meaning. Regardless of issues of interpretation, 
though, I argue that there is for the realist ultimately no way of avoiding the 
external. 
Maddy argues that philosophy is metaphysical. I agree, but further argue that, 
because of the nature of mathematical realism and philosophy, more than just 
what fits easily under the rubric'philosophy' is metaphysical. 'Mathematical 
realism' itself and 'justification' are both examples of'metaphysics' once just 
about any degree of realism is granted. 
According to this stance, I interpret Godel's own understanding of these terms 
as metaphysical. His realism and his interest in Husserl motivates and provides 
some evidence for the validity of such an interpretation. This expansion of the 
term 'metaphysical' is defended and expressed with greater precision through 
the ideas of Derrida and Husserl and through ideas more or less directly inspired 
by their work. Also defended by these means is the idea that Maddy's separation 
of philosophy from concepts like 'mathematical realism' and 'justification' is itself 
in need of further justification. 
Phenomenological concepts and terminology are then brought to bear on Godel's 
mathematical realism, which results in the claim that Godel's sought-after 
justification for mathematics can be aligned with Husserl's filled intention. That 
the two concepts so readily fit together is, I believe, no coincidence: the 
Husserlian framework that Godel appeals to, and Godel's realism itself, are in 
many ways paradigmatic of mathematical realism in general and the idea of an 
independent 'other' is a predominant occupation for them both (albeit from two 
separate angles). 
Metaphysics is defined as that which prioritises presence over presentation, or as 
that which has 'the sign' dependent on 'the signified', or, in mathematical realist 
terms: that which has the formalism dependent on the independent 
mathematical reality it represents (insofar as the formalism is interpreted as 
representing, as opposed to creating reality). 
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Interpreting Godel's as an overtly philosophical realism, though, involves more 
than simply arguing that his discourses can be read as 'philosophic'. I give an 
interpretation of Godel's realism whereby the possibility of meaning itself 
depends on the existence of an independently existing mathematical realm, and 
meaning is bound to that realm, rather than to the realm of our understanding. 
Using this framework to further explore Godel's ideas helps to establish the 
importance of an external ground for mathematical realism, and to highlight its 
potential benefits. 
Chapter Three 
Chapter three begins with the supposition that one of the benefits of the realist's 
idea of an external ground for mathematics is in the ability of a ground, via 
some sort of reference to that ground, to provide a sort of 'first cause' or reason 
for the existence of mathematics itself (or, mathematics as we understand it -
a.k.a. mathematical formalisms). 
Initially dubbed 'non-arbitrariness', this benefit or trait of realism is more fully 
articulated via the framework Godel provides in his [1995a] wherein the idea 
that realist accounts are a 'representation of a system of truths' is taken to be 
one of their 'essential strengths'. This idea, interpreted according to the schema 
Godel outlines, itself entails that the mathematical reality posited (in those 
accounts possessing this 'essential strength') is, at least to some degree, 
independent - or other than - what we comprehend. And this independence in 
turn entails a specific problem for these accounts: the problem of justifying the 
claim that the fundamental axioms - indeed of any part of mathematics we wish 
to call true and correct - embodies this independent reality. 
Thus, the provision of a ground and the problems presented by the provision of 
a ground (otherwise known as the problem of justification - this problem is more 
fully articulated in the final chapters), taken together provide an interpretation of 
'non-arbitrariness' in realist accounts. 
Arbitrariness, on the other hand, is defined as a corresponding 'groundlessness' 
and perceived lack of any problem of justification. That is - arbitrariness is the 
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perceived absence of the need to justify mathematical claims by connecting 
mathematics as we know it with any 'other' sort of reality, independent of that 
which we comprehend. 
The trait of arbitrariness is then compared with that of 'piecemealness', defined 
according to Zaita and Linsky [1995]. This comparison is designed to show that 
while the traditional platonist and my own realist accounts may suffer from 
piecemealness, they do not suffer from arbitrariness. Which of course leads to 
the question: which is worse? I argue that the trait of non-arbitrariness at the 
very least mitigates the problems presented by the trait of piecemealness - and 
so conclude that it is worse to be arbitrary than piecemeal. 
Non-arbitrariness not only ensures the presence of the problem of justification; it 
also has ramifications for a realist theory of meaning, the presentation of which 
is begun in the previous chapter and elaborated in more detail in the second 
section. To show this, I argue that the difference between a meaningful and a 
meaningless mathematical formalism, for the realist, is a corresponding provision 
or lack of a ground, and that it is in the ground itself that meaning 'resides' 
(rather than in the formalisms, or in 'mathematics itself). 
As a result, none of the means that we possess of accessing or describing a 
mathematical object can, taken alone, account for a meaningful, correct, 
mathematical formalism. That is, when both meaning and reality are taken to be 
fully independent of us, only the identification of formalism with an outside 
ground can provide us with such a thing as a meaningful mathematical 
formalism. (Of course, some other relationship between us and what is 
independent of us might also provide us with a meaningful mathematical 
formalism, but I proceed on the assumption that all other relationships must 
surely provide a more tenuous link than identification). 
Enlarging upon the work of the previous chapter, the nature of this identification 
is presented, in this chapter, as analogous to Husserl's 'filled intention'. This 
particular analogy is employed in order to capture the idea that the independent 
ground is necessarily present {and existent), before mathematics can be 
meaningful (at least for the realist I am proposing). 
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One problem with this analogy is its implication that the independent reality 
(outside our comprehension) and the mathematical formalism (within our 
comprehension) are precisely one and the same, or interchangeable. But a 
realist agreeing with this implication would look no different than a constructivist 
claiming, say, that what we comprehend determines what is. 
In an attempt to discover just what needs to be retained in order for the realist 
to avoid the foregoing scenario, the traits 'arbitrariness' and 'non-arbitrariness' 
are further examined. Defining the latter as 'relevance', I argue that arbitrariness 
is associated with self-reference, and relevance is associated with reference to 
an 'other'. I then argue that, at least for the realist, meaningful mathematics 
depends not only on the existence of an other, but also to reference to this 
other. Whereas for the constructivist or, more generally, for those accounts that 
privilege what we comprehend over what is outside our comprehension, reality 
depends on the comprehended formalism (what is is just whatever it is that we 
comprehend). 
Therefore, the dependence on there being an 'other' and the privileging of this 
other over internal concerns (or over that which we comprehend) is crucial to 
the realist. It is this factor or desideratum that has to be maintained against - or 
kept in tension with - the identification of mathematical formalisms with 
independent mathematical reality, i.e. of what is internal (to humanity) with 
what is external (always other than humanity). 
The remainder of the chapter is taken up with a comparison between two kinds 
of principled platonism - ZaIta and Linsky's, and my own. The latter is the initial 
attempt to formulate the problem of incorporating an independent reality in a 
philosophy of mathematics. This amounts to the problem of how to include both 
the possibility of identifying what we comprehend with this 'other', and the 
principle that this 'other' remains always different from what we comprehend. 
This problem is examined and developed in greater depth in the final three 
chapters. 
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Chapter Four 
This chapter looks at one framework in which the problems surrounding realism 
and anti-realism in mathematics are commonly understood, and compares this 
framework with my own ( as it has thus far developed throughout the foregoing 
chapters). 
The former framework is utilised in Folina's work to set up and identify the 
problems and the strengths associated with realism and constructivism. It 
revolves around the gap (or lack of a gap, in the case of constructivism) 
between what the facts are and what we take them to be. 
There is an implication in this division that meaning is associated with 'what we 
take the facts to be', and that the main problem for the realist is to overcome 
the gap between a meaningful mathematical statement or formalism, and the 
independent mathematical reality 'meant' by that formalism. 
The Godel-inspired schema set up in previous chapters is presented in this 
chapter as an alternative framework in which to express the strengths and 
weaknesses of realist and constructive accounts. 
Meaning, on the Godel-inspired framework, is associated with the independent 
realm, rather than with what we understand. As a result, the main problem for 
realism is the justification of the presumption that mathematical formalisms are 
indeed meaningful. The realist (according to this framework) presumes that 
mathematics is justified. The 'problem of justification' referred to earlier, then, is 
best understood as the recognition or demonstration of this presumption, not its 
establishment. 
The main problem presented by Folina's initial framework is addressed well by 
her own Poincare-inspired account. The problems I see as still remaining for her 
account are comparable to those remaining for my own - with the exception 
that her account is less able than my own to accommodate the notion of an 
independent other. This is not something she specifically sets out to do, nor is 
her account supposed to be realist (although it is supposed to incorporate realist 
strengths). 
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I show, minimally, that her account is not more fruitful than my own, nor more 
effective in answering the questions raised by the initial framework around 
which it is formed. That is, as the final few chapters all help to show, Folina's 
(and indeed almost any) account remains as problematic as the traditional 
realism outlined in its initial framework. And since Folina's initial set-up embodies 
the common if not predominant terms of reference for accounts and solutions 
offered across the spectrum of realist and anti-realist concerns, it is a point 
worth noting. 
From a certain angle, weighing Folina's Poincarean account against my own 
ultimately means choosing between two different mysteries - the mystery of an 
independent 'other' and the mystery of the Poincarean intuitions. This is the 
case, more or less, for each account I address. The mysteries inherent in these 
accounts often do more epistemological work than the mystery of an 
independent other. But just so long as that work involves an attempt to 
maintain, incorporate, even simply gesture toward, or indicate that 'other', I 
believe it will always encounter in the final analysis a conundrum as deep as the 
one I propose. This alone is a reason to retain an overt, fundamental expression 
of the presence of just such an other, since you might as well gain all of its 
benefits if you are going to have to carry all of its problems. 
There is, though, another angle from which to view Folina's account. Hers is a 
transcendental account and, as such, can be interpreted as answering the 
problem of access in a way that leaves room for the notion of a transcendent 
reality that produces or is at least partially responsible for the way we are (or for 
the pre-conditions of a finite thinking being). This means it goes somewhat 
further toward an inclusion of a fully independent/mysterious 'other' than most 
middle road or realist accounts. A transcendental approach can be thought of as 
taking us up to the border of'the other', but then leaving us there. On the other 
hand, a phenomenological approach - one general heading under which my own 
account falls - can be thought of more positively, as an illustration of what 
occurs or might occur if indeed there were a relationship between us and it - or, 
in other words, if indeed we could see/access what is not us. 
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Part 2 
My own account is an attempt to show that there are relationships that hold 
between three things: the word (the recognisable physical mark or symbol), the 
word's sense (what the word means - this is also called 'the formalism*) and the 
independent other (the independent object - also called the independent 
mathematical object, or reality). I offer a model that draws together these three 
factors (over two levels), and leaves room for the 'other', without the pitfalls of 
representation and with the full expression of the desiderata listed. For a graphical 
representation of a more detailed version of this model, see the diagram on page 
136 of this text. 
Chapter Five 
I begin by outlining an approach to the classical problems that realism faces 
which, initially at least, sets those problems aside in favour of a thorough 
examination of the similarities between physical and abstract objects. Particularly 
I focus on the notion that our understanding of mathematical formalisms 
depends on the presence of the relevant mathematical objects themselves, and 
our reception of that presence. I contend that although this idea is generally less 
contentious when applied to physical objects than to abstract objects, it is 
equally applicable to both. 
I defend this contention through ideas inspired by Husserl's phenomenology. 
The way I understand it, phenomenology's starting point is with the idea that 
there is an 'other'. Indeed its main focus is the complex and intricate nature of 
the relationship between that other and ourselves. Specifically, Husserl studied 
the way in which the 'real world' of ordinary material things is given to 
consciousness as existing. I utilise this idea and couple it with the more Fregean 
(or analytic) optimism that indeed such objects do exist. I then propose that real 
(or successful) understanding depends on (at least) two things: (1) the 
assumption of an object whose existence is independent of our understanding 
and (2) the accuracy of that assumption. I argue that phenomenology opens up 
the possibility of studying the existence assumption itself, and so can provide a 
means by which to show the second of the two requirements above. My 
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account, then, incorporates an assumption that there are independent objects 
and studies this assumption via phenomenology in order to illustrate the nature 
of the assumption itself, the reasonableness of that assumption and, finally, to 
express just what such an assumption would look like if indeed it were accurate. 
In other words, there is on one level a relationship between what we understand 
and the assumed existing object. But exploring the nature of the independent 
object's existence further yields another relationship on another level between 
the assumed existing object and the independent, actual existing object. This is 
a deeper expression of the three factors between which I seek to draw 
identities: 'the word' (our understanding), 'the word's sense' (the 
formalism/what we understand) and 'the independent other' (which is and is not 
the 'other' itself). I propose that successful understanding takes place when our 
understanding of a thing is ultimately identical to the thing itself, just because 
the thing itself is identical to the assumed existing thing itself that we 
understand. 
The phenomenological framework wherein these identities are studied in more 
detail offers yet another name for 'the thing we understand' - the noemata 
(a.k.a. 'the formalism*). 'The word'/'our understanding' is known as noesis. My 
proposal consists of the notion that the first relationship above depends on the 
second. That is, (in phenomenological terms) the relationship between noemata 
and noesis depends (for its accuracy, but also even for its existence) on there 
being a prior relationship between noemata and the independent object. As I 
have suggested, this notion (of the dependence of 'real' understanding on the 
relevant object's real existence) is, perhaps, more in accordance with Frege than 
with Husserl. But the theory of meaning I go on to express is distinctly un-
Fregean. Specifically, I contend that it is impossible to have sense without 
reference (so long as 'sense' and 'reference' are able to be aligned with 
'formalism' and 'independent objecf). 
Chapter Six 
Chapter six outlines a theory of meaning according to which meaning is 
inextricable from the realm of independent objects. The theory is that the 
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existence of an independent object (or realm) is a necessary pre-condition for 
the meaningfulness of anything we say or even think about that realm. The 
definition of inextricability demonstrates how meaning can be understood as 
objective, by showing how it depends on the independent reality itself being 
present. The definition also explicates the productive nature of that independent 
reality. For instance, a scenario is provided in order to demonstrate how an 
independent reality can produce meaning. The notion that an independent 
reality produces mathematics derives from the idea that mathematical meaning 
in particular cannot exist without it. 
The theory, in general terms, is as follows. 'Natural' or 'real' meaning is 
inextricable from independent reality. The notion of inextricability encompasses 
the notion that there is an independent reality which produces mathematical 
formalisms. More precisely, mathematical formalisms cannot exist without a prior 
presence, or an origin - an original productive act. The formalism in turn 
produces our understanding (it gives us something to understand). When we 
understand correctly, then what we understand /swhat the formalism means, 
and what the formalism means /sthe relevant independent object or reality. 
I also try to show what 'meaningless' mathematics would look like according to 
my theory - that is, the real or natural meaning of a mathematical formalism is 
contrasted with its 'shallow' or workable meaning. This accommodates the 
notion that a mathematical formalism's objective (real or natural) meaning need 
not be recognised as such. Importantly, this allows that widely accepted 
mathematical meanings of mathematical formalisms do 'get it right', regardless 
of any theories of meaning. That is, my own expression of the presumption that 
mathematics is correct most of the time holds that mathematical formalisms do 
indeed have objective meaning, since their objects do in fact exist 
independently, and are themselves what is meant. 
So, what we understand, what we take as the meaning of a mathematical 
formalism, what we believe is the relevant object and what in fact is the object -
the independent 'other' embodied by the formalism - all can be the same thing 
and most of the time they are. But, so long as the idea of an 'other' is to be 
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preserved at all, and so long as the notion that it is this 'other' upon which real 
meaning depends, then our understanding, the meaning and the independent 
object, must remain separable. The final chapter deals with this apparent 
paradox. The strategy there is twofold. First, I attempt to make some sense of 
the paradox and second, I argue that regardless of whether or not it makes any 
sense, the paradox itself is just as much an integral part of the realist's 
philosophy as the idea of an independent reality. It cannot be overcome without 
the loss of the realist notion of an independent reality. In short, in order to 
accommodate the idea of an 'other* in a mathematical realist account, one must 
accommodate this paradox. 
Chapter Seven 
The final chapter focuses on the notion of independence and on presenting a 
realist philosophy of mathematics able to express and encompass that notion. I 
show that any realism that at the outset includes the idea of an independent 
reality that we can and do know, must at some stage encounter the paradox 
above. More specifically, I give an account holding that there is an independent 
realm whose reality is at least as robust as the physical world's, and holding that 
mathematics is mostly correct, and that correct mathematics is the result of our 
being able to access this realm. I then argue that such an account is posing a 
problem of justification (the problem of justifying the claim to 'know' 
mathematics) and that such an account will at least encounter, if not find itself 
committed to, the following: that the mathematical reality that we do see or 
comprehend can itself be said to be identical with independent mathematical 
reality just in case the independent reality is not the thing we see or 
comprehend. 
I attempt to describe this paradox in more detail in order to show that it is, if not 
completely within our grasp, comprehensible to some degree. I believe that 
some of Husserl's ideas enable just such a description. That is, phenomenology 
provides a single conceptual framework wherein both ends of the paradox can 
be expressed. This does not mean that the paradox is reconciled within that 
framework, but the fact that one account can naturally and comprehensibly deal 
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with both of its ends is important, and goes some way to providing a way to 
accept that the paradox has a definite role in any discussion of mathematical 
realism. 
Simply and informally put, I take Husserl as saying something like, 'we cannot 
know what's outside of our comprehension, therefore we cannot know what's 
independent or 'other' than us ... but here's how we do'. Or, in other words, 
phenomenology provides a picture of just how things would look if we could 
know the fundamentally unknowable and that picture correlates well with our 
real experience of the world and its phenomena. 
I argue that the paradox and Husserl's accommodation of it provide the best 
description of exactly what it is that the realist is committed to by holding that 
we can 'get it right' (that mathematics is correct and true) and that the reality 
posited is independent. And so long as the realist wants to argue that 
mathematical reality is always something different from us and our constructs, 
but that this fact does not rule out the possibility of our being able to see or 
access that reality, then he needs some way of accommodating the paradox 
above. 
I accept the paradox but, at the same time, I argue the following: (1) that the 
paradox is at least as good an explanation of our relationship to mathematical 
objects as any posited in a philosophy of mathematics so far; (2) that the 
explanation the paradox provides is tenable or workable; and (3) that accepting 
the paradox improves our understanding of that relationship. This last point just 
says that the paradox, though contradictory, is not so far-fetched that we cannot 
imagine a scenario where both its claims are true. Indeed that scenario is the 
proposed (phenomenological) 'solution' I put forward. 
I argue for (1) using Derrida's arguments to the effect that philosophy in general 
is no further ahead on the problems posed than my own particular stance. That 
is, Derrida's arguments show that all philosophies, so long as they share certain 
features - in particular, the idea of a 'ground' - can get no further in describing 
our relationship with mathematical reality than an open acceptance of the 
paradox above. 
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Addressing (2), I argue that phenomenology, as an account of our relationship 
to pure phenomena, accommodates the mysteriousness of an 'other' while at 
the same time tells a story as to how our perception or understanding can 
access this mystery. That is, phenomenology embraces the paradox, refines it, 
and makes it 'work' as a solution to the problem posed. The solution is not a 
resolution. In the end, the answer I put forward to the problem of justification is 
that it must remain unresolved. The claims that generate the problem need to 
remain in tension with one another because they cannot be reconciled without 
being undermined. The 'solution', then, is to describe what we and the world 
would be like if the paradox accurately encapsulated our real experience with 
regard to the independent 'other' that is mathematical reality. 
Point (3) is not directly defended. Whether or not my analysis of the paradox 
takes us further than simply ignoring it or attempting to obliterate it, is left up to 
the reader to judge. 
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1. Independence and Justification 
1.1. Introduction 
In his introduction to Shapiro [1997], Stewart Shapiro outlines a number of 
desiderata for his work. These begin with the statement that mathematical 
assertions ought to be taken literally, that is "at face value" (p. 3). Shapiro says 
that his first desideratum suggests realism in mathematics for two reasons. The 
first of these reasons is that mathematical assertions tend to talk about 
mathematical objects as though they exist. The second is that scientific assertions 
tend to talk about scientific objects as though they exist, and scientific language is 
effectively inseparable from mathematical language. Specifically since model 
theoretic semantics applies to ordinary and scientific language, this same model 
theoretic semantics ought to apply to mathematical language. 
This means that the initial desideratum boils down for Shapiro to two separate 
desiderata. The first - realism in ontology - arises from the fact that model 
theoretic semantics has the singular terms of its language denoting objects and the 
variables ranging over a domain of discourse. Taking mathematics at face value 
then, means taking mathematical objects to exist. The second separate 
desideratum - realism in truth-value - arises from the fact that the model theoretic 
framework attributes each well-formed, meaningful sentence with a determinate 
and non-vacuous truth-value, either true or false. Thus the primary requirement 
that Shapiro places on his own account is "to develop an epistemology for 
mathematics while maintaining the ontological and semantic commitments [above]" 
(p. 4). He seeks to fulfil this requirement both negatively and positively. 
1.2. The Equivalence Solution 
On the negative side he argues against what he sees as the best of the anti-realist 
programs - those that seek to explain most of mathematics as it stands. His 
primary claim against these programs is that they involve at least as much of the 
epistemic and semantic problems involved in realism: 
In a sense the problems are equivalent - for example, a common manoeuvre today is to 
introduce a 'primitive' such as a modal operator, in order to reduce ontology. The 
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proposal is to trade ontology for ideology. However in the context at hand -
mathematics - the ideology introduces epistemic problems quite in line with the 
problems with realism. The epistemic difficulties with realism are generated by the 
richness of mathematics itself (p. 5). 
In turn, I argue in what follows that the difficulties generated by this argument are 
greater than the difficulties generated by a more traditional platonism. The burden 
on the latter is to show how we can know anything about an abstract, eternal, 
acausal realm of real, existing mathematical objects. The burden on the fomrier, 
however, is to show how the burden associated with the existence posited for 
mathematical objects in realism is any greater, or indeed in the final analysis, any 
different, than that which I will argue ought to be associated with the non-
existence posited for mathematical objects in anti-realism. What I will show, in the 
following, is that denying the existence of mathematical objects requires as least as 
much philosophical justification as asserting it. 
1.3. The Caesar Problem 
Another of Shapiro's main (negative) arguments is his argument that the 'Caesar 
problem' is not a real problem for mathematical realism. In short, the Caesar 
problem poses the question: precisely what are the real or original objects of 
mathematics and how can these be identified? Specifically, how can numbers be 
distinguished from any other kinds of object, such as the object that is Julius 
Caesar? Since there is no 'in principle' way of deciding between the various 
candidates, it is tempting to conclude with Benacerraf (see Benacerraf [1965]) that 
the singular terms of mathematical language do not denote objects at all, at least 
nothing akin to ordinary or scientific objects. Shapiro ([1997]) argues that the 
acceptability of this conclusion "depends on what it is to be an object... on what 
sort of questions can be legitimately asked about objects and what sort of 
questions have determinate answers waiting to be discovered" (p. 5). 
Shapiro's argument says that there is no real fact determining the matter of 
whether the places of a structure and other objects, or whether the places of two 
different structures, are identifiable. According to Shapiro, the only questions of 
identity with a determinate answer are those asked within the context of the single 
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structure. That is, there is no determinate answer to the question 'is the 2 of the 
natural numbers identifiable with the 2 of the real numbers?' but there is a 
determinate answer to the question 'is the 2 of the natural numbers identifiable 
with the 4 of the natural numbers?' So whether or not the places of the natural 
number structure exist as objects in the universe, or existed as objects before we 
identified them as such, is for Shapiro a non-question. 
This has the consequence that our identification or 'discovery' of mathematical 
structures may or may not be a discovery or identification of objects that existed 
previous to whatever procedure enabled the discovery or identification itself. I 
argue that this means that the structures of Shapiro's structuralism are at worst 
entirely new objects whose existence depends on the various epistemic routes by 
which they are encountered, and at best, are unable to be identified with any 
unique realm of real, pre-existing mathematical objects. I also argue that this 
means that the notion (desirable for the realist) that dependence of mathematical 
truth, proof, coherence, etc. depends on mathematical reality cannot properly be 
incorporated into Shapiro's account. 
It should be noted, though, that Shapiro himself does not seem to see this as a 
problem. Rather, he aligns his program with Putnam's internal realism wherein "the 
notions of object and existence are not treated as sacrosanct, as having just one 
possible use" (p. 128, quoting Putnam). 
1.4. The Response 
In sum, in this chapter, I will be looking at Shapiro's structuralism as a version of 
mathematical realism. I will argue that, although Shapiro's account does address 
the problem of how we come to know what we know when we do mathematics, it 
does so at the expense of a clear, specific account of the sort of reality that 
mathematics is about. In particular, it remains unclear just what structures are and 
how such things can be said to occupy a place in the realm of independent, 
objective reality. 
Specifically, I will argue that the sort of independence that Shapiro attributes to his 
structures - i.e. the 'ante rem' existence of structures - does, in the end, little 
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explanatory or practical work. That is, the 'ante rem' existence Shapiro attributes to 
structures is too vague or too weak a notion to serve the realist aims he seems to 
want it to serve. I suggest that the problems with Shapiro's 'ante rem' structures 
derive in part from his rejection of a single fixed mathematical universe and in part 
from the lack of support his account offers for the strong notion of independence 
that he initially appears to favour. 
In particular, the notion of 'ante rem' existence does not settle traditional realist 
problems, such as the various offshoots of Benacerrafs problem. As we saw above, 
these most notably include problems of reference and correctness: for instance, the 
problem of showing that mathematical names and formalisms correctly correspond 
to or 'pick out' their genuine counterparts in the independently existing 
mathematical realm, if these counterparts are indeed independent of their 
instances. 
I also argue that Shapiro's 'ante rem' existence for structures does not, in the end, 
defend the idea commonly held by realist mathematicians, that there is a 
determinate yes or no answer to mathematical questions and unproven 
mathematical theories. 
1.5. Strong Ante Rem Independence 
Structuralism is often summed up with the phrase 'mathematics is the science of 
structures'. According to the structuralist (Shapiro [1997]), what we study when we 
do mathematics are structures: "the abstract form(s) of... system(s) ... [where a 
system is] a collection of objects with certain relations" (pp. 73-74). 
Shapiro reworks the structuralist slogan 'that mathematical objects are places in 
structures'. He points out that there is an intuitive difference between an object 
and the place or space it occupies. There are, then, two separate items to consider 
- places in structures, and objects that occupy those places. 
In Shapiro's account, an object is an 'office-holder', and the place in a structure 
that object might occupy is an office. According to Shapiro, the intuition that these 
are indeed two separate items boils down to a distinction in linguistic practice. 
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There are, he says, two different ways of talking about structures and their places, 
depending on where (or on what) your focus lies. 
When your focus is on the exemplifications of a structure - that is, on the things 
that occupy its places - you speak as though there is a collection of things that can 
occupy or exemplify the places of that structure. This is Shapiro's 'places-are-
offices' perspective. To take Shapiro's examples, we might focus on the objects -
people in this case - that occupy the places of the structure of a baseball team. A 
comment that "the shortstop today was the second baseman yesterday" would be 
made from this perspective. Also from the 'places-are-offices' perspective, we could 
focus on the possible occupants of the structure of government, and note that "the 
current vice president is more intelligent than his predecessor". The idea that the 
Von-Neumann 2 has one more element than the Zermelo 2 is likewise a concept 
arising from the 'places-are-offices' perspective (all quotations from p. 82). 
On the other hand, from the 'places-are-objects' perspective, statements are about 
structures as such, independent of any of their exemplifications (p. 83). To take 
Shapiro's examples again: "we say that the vice president is the president of the 
senate, [or] that the chess bishop moves on a diagonal" (p. 83). 
In sum, the domain of discourse from the 'places-are-offices' perspective is the 
objects or things that occupy the places of a structure, whereas the domain of 
discourse from the 'places-are-objects' perspective is the places themselves, of a 
given structure. 
For Shapiro, the slogan that mathematical objects are places in structures is to be 
interpreted from this latter perspective. So that when the structuralist says that 
sets are objects, he means that each place in the set theoretic structure is an 
object - at least grammatically and at most literally. 
Arithmetic, then, is about the natural number structure, and its domain of discourse 
consists of the places in this structure, treated from the 'places-are-objects' 
perspective. The same goes for the other non-algebraic fields, such as real and 
complex analysis, Euclidean geometry, and perhaps set theory (p. 89). 
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The above distinction is important to Shapiro's account for a number of reasons, 
one of which is the articulation of his particular realism, particularly to his claim that 
structures are 'ante rem'. That is, Shapiro's realism takes the 'places-are-offices' 
perspective literally. For Shapiro, "bona fide singular terms, like 'Vice-President', 
'short-stop', and '2', denote bona fide objects" (p. 83). 
Likewise, for Shapiro: 
structures exist whether or not they are exemplified in a nonstructural realm. On this 
[interpretation] statements in the 'places-are-objects' mode are taken literally, at face 
value. In mathematics, anyway, the places of mathematical structures are as bona fide 
as any objects are (p. 89). 
Another reason that this particular distinction is important to Shapiro's account is 
that he sees it as enabling his program both to commit to numbers as objects, and 
to resolve (or, more accurately, to resign) Frege's 'Caesar problem' via ontological, 
specifically interstructural relativity. 
This second reason will be dealt with in some depth later, but is worth touching 
upon now. Recall that, in a nutshell, the Caesar problem asks how numbers can be 
objects (as Frege argued they were) when it seems that there is no way in principle 
of distinguishing between numbers and any other kind of object. How, for instance, 
can we tell that the object '2 ' is the same or different to the object 'Julius Caesar' 
(p. 78)? 
Shapiro's solution uses the distinction between the 'places-are-offices' and the 
'places-are-objects' perspectives by arguing that each perspective creates its own 
context for these kinds of identity questions, and it is only within the confines of 
one of these contexts at any one time that such questions can even make sense. 
For instance, we may ask, from the 'places-are-objects' perspective, whether or not 
the object '2 ' is the same or different from the object '4'. And because this question 
is asked within the confines of only one of the two possible perspectives, we may 
expect to discover a definite answer. It is determinate, Shapiro argues, that '2' is 
identical to '2 ' and not to '4'. But he adds: 
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it makes no sense to pursue the identity between a place in the natural number 
structure and some other object, expecting there to be a fact of the matter. Identity 
between natural numbers is determinate; identity between numbers and other sorts of 
objects is not, and neither is identity between numbers and the positions of other 
structures (p. 79). 
According to Shapiro, these latter questions, rather than staying within the confines 
of only one or the other of the two perspectives, commit the error of taking both 
perspectives at once - that is, of trying to compare their different foci within one 
question. 
Asking whether "the shortstop is Ozzie Smith" (p. 79) commits a similar mixing of 
perspectives, or crossing of contexts, and is therefore deemed by Shapiro to be a 
non-sensical question. He argues that in this case the person and the position share 
no criteria by which to establish or reject their identity. Of course, Ozzie Smith can 
take the position of shortstop, and so in this sense, 'be' that position, but according 
to Shapiro, this is not a question of identity. And it is in just this same way - that 
Ozzie Smith can be the shortstop, but can neither be nor not be identical to the 
shortstop - that Julius Caesar can be '2', but is neither identical nor non-identical to 
'2'. Shapiro's solution to the Caesar problem, then, is to ban the question it asks. 
Questions of identity like these, that mix perspectives, "do not have definitive 
answers, and they do not need them" (p. 80). 
This solution though, in order to be consistent, has to apply to questions of identity 
between different structures as well. This is because the places of one structure 
can be the place holders of another, in the same way that Ozzie Smith can be the 
shortstop. I will be arguing (later) that it is this particular application of his general 
ban on mixing perspectives that threatens Shapiro's overall solution to the Caesar 
problem. To anticipate, I believe that there is something intuitively quite different 
between asking if Julius Caesar is identical to 2 and asking whether or not the 2 of 
the natural number structure is identical to the 2 of the real number structure. This 
latter sort of question is not so easily dismissed as non-sensical, or wholly 
indeterminate. 
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The important point for now though is that, from what we have looked at so far, it 
can be argued that the nature or degree of independence that Shapiro wants for 
structures is a significant one. For Shapiro, taking the 'places-are-offices' 
perspective literally means that structures exist before and apart from any non-
structural exemplification in any realm whatsoever (p. 75). This could mean a 
couple of different things. It might mean that the existence of structures is an 
existence that is independent of the theories - mathematical or otherwise - that we 
have about them. It might also mean that their existence is independent of both 
the act (since they exist before exemplification) and objects (since they exist apart 
from any exemplification) of our comprehension or understanding. 
The benefits of an ante rem structuralism, Shapiro believes, include "[the fact that 
this kind of structuralism is] the most perspicuous and least artificial... It comes 
closest to capturing how mathematical theories are conceived" (p. 90). I agree with 
this claim only provided that by 'ante rem structuralism', Shapiro means a 
structuralism which includes both degrees of independence given above. 
Even if this proviso is granted, though, and we conclude that the most perspicuous 
structuralism posits structures with this degree of independence, there still remains 
the question of how to accommodate this degree of independence in a structuralist 
account. This question will arise again later. First, I will further consider the 
evidence in support of the idea that Shapiro cfoesmean to include this degree of 
independence for the structures in his account. 
1.6. Ante Rem vs. In Re 
When he considers the possible status of mathematical structures, Shapiro 
distinguishes his 'ante rem' stance from an 'in re' realism regarding structures. The 
former stance, he says, takes structures as "exist[ing] prior to and independent of 
any items that may instantiate them" (p. 84). The latter, by contrast, takes 
structures to be no more than a generalisation of those items. So, according to 'in 
re' realism, structures exist only as a result of their instances (specifically of the fact 
that those instances can be generalised). 
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Dummet's characterisation, and the fact that Shapiro reproduces it in order to help 
explain his 'ante rem' realism, is also useful here. Dummet's 'mystical structuralism' 
(congruent to Shapiro's 'ante rem' structuralism) distinguishes structures by what 
they are not; none of a structure's extrinsic instances or properties are what the 
structure itself is. Nor are they part of it. The structure is independent because it is 
not dependent on anything, not even on likely candidates such as sets or numbers. 
By contrast, Dummet's 'hard headed' structuralism (congruent to Shapiro's 'in re' 
structuralism) identifies a structure as the common element of all its systems (p. 
85). 
So, the fact that Shapiro aligns his ante rem structuralism with Dummet's 'mystical 
structuralism' gives support to the idea that the independence he envisaged for 
those structures (at least at this stage) was a significant one. Indeed, Dummet's 
characterisation gives 'mystical/ante rem' structures complete independence from 
any of the ways we presumably come to know or 'see' them: i.e. via their extrinsic 
instances and properties. This suggests that Shapiro's structures presupposed to 
be independent of the acts and objects of our comprehension. 
1.7. Not So Strong Independence / The Equivalence Solution 
It could, however, be argued that the nature and degree of independence that 
Shapiro wants for his structures is not the sort of strong independence outlined 
above. Perhaps the independence he ascribes is not even supposed to be as strong 
as that which we usually ascribe to ordinary physical reality. This might be thought 
to be the case (or alternatively, it may be argued that Shapiro can no longer defend 
the strong ante rem stance he begins with) especially given chapter seven of 
Shapiro [1997]. In this chapter, Shapiro seeks to establish that an anti-realist who 
proposes to avoid a commitment to the existence of abstract objects such as sets 
or structures is ultimately no better off - particularly on the epistemic front - than a 
realist who embraces the notion that such objects actually exist. 
In so far as it challenges the anti-realist notion that mathematics is about no more 
than linguistic or logical notions we are already familiar with, this line of thought is 
a powerful tool for the realist. But just so far as it challenges these anti-realist 
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notions, to that same extent it also jeopardises the realist's own proposed notion 
that mathematics is about an actual rather than a possible reality, especially any 
kind of non-derivative, or strongly independent realm. 
The argument that Shapiro puts forward begins by showing that the anti-realist 
programs he examines and the realist's commitment to real abstract objects are, in 
fact, equivalent. That is, he shows that "any insight that modalists [the particular 
group of anti-realists to whom Shapiro directs his argument] claim for their system 
can be immediately appropriated by realists and vice versa. Moreover, the 
epistemological problems get "translated" as well" (p. 219).^  
Very basically rendered, the argument compares a possible mathematical realm 
(one built from a plural quantifier, a contractibility quantifier, or an operator for 
logical possibility) with a real mathematical realm (of structures, individual objects, 
or simply an independent reality). This comparison shows that each is as 
problematic as the other. Given this situation, Shapiro concludes that we might as 
well opt for the real realm. This is primarily because this option minimises the 
'ideology' needed to explain the realm in question (given that a real realm takes 
mathematics at face value), is the 'most perspicuous and natural' interpretation 
and, not least, explains why mathematics is done as though it is about 
independently real objects. 
I accept Shapiro's arguments here, and take it as true that modal anti-realism 
(where 'modal anti-realism' encompasses all the programs Shapiro reviews) is, in 
an important sense, equivalent to ante rem structuralism. 
But Shapiro's argument shows more than this. After all, equivalence goes both 
ways. Unless something more than a reduced ideology sets it apart from its anti-
realist counterparts, ante rem structuralism inherits all the problems of modal anti-
realism, including, for example, the particular burden of explaining why 
mathematics can legitimately be taken at face value at all - how, for example, its 
objects are still as bona fide as any objects in the natural or physical world. And so, 
one of Shapiro's original desiderata is undermined. And these sorts of questions 
^ For a full account of this argument see Shapiro [1997, 216-242]. 
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mean that the realist camp now has to take on board precisely what Shapiro hoped 
to avoid - an increased ideology. 
So the proposed "trade off... between a vast ontology and an increased ideology" 
(p. 218) has more ramifications than are at first apparent. The trade-off does, as 
Shapiro claims, mean that any possible reality inherits all the problems of an actual 
reality, especially since a possible ontology is, in the end, no smaller or less 
problematic than its real counterpart. 
But the trade-off also means that a real or actual ontology is, for all intents and 
purposes, equivalent to a possible ontology - unless something extra sets the 
former apart from the latter - and so perhaps not as real as, say, physical reality. 
Certainly, it is not easy to see how such an actual reality is in any way independent 
- either of the constructed or possible reality it is equivalent to or, by extension, of 
the quantifiers and concepts from which a possible ontology is derived. We are 
almost back to square one. The reality ascribed to ante rem structures now appears 
to be no more solid or objective than the reality ascribed to their modal 
counterparts. If this is indeed the case then the realist now shares the anti-realist's 
burdens and makes little or no gain over the anti-realist on such issues as 
justification, objectivity and how mathematical statements can convincingly - that 
is, at least as convincingly as statements about the physical world - be said to be 
true or false. 
1.8. Independent Ante Rem Justification / Shapiro's Positive 
Approach to Realism 
After outlining his ante rem stance, Shapiro proposes a possible anti-realist 
response asking how we are justified in our beliefs about mathematical objects. In 
response to this question Shapiro ofl'ers the theory that we can, through physical 
perception, "recognise", "apprehend" and "attain knowledge of" abstract patterns -
hence also of abstract structures. Those structures not directly attainable through 
physical perception, he argues, "are in fact apprehended (but not perceived) by 
abstraction". Specifically, this theory says, "pattern recognition ... is a faculty ... 
leading to an apprehension of freestanding, ante rem structures" (all quotations p. 
113). 
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As it stands, though, even another realist might feel that there is something 
missing from this theory. Imagine a basic physical realism; suppose that this 
realism is simply the belief that the physical realm is real. Such a realist might hold 
that ordinary physical objects have an existence independent of our own - i.e. they 
exist prior to and separate from us, and so are not dependent on us. In order to 
justify our beliefs about these sorts of objects, such a realist needs to show (at 
least) that what we 'perceive' as physical reality is in fact, or in some sense, the 
same reality that existed prior to, or independent of our perception of it. Note that 
in order to show this, the 'what-is-perceived' and 'what-existed-prior-to-that-
perception' must (initially at least) be distinguishable from each other. If they are 
not distinguishable, then 'the tree I see' cannot, at some later stage, be shown to 
be identical to, or in any way the same as 'the tree that exists prior to and 
independently of my seeing it'. Yet this active, later identification is a necessary 
part of the justification Shapiro requires if his more perspicuous ante rem stance is 
to be maintained. Simply assuming that the 'what-is-perceived' and 'what-existed-
prior-to-that-perception' are the same thing from the beginning, with no initial 
distinction between them, begs the question of how our beliefs about this 
previously existing independent reality are justified. And this reasoning can be 
applied to Shapiro's theory above, simply because nothing distinguishes his 
'apprehended structure' from his 'independently existing structures'. 
Shapiro does give this problem some attention, specifically by imagining and 
answering another possible objection to his theory - this time of pattern 
recognition: 
Somewhere along the line anti-realists might concede that pattern recognition and the 
other psycholinguistic mechanisms lead to a belief'xn (perhaps ante rem) structures, and 
they may concede that we have an ability to coherently discuss these structures. But 
anti-realists will maintain that these mechanisms do not yield knowledge unless the 
structures (or at least their places) exist. Have we established this last, ontological 
claim? Can this be done without begging the question? 
... I present an account of the existence of structures according to which an ability to 
coherently discuss a structure is evidence that it exists ... This account is perspicuous 
and accounts for much of the 'data'- mathematical practice and common intuitions 
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about mathematical and ordinary objects. The argument for realism is an inference to 
the best explanation. The nature of structures guarantees that certain experiences count 
as evidence for their existence (p. 118). 
Again, it is not only an anti-realist who could object here, but a realist as well. 
Specifically, the realist along with the anti-realist, could note that certain 
mechanisms do lead to things that look like the proposed ante rem structures, but 
nothing about the mechanisms themselves can establish that these things are 
indeed what they appear to be: independent, previously existing structures. The 
mechanisms lead perhaps to a belief in Shapiro's ante rem structures but not 
necessarily to those structures themselves. Further, evidence that an abstracted or 
psycholinguistically apprehended structure exists is not evidence that the same 
structure existed prior to, or independently of, the mechanism that led us to believe 
in it. This evidence only supports the existence of the apprehendedsXxMfXwxe, and 
without reason to believe that the structure is ante rem, evidence for the existence 
of what we see - even if this evidence is the ability to coherently discuss the object 
of our perception - is not evidence for its existence independent, or prior to, our 
perception of it. Again, these two objects - the object of our perception and the 
independent object existing prior to our perception - need to be distinguished 
before they can be shown to be the same, similar or strictly identical. You cannot 
prove that two things are in fact one thing simply by assuming that they are. So it 
still seems that Shapiro's structures have a degree of independence which is in fact 
less than his initial ante rem stance suggests. 
Suppose, though, that we give up trying to maintain any initial separation between 
the two, and we do simply assume that the apprehended structure is one and the 
same as the independent structure. A question remains: in what sense is the 
yielded structure's existence something more than - above and beyond - the 
existence of the end result of the process of abstraction or psycholinguistic 
apprehension that yielded it? That is, does the idea of independent or prior 
existence attach naturally to the structures arrived at via abstraction? If so, how? 
What is it about the psycholinguistically yielded structures that makes it reasonable 
to ascribe independence or priority to their existence? 
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If this same question were applied to physical reality, one possible answer would 
be the apparent persistent existence of the objects when we close our eyes, walk 
away from them, etc. What sort of things can we say about abstract mathematical 
structures such that our experience of them gives evidence for their independence? 
There certainly are compelling features of mathematical reality we can appeal to 
that support the idea that it is independent and existed prior to our perception of it. 
The undeniable force of mathematical truth is one such feature. The point is that 
we can ask for this sort of evidence. And an appeal to our ability to discuss it 
coherently, by itself just doesn't seem to provide enough of the sort of evidence 
required for justification. And so the question remains. 
All this is just to say that it is reasonable to ask what sort of existence the 
apprehended structures can naturally or reasonably be said to have - given only 
what we do know and experience of them. That is, we can ask: does independent 
or prior existence sit naturally with the structures arrived at via abstraction? Or is 
such an ascription of independence, in this case, somehow ad hoc? 
1.9. The Natural/Least Artificial Attitude 
How, then, do we accommodate strongly independent ante rem structures in a 
relatively natural - i.e. in a 'non-ad hoc'- way? One way of judging whether the 
inclusion of this sort of independence is ad hoc or not, is to assess how well the 
proposed independence sits with the account overall. This can be done, first of all, 
by assessing whether or not the account has 'room' (or enough room) for this sort 
of independence and, if it does, by assessing whether this room provides 
comfortable or forced accommodation. 
But before thus assessing Shapiro's account, note that another occasion upon 
which a proposed independence might appear ad hoc is when its inclusion in an 
account is simply stipulated. I grant that a significant independence, such as 
Shapiro's ante rem structuralism involves, probably does have to be simply 
stipulated at some stage or other, if it is to be included in an account at all. 
Independence cannot, after all, be positively 'shown'. Generally, we establish that 
something is independent of something else by showing that it is not dependent on 
the something else, rather than by attempting to positively illustrate some inherent 
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independent nature it might have. Independence is 'arrived at' (insofar as it is 
'arrived at' at all) negatively, and so also by stipulation, rather than by proof. So the 
fact that something is simply stipulated in an account does not automatically render 
its inclusion ad hoc. I take it that we can suspect the idea of independence to be ad 
hoc when its setting (i.e. the rest of the account) renders its inclusion somehow 
unnatural or, at worst, if there is nothing in an account able to interpret or make 
some sense of such a stipulation. 
Now recall that, even if we agree with Shapiro's claim that the ability to discuss a 
structure coherently is itself evidence that that structure exists, the issue of the 
nature of that structure's existence still remains untouched. At best, all we have is 
evidence that an abstracted or psycholinguistically apprehended structure exists 
(independent or otherwise). But it remains unclear how fi^/s evidence supports the 
independentex\stence of that same abstracted structure. 
We can get some idea of how Shapiro regards this problem from his brief 
discussion of the ambiguity, inherent in his account, in the reference of numerals 
(and across mathematics in general). Shapiro points out that his structuralism 
entails that: 
'4', for example, denotes a place in the natural number structure, a finite cardinal 
structure, a finite ordinal structure, a place in the real number structure, a place in the 
integer structure, a place in the complex number structure and a place in the set 
theoretic hierarchy (p. 120). 
Now recall that for Shapiro, structures exist before and apart from any of their 
exemplifications. But if we take this to mean that for Shapiro there is an 
independent structure that existed before our denoting term '4' did, then it seems 
that the above ambiguity ought to be able to be resolved. That is, we ought to be 
able to say whether or not the denoting term '4' picks out that particular pre-
existing structure, or a place in that structure. 
1.10. The Caesar Problem Revisited 
This same problem can be approached from a number of different angles, and the 
Caesar problem is just one of these. In chapter four of [1997], Shapiro utilises 
42 
Robert Kraut's work, "Indiscernibility and Ontology", to provide an "epistemic route" 
to mathematical structures. Kraut considers an imaginary economist who speaks a 
version of impoverished English, a language that does not have the resources to 
distinguish between two people with the same income (p. 19). Where person P has 
the same income as person Q, anything that the speaker of this impoverished 
language can say about P applies equally to Q. That is, an interpreter of the 
economist's language could apply the Leibniz principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles that, for the economist, P=Q, since the two items cannot be 
distinguished. From the economist's point of view, they are treated as a single 
object. Shapiro gives the following scenario to illustrate: 
if the interpreter sees a certain woman [who earns $35,000 per annum], he might say 
(on behalf of the economist), "there is the $35,000." If a man with the same income 
walks by, the interpreter might remark, "There it is again." The economist herself might 
make the identification if she knows that the two are indiscernible and does not envision 
a framework for distinguishing them (p. 19). 
Even at this stage, there is a natural ambiguity that threatens to undermine any 
potential realist stance regarding the objects proposed. So long as the economist's 
'knowledge' that the two are indiscernible consists in her not being able to envision 
a framework in which they might be distinguished (in this case, the full background 
language, ordinary English), the object's existence could, in an important sense, be 
regarded as given by the language itself, or as prior to the existence of this 
particular language. This early ambiguity could be understood as highlighting the 
shortcomings of the Leibniz principle, specifically, the possibility that the principle 
by itself is not enough to establish true identity, i.e. objects that are able to be 
'taken as' one rather than two, are not necessarily one rather than two in point of 
fact. An alternative understanding of the ambiguity might simply be that an 
application of the principle that results in identity relations between things on this 
basis is, in fact, a /77/sapplication.^ 
Shapiro makes two points, both of which can be used to support the idea that an 
object's existence is given by the (object) language itself. First, he notes that 
Suggestion by Dominic Hyde. 
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"nothing is lost by interpreting [the economist's] language as about income levels 
and not people [such that] ... A singular term, like "the Jones woman", denotes an 
income level" (p. 20). But if we were presented with this interpretation alone, we'd 
have a free-standing language, without the history from which it evolved, and in 
this case something more than history is lost. Specifically, the missing history takes 
with it an item of evidence that the object's (or at least an object's) existence 
predated the language being used to refer to those objects. Indeed Shapiro agrees 
that the only way we can understand examples like Kraut's economist is by 
possessing the 'background language' ourselves. This same point applies to the 
mathematician and to the 'number-person' that Shapiro models on Kraut's example. 
(This latter is someone who speaks an impoverished version of English in which 
equinumerous collections of objects are indiscernible.) 
The second point Shapiro makes that appears to lend support to the idea that the 
object's existence arises from language, rather than the other way around, is the 
following: one way of understanding the thrust of the sub-languages examples, is 
through Frege's GrundlagenxeswW. (taken here from Coffa [1991]) that "a wide 
range of statements previously regarded as extralogical and involving an appeal to 
either empirical intuition (Mill) or to pure intuition (Kant) involved only reference to 
concepts" (p. 75). That is, 'number statements' make no sense so long as we try to 
understand them as being about objects, but they do make sense if we understand 
them as having a concept as their 'target'. Or, as Shapiro [1997] puts it: 
Suppose that our number-person looks at two decks of cards and we interpret him as 
saying "There is two". Then we assume that, at some level, the number-person knows 
that it is the decks and not the cards or the colours that are being counted. Nothing in 
the hunk of mass determines that it is 2, 104, or any other number for that matter. If 
the subject loses the use of sortals like "deck", he will not see the stuff as 2. To 
accomplish this feat, the subject must be aware of the decks and must distinguish the 
two decks from each other (pp. 20-21). 
Frege's point (according to Coffa [1991]) is that since it is only when the concept is 
determined that the number attribute is fixed, regarding the concept itself as the 
topic of the number statement is natural. But Frege was sensitive to the possibility 
that this idea introduced an ambiguity between understanding and acquaintance. 
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He not only addressed this possibility; he went to great pains to avoid it by drawing 
a sharp distinction between sense and the real world, pointing out that the things 
we understand, be they concepts, universals, properties or essences, are something 
altogether different from the 'real world'. That is, "He denied that understanding is 
a glorified form of'seeing' aimed at these entities...[His] point was that while 
understanding does involve "giving" the object in question, it need not necessarily 
be "given" in the mode of acquaintance" (p. 81). 
Contra-Frege, and in defence of structuralism, Shapiro offers what he argues is a 
better way to understand the Kraut sub-language examples; namely, that what 
they show us is that income levels, numbers etc, are 'places in structures'. (Recall 
Shapiro's distinction, in linguistic practice, between an object, an office holder; and 
a place in a structure, an office.) 
Although Shapiro acknowledges that the division between the places-are-offices 
perspective and the places-are-objects perspective is both relative and not sharp, 
its existence is nonetheless a crucial part of his structuralist interpretation of the 
sub-languages examples. This is because if the distinction is not drawn at some 
point, Shapiro's program becomes an eliminative program, whereby the 
places-are-objects perspective is reduced to the places-are-offices perspective -
specifically by calling the former a generalisation over the latter. It is purposely to 
avoid this scenario that Shapiro gives a direct stipulation that at some point the 
places-are-objects perspective has to be taken literally. The problem then becomes 
whether, given the rest of his account, this perspective indeed can be taken literally 
and, if it can, whether the simple stipulation that it has to be taken literally and so 
therefore will be, can satisfy a realist for whom independence is a basic desiderata. 
That is, we now have some way of judging whether the independence of Shapiro's 
structures is somehow ad hoc. Recall that a realist for whom independence is a 
fundamental part of their philosophy may feel that simply stipulating a principle of 
independence does not do justice nor account for its central role in realism. Far 
from being fundamental, independence when simply stipulated can remain 
undefended, unaccounted for, and so relegated to a secondary, ad hoc position. 
45 
To further clarify these points, I propose the following as a working definition of the 
terms used above. A fundamental principle of independence is one which entails 
(or, perhaps more correctly, is burdened with) the idea that the existence of 
mathematical language itself depends on the previous existence of mathematical 
objects. That is, the list of things we can literally 'make up' or imagine, depends on 
the list of things already in existence. Further, if there were not an external reality 
we could talk about (including ourselves), there would be no talking. The 
fundamental principle, then, says that mathematical objects are not things we could 
have imagined. They are not part of the list of things we could have talked about 
were they not in existence. Hence, our ability to speak of them - mathematical 
language itself - depends on their existence. By contrast, a secondary or 'ad hoc' 
principle of independence is one which (at least at its extreme end) entails that 
mathematical language 'gives' the existence of mathematical objects - this is the 
idea that language and reality (minus mathematical objects or reality) is or was 
enough to give rise to mathematics itself, or the idea that the existence of 
mathematical objects depends on the previous or sometimes simultaneous 
existence of mathematical language. At least, this is the concept of an 'ad hoc' 
principle at its extreme end. At its less extreme end, an ad hoc principle is one 
which is ambiguous between the extreme ad hoc and fundamental definitions. 
Suppose now that the independence sought is fundamental, and stipulated 
independence is consequently perceived as a problem. It is in the solution to this 
particular problem (i.e. the problem of stipulated independence) that a key 
difference between accounts such as Shapiro's, and accounts that run more along 
(what I have dubbed) Fregean lines, can be identified. 
A Fregean-type answer argues not only that the places-are-objects perspective can 
indeed be taken literally, but also that the stipulation that it oughtto be is neither 
simple nor ad hoc. This type of answer seeks to show that independence is 
fundamental in accordance with the definition above, and so can fulfil our proposed 
realist's desiderata. This type of answer represents (for our current purpose) a 
concerted efl'ort to retain the realist idea that the truth or falsity of mathematical 
statements in some way depends on the presence or absence of the corresponding 
object in mathematical reality. In what follows I will argue that the cost of this 
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effort - or the inescapable burden it entails - is the retention of the Caesar 
problem' (which is one reason for the dubbing of this sort of approach as 
'Fregean'). 
A Shapiro-type answer also argues that the places-are-objects perspective can be 
taken literally, but this type of answer makes a concerted effort to avoid the Caesar 
problem. What I hope to show is that avoiding the problem entails the loss of the 
proposed realist's desiderata above - i.e. the notion of independence as 
fundamental. 
1.11. The Fregean vs. the Shapiro approach 
Frege's original Caesar problem came about via his belief that the 'real world' 
comes to us already 6\y\ded up into separate elements: namely those elements that 
constitute a given claim's topic and determine its truth-value. 
Coffa [1991] illustrates the Fregean approach with the following example. Whether 
the claim: 
(A)The author of 'Waveriey' is tall 
is true or false depends entirely on whether a single object in the universe, namely 
Scott, has a single property, namely a certain height. The grammatical units: 
"the author of 'Waverley'" and 
"x is tall" 
are associated with the truth-relevant parts of the world, i.e. with those elements 
of the world that are the only ones relevant to the determination of whether what 
(A) says is true. That is, the grammatical units of a claim are associated with the 
elements that constitute its topic and determine its truth-value. 
The real world, then, includes all such elements: "all that we talk about when we 
don't talk about talking" (p. 80). 
These elements, according to Frege, are themselves what is meant by a given 
claim. That is, they are a given claim's 'significance' or 'meaning' (p. 80). 
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So, grammatical units, effectively or ineffectively, correctly or incorrectly, sort the 
world into those elements that matter and those that don't as far as the truth of a 
given claim is concerned. 
The following argument, also Coffa's, clarifies Frege's belief in an original, 
previously partitioned ontology (the real world), going on to show how this belief 
leads directly to the Caesar problem: 
All that is required for the purposes of communication or responsible discourse in 
general is that what we say be intelligible, and this has little to do with the possession of 
effective methods to identify either its referents or truth-values (p. 81). 
But, as Coffa observes, sense in Frege's account is nonetheless intimately related to 
the truth-value-relevant elements in the world. This, Coffa notes, is strongly 
suggested by a seldom-noticed fact: Frege took it as self-evident that the 
grammatical analysis appropriate to the study of sense coincides with the 
grammatical analysis appropriate to the study of meaning. The understanding of 
the sense of a sentence is not, for Frege, a holistic phenomenon but comes about 
through the understanding of the sense of its parts. 
Notice that there is, in principle, no reason the grammatical units that provide the 
building blocks of propositional sense should be the same that provide the truth-relevant 
features of the world, unless sense (and therefore understanding) are essentially a 
matter of doing something with those worldly units (p. 81). 
So, from the perspective of a Fregean approach, examples such as the Kraut sub-
language procedure produce claims capable of being 'true' or 'false', only\f the 
objects produced by such languages (indeed, by any singular term - which, for 
Frege, included numerals) are in some essential respect not new {this respect 
might be 'relevant to' or 'including something of the old, or original, ontology). 
For Frege, any language, including natural language, is capable of producing true 
claims only when it contains a device establishing a correlation, however 
ineffective, with objects of the original ontology - in this case, of the real world. 
That is, procedures such as Kraut's 'sub-language procedure', from the Fregean 
viewpoint would be capable of true claims only to the extent that they are capable 
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of establishing a link between the original elements of the real world and the 
elements 'produced' by that language. Indeed, for Frege (according to Coffa), it is 
only in this way that language can be seen as a means by which we understand 
claims concerning the objects language produces. 
So for Frege, whether or not our understanding is effective - that is, whether what 
we understand is capable of being true or false - depends upon the absence or 
presence of objects in the original ontology, the real world. Another way of putting 
this point is to say that our understanding depends on what is, and is not, the real 
world. I believe that this dependence of effective understanding on the existence of 
the relevant objects in the real world comes about directly as a result of Frege's (at 
least according to this interpretation) grasp and retention of the original realist 
intuitive notion of independence in a realist perspective. It is when the idea of a 
single fixed universe is retained that the problem of identifying all the items to be 
found in the original ontology presents itself. And so we arrive back at the Caesar 
problem, so named because Frege's account seems both to demand, and lack, a 
means by which to determine how and why each number is the same or different 
from any object whatsoever. Shapiro [1997] elaborates: Frege's account "has 
nothing to say about the truth-value of identity statements such as '(A) Julius 
Caesar = 2' or '2 = { {0 } } ' etc." (p. 28). 
Shapiro, along with commonsense, in fact agrees that we could not understand 
claims about objects which are themselves produced by a language without an 
original ontology. But, in contrast to the Fregean approach, he argues that there is 
not something that could be called the background ontology. For Shapiro, "the idea 
of a single, fixed universe, divided into objects a priori, is rejected" (p. 28). 
Recall that Shapiro sets out to show that a "good philosophy of mathematics should 
show why questions as to the truth-value of statements like (A) need no answers, 
even if they are intelligible" (p. 13). 
In order to establish this, Shapiro offers that in mathematics there are no objects 
simpliciter{[i. 15). That is, there is no structure-independent answer to such 
questions. A mathematical object for Shapiro is a place in a fixed structure. So a 
number, for example, is a place in the natural number structure. According to 
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Shapiro, identity between objects within a given structure /s determinate, but 
identity between numbers and other sorts of objects is not (p. 14). 
Thus, according to Shapiro, 
... one can ask about numerical relations between numbers, relations definable in the 
language of arithmetic, and we can expect definite answers to these questions. Thus, 
1<4 and 1 evenly divides 4. These are questions internal to the natural number 
structure. But if one inquires whether 1 is an element of 4, there is no answer waiting to 
be discovered. It is similar to asking whether 2 is heavier than 4, or funnier (p. 14). 
Thus, for Shapiro, only statements of the former kind - i.e. those internalto a 
single structure, have a determinate truth-value, so the truth-value of this (internal) 
sort of statement is to be discovered. 
By contrast, Shapiro claims that the truth-value of statements like the latter is a 
matter of invention or stipulation. Hence there is no answer waiting to be 
discovered to the Caesar problem. 
To delve further into the Kraut sub-language procedure, viewing the level-roles as 
played by groups of people, or by individual people, is taking the 'places are offices' 
perspective. But, "when we focus on the impoverished sub-languages and interpret 
them with the Leibniz principle, we take the places of the structure - income levels 
and numbers - as objects in their own right. This is the 'places are objects' 
perspective" (p. 21). 
Now, the process by which we arrive at this 'impoverished sub-language' involves, 
first of all, taking a framework with objects already within the range of its variables 
- i.e. a framework that already has ontology. The next step is to 
focus on an equivalence relation over the ontology of the base language [which]... 
divides its domain into mutually exclusive collections - called 'equivalence classes'... The 
idea here is to see the equivalence classes as exemplifying a structure and to treat the 
places of this structure as objects (p. 21). 
A sub-language is then formulated for which the equivalence is a congruence such 
that where two items are equivalent they are indiscernible. Shapiro suggests that: 
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In such cases ... in the sub-language, the equivalence relation is the identity relation. 
The idea here is that the language and sub-language together characterise a structure, 
the structure exemplified by the equivalence classes and the relations between them 
formable in the sub-language. It is thus possible to invoke the places-are-objects 
orientation, in which the places in this structure are rightly taken to be its objects (p. 
22). 
The final step in Shapiro's argument is to introduce the idea that the framework of 
pure mathematics, along with that of his own 'structure theory', might allow 
sub-languages in which either isomorphism or structure equivalence is a 
congruence. In this way, structures themselves are to be seen as objects in their 
own right and, according perfectly with the structuralist's credo, mathematics is the 
science of structure. 
From the perspective introduced above, the problem with this is that it can boil 
down to a claim that it follows from the coherence of a structure characterisation 
that there are things which satisfy it. Indeed, Shapiro believes that coherence just 
means satisfiability. And this means that coherence cannot be characterised in a 
non-circular way. In his defence, Shapiro argues that mathematics itself involves an 
inherent circularity born of the common mathematical practice of settling questions 
of coherence just by modelling one structure in another - for example, complex 
numbers are coherent just because they can be modelled in the real number 
structure. The final port of call, then, is set theory - in which all other mathematical 
structures can be modelled (p. 22). 
According to Shapiro, set theory itself is satisfied because it is coherent, and is 
coherent because it is satisfied. But we can't have it both ways. If the former is the 
case, the (Fregean-type) realist notion of dependence of mathematical formalisms, 
proof, truth and coherence on mathematical reality is lost. Only if the latter holds is 
this important realist notion retained. And it is hard to see how Shapiro could argue 
that a structure is coherent because it is satisfied without a determinate 
background ontology of mathematical objects - or without the idea of a single, real 
mathematical universe that exists not because of, but before, our notion of 
mathematical coherence. 
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1.12. Structures, Realist and Otherwise 
The idea that mathematical systems and concepts themselves are founded or 
depend on a pre-existing mathematical reality (and not the other way around) is 
one of the central realist notions given in the introduction as being worth trying to 
retain. But, for the realist seeking to retain those central notions, there are other 
features that a structure characterisation would need to posses before it could 
serve as any sort of foundation or 'final court of appeal' for mathematical theories 
and questions of mathematical existence. 
Specifically, a foundation would need, for the realist, to be in some sense 
metaphysical, at least to the extent that existence questions are resolvable only by 
reference to a reality independent of the systems it grounds. That is, existence 
questions should, for the realist seeking to retain the central notions, be resolved 
by reference to a supposed, or stipulated (in a non-ad hoc fashion), abstract reality, 
as opposed to the coherent characterisation of a structure or indeed to any sort of 
a reality whose existence can likewise be attributed to ourselves, or to our ability to 
define or construct it. Indeed, without reference to a metaphysical independent 
reality, the line between construction and discovery - or in this case, between a 
coherent structure and a satisfied structure - is blurred. 
The realist can grant that we can create coherent structures and say they are 
satisfied, or he can say that we can discover satisfied structures and show that they 
are coherent. But the term 'discover' and the idea that the structures are 'ante rem' 
both lose their force if, in the final analysis, each of these ideas is defined in terms 
of the other. 
So, in order to retain the force of such terms and of the ideas they represent, the 
difference between the sort of foundation Shapiro envisages and what is perhaps a 
realist's ideal foundation for mathematics is worth exploring further. 
This is where Maddy's Set Theoretic Naturalism provides a useful foil. Like Shapiro, 
Maddy suggests, in Maddy [1996], that set theory 
Perhaps most fundamentally ... provides a court of final appeal for questions of 
mathematical existence and proof; [that is] if you want to know if there is a 
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mathematical object of a certain sort, you ask (ultimately) if there is a set theoretic 
surrogate of that sort: if you want to know if a given statement is provable or 
disprovable, you mean ultimately from the axioms of set theory (p. 26). 
And, Maddy argues, that is allyou mean, or all you need mean, for set theory to 
provide a secure foundation for mathematics or, more precisely, if set theory's 
claim to be a ground for mathematics is to be justified. 
What you need not mean, in order for set theory to be such a foundation, is that 
set theory gives us the true nature of numbers, or that set theory is consistent or 
complete, or that there is a metaphysical justification for the foundational role it is 
supposed to play. For Maddy, set theory's mathematical role alone is enough. 
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2. Meaning and Justification 
2.1. Introduction 
Maddy's Set Theoretic Naturalism, as set out in Maddy [1998], attempts to provide 
a justification for the fundamental axioms of set theory and hence for the idea that 
set theory itself is a foundation or a ground for the rest of mathematics. The main 
point of Maddy's account is that the mathematical benefits of set theory achieve 
this justification on their own, making it unnecessary to look beyond mathematics 
itself in order to justify the axioms of set theory or to defend its foundational role. 
In opposition to Maddy, one could argue that there is a need to look beyond the 
mathematical benefits of set theory in order to justify its axioms and its proposed 
role as the foundation for the rest of mathematics. Specifically, the opposing view I 
offer in the following is that there is a need to justify set theory philosophically or 
metaphysically justify set theory if it is to count as a foundation for mathematics -
or at least there is for the mathematical realist. This chapter, then, primarily 
explores precisely what this opposing claim amounts to. 
First, though, Maddy's claim itself needs examining. Among other things, Maddy 
[1998] argues that the primary job of set theoretic foundations is "to isolate the 
mathematically relevant features of a mathematical object and to find a set 
theoretic surrogate with those features" (p. 26). 
This view, as Maddy points out, rejects the notion that there is any non-arbitrary or 
unique identification of numbers with sets, or for that matter, of integers, rationals, 
reals, functions, etc. with sets, such that one kind of set should be favoured over 
another as the true mathematical object or reality that numbers, integers, reals, 
etc. represent. 
So, for instance, favouring von Neumann's identification of 2 with {0 , {0 } } over 
Zermelo's identification of 2 with { {0 } } , signifies "nothing deep enough to motivate 
a metaphysical argument" (p. 24) that von Neumann sets are the real sets or the 
ultimate reality underpinning mathematics. The same point, of course, applies to 
favouring Zermelo sets over von Neuman. Both claim to provide a set theoretic 
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surrogate for mathematical objects, but neither need nor do claim to do more than 
that. 
Equally, the notion that set theory's job is no more than to provide set theoretic 
surrogates for mathematical objects, involves the rejection of the idea that such 
surrogates eliminate or negate the original objects and so reduce the ontology of 
mathematics from numbers, reals, integers, etc. and sets, to sets alone. From her 
job description for set theory, Maddy points out, "no such strong ontological 
conclusion is [or need be] drawn" (p. 26). 
With neither the 'unique identification', nor the 'reduced ontology' (both extra-
mathematical) justifications claimed for set theory, and with no claim that set 
theory possesses any metaphysical characteristics the realist might desire or 
require of it in order to justify its foundational role, Maddy sets about arguing the 
case on set theory's mathematical merits alone. 
These merits include the provision of a united arena of (set theoretic surrogate) 
mathematical objects in which their relationships and various interactions can be 
clearly laid out; the development of new set theoretic axioms as a consequence, 
and the provision of a stopping point for "doomed efforts at proof" (p. 28) until the 
status of these new axiom candidates is resolved. 
In sum, for Maddy, set theoretic foundations: 
Play a strong unifying role: vague structures are made more precise, old theorems are 
given new proofs and unified with other theorems that previously seemed quite distinct, 
similar hypotheses are traced at the basis of disparate mathematical fields, existence 
questions are given explicit meaning, unprovable conjectures can be identified, new 
hypotheses can settle old open questions, and so on. That set theory plays this role is 
central to modern mathematics, that it is able to play this role is perhaps the most 
remarkable outcome of the search for foundations. No metaphysics, ontology, or 
epistemology is needed to sweeten this pot! (pp. 34-35) 
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2.2. Meaning and its Relationship to the Mechanical Systems of 
Mathematics, or Two Mathematical Meanings 
There is, in recent literature, some question as to the relationship between what 
has been dubbed Godel's philosophical, or extra-mathematical realism and his 
purely or practical mathematical concerns. Maddy's work addresses this particular 
issue quite frequently.^ In order to discuss the view she presents more rigorously, I 
will for the moment assume that Godel at least entertained the idea that purely 
mathematical issues in fact do share an important relationship with philosophical or 
'extra-mathematical' issues. In this way, Godel's thoughts - or, in this case, my 
own specific re-presentation of Godel's thoughts - can provide a useful foil to 
Maddy's. 
One of the things that I hope to highlight via this juxtapositioning, is the important 
effect on this issue and on wider issues of a specific ambiguity surrounding the 
separation between the formal or mechanical systems of mathematics and their 
meaning. 
'Meaning' can be understood as referring to either to what we tal(e the facts to be 
(the formalism^), that is, a certain common or individual understanding of what 
mathematical formalisms say; or what the facts are {^ude^ewdent reality), that is, 
the way the mathematical world really is, which (clearly enough) includes the realist 
notion that that reality exists quite apart from any collective or individual 
understanding of it.^ The specific ambiguity that the juxtaposition between Maddy's 
and Godel's work highlights, occurs when these two possible referents of the term 
'meaning' are conflated. The fact that I do not understand such a conflation as an 
error, suggests that I take 'meaning' to be about more than language. In this way, 
the meaning of a term or sentence, and whether or not a term or sentence has 
meaning become ontological, as well as semantic issues. 
^ Her [1998] and her [1996] both include discussions pertinent to this question. 
^ I use the term 'formalism' in much the same way as Frege uses the term 'sense'. That is, the formalism is 
the (correct) way of understanding a given mathematical symbol (or series of symbols, theorems, etc.). 
Importantly, "In grasping a sense [or formalism], one is not certainly assured of meaning anything" Frege 
[1984,159]. There is more on this in the following section. 
^ This division is also discussed in my discussion of Folina's work in chapter 4. The two discussions taken 
together make the point that meaning cannot be thought of as something on the level of formalism, unless 
that level is identified with the level of independence. That is, Godel's optimistic aligning of what the facts are 
and what we take them to be is one way of taking the problem of access as solved. 
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Godel's writing conflates the two referents, and frequently.'* I suppose (for the 
purposes of this chapter) that this conflation is due to Godel's philosophical stance 
on the nature of mathematical truth. We could argue, for instance, that for Godel, 
mathematical formalisms derive their meaning from the fact that they describe a 
pre-existing mathematical realm. The derived meaning and the pre-existing realm 
are at least intertwined; at most, indistinguishable. Indeed without this conflation, 
mathematics is, for Godel, rendered meaningless, reduced to a 'mere game'. 
In posing the problem of the justification of mathematical certainty in his [1995a], 
Godel writes, 
[if] it is acknowledged that the truth of the axioms from which mathematics starts out 
cannot be justified or recognised in any way ... the drawing of consequences from them 
has meaning only in a hypothetical sense, whereby this drawing of consequences itself 
... is construed as a mere game with symbols according to certain rules, likewise not 
[supported by] insight (p. 379, square brackets in text). 
Further, the way in which Godel poses the problem of justification above -
specifically its ambiguous treatment of mathematical 'meaning' - might be 
understood as an expression of Godel's own brand of mathematical realism, in 
particular of his faith in an independently existing 'mathematical realm'.^ Another 
(for the sake of comparison) is his philosophical discussion of the Incompleteness 
Theorems, particularly in counting his results as evidence against the efficacy and 
expressive power of the formalisms rather than as evidence against the belief that 
what they express are the truths of an independently existing reality. But Maddy 
offers an alternate interpretation of Godel's realism, and this alternative draws 
direct attention to the importance of the ambiguity between the two possible 
referents of the term 'meaning' in mathematics. 
"• By this I mean that Godel uses the term 'meaning' in both special and ordinary ways. Compare his special 
or particular use of'meaning' in the quotation above (Godel [1995a, 379]) with the following, more everyday 
use: " ... let A and B be two meaningful propositions ..." (Godel [1995c, 196]). 
^ And, in fact, this is what I believe - that Godel not only conflates the two possible referents of mathematical 
'meaning' to this effect, but that this conflation itself is one of the primary forms of expression by which 
Godel's brand of mathematical realism can and should be detected and understood. 
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2.3. Mathematical Meaning and Mathematical Reality 
First note that by admitting the above ambiguity exists - i.e. by admitting that 
there is indeed a difference between what the facts are, and what we take them to 
be, we are admitting the presence of a three, rather than two-levelled separation, 
at least when the two referents of the term 'meaning' are /7(3f conflated. That is, we 
are acknowledging that there are three separate items in play: our individual 
understanding of the fomialisms, the mathematical formalisms themselves (or, the 
correct way of understanding the mathematical symbols, sounds, theorems, etc.), 
and the independent reality that the formalisms (correctly or incorrectly) describe. 
Aflier all, there could be no possibility of a conflation of the two referents of 
'meaning' - in other words, there could be no way of expressing that 'the 
independent facts just are what we take them to be' - without there flrst being the 
possibility of two separate referents (the independent facts, and what we take 
them to be) and so also of this three-levelled separation. To clarify these three 
levels further, note that what I mean by 'our understanding of the formalisms' can 
be aligned with Frege's 'ideas' (Frege [1984]) - something wholly internal and 
subjective: "the same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with 
the same idea. The idea is subjective: one man's idea is not that of another" (p. 
160). Similarly, 'the formalisms themselves' can be aligned with Frege's 'sense' -
something neither internal nor external, and so, according to Frege, both "actual" 
and "unactual" (p. 371): "a thought belongs neither to my inner world as an idea, 
nor yet to the external world, the world of things perceptible by the senses" (p. 
369). Finally, my 'independent reality' can be aligned with Frege's 'referent' -
which, for Frege, for a name at least, is an object. Frege also has truth-values as 
referents (the referents of sentences), but given his treatment of these as objects 
(pp. 163-164) it is, I believe, safe to attribute externality and independence to 
Frege's 'referent', and I align it with my 'independent reality' on that basis. 
Godel's conflation of the two possible referents of the term 'meaning' can be 
interpreted eitheras an expression of his philosophical realism oras the outcome of 
his desire to demonstrate the special nature of our understanding of mathematical 
truths - i.e. of what Shapiro (in the introduction to [1997]) calls 'optimism'. Which 
of these interpretations is favoured will depend on which of the two possible 
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referents of meaning the interpreter takes Godel as emphasising. Or, put another 
way, which interpretation is favoured will depend on the extent to which the 
interpreter agrees with my thesis that meaning is an ontological as well as a 
semantic issue. That is, it will depend on whether the interpreter sees Godel's 
primary interest as located on the third level (of independent reality itself), or on 
the second (of what we understand of that reality, and so also our understanding 
itself). It is precisely this choice between interpretations and, more specifically 
again, the fact that the choice itself often remains unstated that creates the 
ambiguity presently under discussion. 
Maddy [1998], makes a similar point: 
though one strain of Godel's writings involves a truly philosophical Realism, another 
actually consists of a series of realistic-sounding methodological principles: allow 
infinitary methods in metamathematics, don't require existence proofs to provide 
constructions or definitions, allow impredicative definitions, regard axiomatic set-theories 
as extendable. All of these principles can be seen as arising out of practice and as 
guiding successful subsequent practice, in the manner of a true methodological maxim 
like mechanism (p. 36). 
Thus Maddy sets out to explore a reading of Godel's realism in which, 
the ultimate justification for these maxims is in the actual practice of mathematics rather 
than in philosophical realism. On this reading, Godel's realism plays an inspirational role, 
like Einstein's Verificationism, while his various methodological realisms play the role of 
true methodological maxims, like Mechanism (p. 36). 
Maddy's own interpretation, then, takes Godel as emphasising an internal 
mathematical meaning related more to the nature of our understanding than to any 
metaphysical realm; over the sort of meaning associated with his philosophical 
realism - i.e. his belief in a pre-existing mathematical realm. 
2.4. Maddy's Set Theoretic Naturalism 
My own reading of Godel's realism is in contrast to Maddy's, and is here identified 
by both Maddy and myself as 'philosophical realism'. A key principle guiding 
Maddy's Set Theoretic Naturalism is that of the primacy of mathematical practice 
59 
over philosophy, or 'extra-mathematical' concerns. By contrast, a key principle 
underlying philosophical realism is that of the primacy of philosophy - in this case, 
a realist philosophy - over principles derived from mathematical practice, when it 
comes to the justification of mathematics itself. Note that I do not intend here to 
argue that philosophy is the court in which correct mathematical practice in general 
should be determined. Nor, though, do I wish to say that philosophy has nothing to 
say on such matters. Along with Shapiro [1997], I take it that "any principle used 
in mathematics is taken as correct by default but not incorrigibly. The correctness 
of the Z7^ /<rof mathematics is [here] a well-entrenched, high-level theoretical 
principle" (p. 30). 
Regarding the problem of justifying mathematics, Maddy's position, in [1996], 
excludes philosophy from any justification role whatsoever, in favour of 
mathematics itself: 
what I propose is a naturalistic picture: when pursuing methodological questions, forget 
the extra-mathematical philosophising and attend to internal mathematical 
considerations. This is not a philosophical position, on a par with realism and formalism; 
it is rather a meta-philosophical injunction about the proper relation between philosophy 
and mathematics, about the proper means by which a methodologist should approach 
the problem of justifying, organising or extending existing mathematical practice. The 
central tenet is that extra-mathematical philosophy plays an inspirational, not a 
justificational role (p. 502). 
Indeed, Godel is readily interpreted along these lines, such that the justification he 
seeks of the fundamental axioms of mathematics lies in the success of the set of 
axioms currently accepted. Undoubtedly, Godel, as a mathematician, would have 
concerned himself with the sort of evidence for set-theoretic axiom candidates that 
Maddy is interested in. To illustrate the potency of this sort of evidence, and of the 
claim that Godel would himself have appealed to that evidence, I include Maddy's 
list, given in [1988], of'extrinsic' evidence (internal to mathematics) here: 
1. Confirmation by instances (the implication of known lower-level results, as, for 
example, reflection implies weaker reflection principles known to be provable in 
ZFC.) 
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2. Prediction (the implication of previously unknown lower level results, as, for 
example, the Axiom of Measurable Cardinals implies the determinacy of Borel sets 
which is later proved from ZFC alone) 
3. Providing new proofs of old theorems (as, for example, game-theoretic methods 
give new proofs of Solovay's older set-theoretic results) 
4. Unifying new results with old, so that the old results become special cases of the 
new (as, for example, the proof of PW0(77i) becomes a special case of the 
periodicity theorem) 
5. Extending patterns begun in weaker theorems (as, for example, the axiom of 
Measurable Cardinals allows Sovslins's theorem on the perfect subset property to 
be extended from i:\to £ I) 
6. Providing powerful new ways of solving old problems (as, for example, QPD 
settles questions left open by Luslin and Souslin) 
7. Providing proofs of statements previously conjectured (as, for example, QPD 
implies there are no definable well-orderings of the reals) 
8. Filling a gap in a previously conjectured "false, but natural" proof (as, for 
example, Det {AI filled the gap in Moschovakis's erroneous "sup" proof of 
PWO773) 
9. Explanatory power (as, for example. Silver's account of the indiscernibles in L 
provides an explanation of how and why V* L) 
10. Intertheoretic connections (as, for example, the connections between 
determinancy hypotheses and large cardinal assumptions count as evidence for 
each) (pp. 758-759). 
Thus, in [1996], Maddy claims: 
if your interest is in set-theoretic methodology [as Maddy's is], and in particular, if you 
want to know how those methods can be justified and extended then you should attend 
to the details of practice. As a corollary, the demise of set-theoretic realism should not 
inspire a search for new extra-mathematical metaphysics (p. 503). 
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And this does seem a reasonable claim, given quotations from Godel like the one 
she uses as further evidence here: "Such a belief [in the well-determined (mind 
independent) reality of sets] is by no means chimerical, since it is possible to point 
out ways in which the decision of a question, which is undecidable from the usual 
axioms, might nevertheless be obtained" (p. 497). 
Further, Maddy's view offers a helpful way of understanding some of Godel's 
seemingly paradoxical assertions regarding the status of the platonist position as 
justification for the axioms of set theory.^ Not only this, but, by highlighting the 
ambiguity present in Godel's writing, set-theoretic naturalism opens the door to 
responses to Godel's problem of justification that are less traditionally or 
philosophically realist and more concerned with the internal workings of 
mathematics itself, and this is no bad thing. 
The counter-point I want to make, though, is that there is (at least) some question, 
given that it can be argued that Godel otoes conflate the two referents of the term 
'meaning', as to which one of these referents Godel was most interested in (or 
which, indeed, any philosophical realist might be). The issue of justification for 
Godel can, in accordance with the ambiguity, be read as either (or both of) a 
concern to show that what we take the axioms to mean is in fact what the 
formalisms express, or that what the formalisms express are the truths of a mind-
independent realm. I believe Godel saw both of these as much the same question, 
given that for him, mathematics is true and independent. Which is why, for Godel, 
showing the 'certainty of mathematical knowledge' most likely meant showing the 
relevance of the formalisms themselves by establishing the presence of a 'strong 
enough' link between formalised concepts and what they express. Which in turn 
explains his great interest in the idea of'pre-theoretical' concepts, and the 
possibility of intuitive access to these as a process independent of the formalisms or 
'mechanical systems' of mathematics themselves.^  
^ For example,"... our axioms, if interpreted as meaningful statements, necessarily presuppose a kind of 
Platonism, which cannot satisfy any critical mind and which does not even produce the conviction that they 
are consistent." Godel [1995b, 50] versus his approval of Russell's Zoology analogy, namely that "[abstract 
studies, such as logic and mathematics, are]... concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though 
with its more abstract and general features" Maddy [1997, 90 quoting Russell and Godel]. 
^ For an example, see Godel [1995a, 380-383]. 
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And so, in contrast with Maddy, my own interpretation of Godel's realism entails the 
claim that any 'demise of set-theoretic realism', in fact should\r\sp\re a search for a 
new extra-mathematical metaphysics as an alternative justification or ground for 
mathematics itself; and that Godel's work can be read as a search for just such a 
justification. 
2.5. Maddy's Problem of Justification 
Recall that Maddy's interpretation of Godel's justification is along 'set theoretic 
naturalist' lines. What she hopes thereby to show is that it is somewhat misleading 
to characterise Godel's realism simply as traditional platonism. She goes so far as to 
claim that any 'extra-mathematical' realism (the philosophical theorising about the 
nature of mathematical things) is perhaps better understood as largely irrelevant to 
Godel's real concerns. As an alternative perspective on just how his realism should 
be understood, she offers, in [1996], the following naturalistic interpretation of 
Godel's views: 
Insofar as extra-mathematical assumptions about the nature of mathematical things are 
relevant at all, they enter as secondary conclusions: such-and-such is a good 
mathematical method; therefore, realism is a better philosophical view than, say, 
constructivism (p. 497). 
To defend this perspective, Maddy analyses samples of the reasoning process by 
which Godel arrives at various conclusions which seem to her to show that his 'real 
concerns' are particular issues in the actual practice of mathematics, rather than 
the defence or even the expression of a philosophical realism. One such example is 
Godel's argument that the Continuum Hypothesis is a meaningful question 
regardless of whether or not it turns out to be independent of ZFC. Maddy takes 
the following quotation as representative of his reasoning: 
...the undecidability of Cantor's conjecture from the accepted axioms of set 
theory...would by no means solve the problem. For if the meanings of the primitive 
terms of set theory...are accepted as sound, it follows that the set-theoretical concepts 
and theorems describe some well-determined reality, in which Cantor's conjecture must 
be either true or false. Hence its undecidability from which the axioms being assumed 
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today can only mean that these axioms do not contain a complete description of that 
reality (p. 496, quoting Godel). 
Maddy points out that our initial impression of what is going on here, namely an 
argument to the effect that there is a real world of sets in which CH (the 
Continuum Hypothesis) is true or false, therefore it remains a meaningful question, 
is too hasty. This is because, Maddy says, Godel's next sentence (previously 
quoted) reads: 
Such a belief [in the well-determined reality of sets] is by no means chimeral, since it is 
possible to point out ways in which the decision of a question, which is decidable from 
the usual axioms, might nevertheless be obtained (p. 496, quoting Godel). 
On the strength of this sentence, Maddy claims that what is going on in fact is that, 
integral mathematical considerations are [being] used to defend the claim that CH is a 
legitimate question to which an answer might be found, and this conclusion, in turn, is 
[being] used to support the extra-mathematical belief in the objective reality of sets. In 
other words, the mathematics is supporting the philosophy, not the other way around 
(p. 497). 
So the problem of justification for Maddy is a strictly mathematical one. 
With this interpretation Maddy establishes what she believes are Godel's real 
concerns. She then goes on to expand upon the central tenets of set theoretic 
naturalism and to fashion her own response to the problem of the justification of 
the fundamental axioms of mathematics. 
2.6. The Metaphysical Problem of Justification 
My interpretation, on the other hand, includes a principle of priority stating that of 
first importance to the realist (including Godel) is the dependence of meaning upon 
the independent mathematical realm itself. This principle itself depends on the 
more general claim (contrary to Maddy's) that states that, for the realist, internal 
mathematical concerns are (at least at times) secondary to philosophical concerns. 
The primary defence of my own interpretation is, like Maddy's, to be found in 
Godel's work. In his [1995a], Godel attempts to describe in terms of philosophical 
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concepts the development of the foundational research in mathematics since 
around the turn of the 20*^  century, and to fit that description into a general 
schema of possible world views. The schema itself is developed by dividing possible 
world views up "according to the degree and manner of their affinity to or, 
respectively, turning away from metaphysics" (p. 375). But before looking at 
Godel's discussion, more needs to be said about the term 'metaphysics'. 
2.7. Metaphysics 
When it comes to reading Godel's later work, specifically his philosophy and his 
interest in Husserl, an interpretation can depend quite a bit on what the reader 
takes 'metaphysics' to mean: some questions have to be answered - e.g. to what 
extent is 'metaphysics' able to be aligned with 'philosophy', how or whether 
philosophy is different from metaphysics, and how or whether both are different 
from mathematics. 
Maddy's Naturalism draws a clear line between mathematics and philosophy and 
her treatment of the term 'metaphysics' suggests that she takes metaphysics to be 
part of, if not identical to, philosophy. 
I also interpret 'metaphysics' as part of, or the same as 'philosophy', specifically 
insofar as I agree that each term can be used in place of the other. Essential 
shared elements of 'metaphysics' and 'philosophy' are presented and enlarged upon 
below. 
The primary difference between Maddy's and my own understanding of the terms 
involved is in our use of terms like 'mathematical realism' and 'justification'. Where 
Maddy draws a line between such terms and 'philosophy', I argue that so long as 
one's mathematics is underpinned by almost any sort of realism, no such line can 
be drawn. 
2.8. The Definitional Framework 
Derrida, in his [1962], points out that there are three levels of objectivity involved 
in any account of abstract or physical reality. 
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The first is the level of the "word's ideal objectivity". The word "set", for instance, is 
recognisable in several different languages, but is bound to those languages in 
which the word itself makes sense. The word's sense belongs on the second level, 
where 'sense' is the intended content or signification of the word. Sense is available 
to several languages also; for example, the sense of the word 'set' is available to all 
of those languages in which 'set' is able to be expressed - i.e. in which set is 
'sayable'. The ideality signified at this level is free, Derrida says, "from all factual 
linguistic subjectivity". 
Thirdly (and of first importance on my interpretation of Godel's realism), there is 
the level of "absolute ideal objectivity", such as the independent idealities of 
Number, Set and the "free idealities" of geometry. The ideality in question here is 
that of 'the object itself. On this level of objectivity, Derrida says, there is no 
adherence to any de facto language, only adherence to the possibility of language 
in general - or, as I will argue, to the possibility of meaning itself (all quotations 
above, pp. 12-13). 
If we locate the recognisable, physical word or mathematical symbol on level one, 
and the independent mathematical realm (mathematical objects in themselves) on 
level three, and in between, on level two, we place something Godel dubs 'the 
mathematical formalism' (thereby treating the fomialism as a sort of meaning 
bearer); then we have a framework through which 'metaphysics' can be defined. 
So, Derrida's three levels of objectivity not only fulfil the purpose for which they 
were intended (which was primarily to be a framework through which Husserl's 
work can be interpreted), but they can also be employed as a framework by which 
Godel's writing can be interpreted. 
The Husserlian equivalent to the Godelian schema I am proposing has physical 
words, sounds and signs at level one, the object itself at level three and 'noemata' 
at level two. At this stage, 'noemata' can be loosely defined following Hintikka 
[1995], as "the sum total of what is thought or meant of an object in an act" (p. 
88). 
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Added to their original purpose of the general elucidation of Husserl's work, 
Derrida's three levels have another purpose, when applied to Husserl. Witness 
Leavy: 
When Derrida elucidated these three [levels], it was specifically in order to show that 
when Husseri does not distinguish between the object itself and its noemata, this can 
only occur within the third region of ideal objectivity, the absolute free objectivity of 
language. (Derrida [1962,14]) 
The three levels can be applied in exactly the same way to Godel's work. Recall 
Godel's conflation of'what we take the facts to be' i.e. a common understanding of 
what mathematical formalisms say (or mean), with 'what the facts are', i.e. the way 
the independent mathematical realm really is, in and of itself. Derrida's and Leavy's 
point above applies equally here: this particular conflation can only occur within the 
third region of objectivity - the region of independent mathematical reality or of 
'the thing in itself. 
The significance of this application can be seen when we note that it is precisely 
when the noemata 'reaches its object' (the intention is filled) that the Husserlian 
conflation occurs. The noemata 'reaches its objecf when what is thought or meant 
of an object, and the object itself, are one and the same. The significance of this 
can be seen most clearly just by looking at what the absence of this conflation 
might mean to a realist. Recall, from the beginning of this chapter, Godel's 
discussion of the separation of the formalism and the objective mathematical realm 
(Godel, [1995a])- specifically in his posing of the problem of justification (see 
quotation, page 57 this text). 
The reduction of mathematics to a 'game with symbols' results from mathematical 
formalisms being separated from their meaning (real as opposed to hypothetical). 
As such, Godel's unjustified mathematics looks very much like the flip side of 
Husserl's 'filled intention'. Meaning which is not hypothetical: real, objective, or 
justified meaning presumably only occurs when the initial axioms are justifiably 
taken to be true. 
So it seems that the justification or 'recognition' that Godel seeks here can be 
interpreted as coinciding with the Husserlian 'filled intention'. The natural fit (one 
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the flip side of the other) between the two scenarios backs this up, as does Godel's 
well-documented interest in Husserl.^  So also do the various attempts to resolve 
Godel's problem through realist interpretations of Husserl's work, such as my own. 
Jakko Hintikka's [1995] is another such interpretation. In that piece, Hintikka puts 
the question "what is it that flils a noema?" (p. 81) and argues that the relationship 
between noemata and "the real world" leads, eventually, to a "phenomenological 
residuum" which is "an interface with reality" (p. 89) and "both a denizen of 
consciousness and a denizen of the real world" (p. 90). The resolution of the 
problem of justification I will propose echoes Hintikka's in this regard. 
2.9. The Definition 
A definition of metaphysics, or of a metaphysical enterprise, can now be attempted. 
Loosely, a given enterprise is metaphysical if, within that enterprise, a 'meaningful 
concept' or a 'meaningful formalism' is a concept or formalism conflatable or 
identiflable with what it is that is meant - i.e. the thing itself, or an independent 
realm or reality. According to this definition, then, metaphysics is an ontological 
exersize. The presumption of this definition is just that the metaphysician means to 
discuss what exists, and if what he discusses does not in fact (independently) exist, 
his words (and his concepts and formalisms) are meaningless. 
In accordance with this definition, the ability of mathematical formalisms to be 
meaningful at all in fact depends on an initial identification between what we mean 
and what in fact is, or independently exists. 
Afl:er, or dependent upon this initial identification, the formalisms can go on to re-
present independent mathematical reality itself, and can do so meaningfully, 
without needing to re-establish the initial conflation; but simply by reference to it. 
The metaphysical realist thereby envisages an origin - a moment of 'pure presence' 
wherein the true, or original mathematical formalisms are fashioned. 
Kevin Hart, in his [1989], clarifies the realist scenario with his exposition of 
Derrida's argument, namely: "that a discourse is metaphysical to the extent to 
which it claims that presence absolutely precedes representation" (p. 11). 
^ For an example, see Dagfinn Follisadal's infroductory note to Godel [1995a, 364-374]. 
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My claim, then, is that Godel's realism is, among other things, a metaphysical 
discourse - and thus the problem of justification Godel poses is, regardless of what 
else it might be, importantly (and interestingly) metaphysical, as opposed, say, to 
methodological, mathematical or anything else. 
Again, Hart clarifies this distinction: 
the distinction between the intelligible and sensible may not always be used to promote 
metaphysical positions, but it becomes metaphysical when intelligibility is taken to mean 
'present to consciousness'... if one uses 'signified' to mean a concept that is present to 
consciousness then one is complicit with metaphysics. A discourse is metaphysical then, 
if the concept is fashioned as [therefore inextricably hMed with] a moment of pure 
presence [here identified as an encounter with the real, independent mathematical 
realm] and the sign as representing the concept in its absence... within these terms, the 
sign fails to represent the concept purely and simply; it introduces the complicating 
elements of materiality and difference which serve to delay and defer the expected 
recovery of the concept. This, accordingly, is the basis of the case [by which 
metaphysics is recognised as such] for valuing the concept over the sign [or, on my 
interpretation, for giving priority to the dependence of meaning on the independent 
realm. That is on giving level three, on which meaning is located (since meaning is 
inextricable from that realm), first priority] (pp. 11-12, italics mine). 
Derrida's deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence, aimed at all forms of 
metaphysical discourse, mathematical realism included, serves here to highlight and 
refine my realist interpretation of Godel's metaphysics. Especially, Derrida offers a 
clear picture of the notion of the importance and of the nature of the order of 
dependence within this interpretation of Godel's realism: 
Stated formally, Derrida's argument would run as follows. No context can circumscribe a 
sign's meaning; the sign's meaning will alter if repeated in a different context; but the 
sign is structurally open to repetition: therefore alterity is a structural feature of the sign. 
The upshot of this argument is that in being subject to the second mode of 
representation, the sign must fail to perform its first and primary mode to the extent to 
which it does not signify the presence purely and simply {p. 13, italics mine). 
As Hart notes: 
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but surely such words as 'primary' and 'fail' are beginning to lose their basis as the 
consequences of Derrida's argument above become evident. We have already admitted 
that by dint of its structure, the sign can always be repeated outside its original context, 
and that the sign's intelligible content is, therefore, always open to modification. 
However, if this possibility is always open, it is an essential possibility and therefore part 
of the sign's structure. We cannot [on Derrida's analysis] then speak of the sign's failure 
to repeat a presence, because the possibility of accidents enables the sign's intelligible 
content to emerge. And if we are to talk of primacy [on Derrida's account] we are 
obliged to ascribe it to this condition of possibility rather tiian to presence of any kind (p. 
13, italics mine for final sentence only). 
We now have a precise summary of the nature of metaphysics, namely that at 
which Derrida's critique above takes aim - i.e. that which ascribes priority to 
presence, and has the possibility of meaning dependent upon fi^/s priority. Now, 
when 'presence' is read as the 'independently existing, real, mathematical realm', 
and meaning is inextricably bound to this third level of ideal objectivity, and when 
'mathematical formalism' is located on the second level, and physical 
word/mathematical symbol on the first (least important, or most dependent) level; 
then we have a summary of the interpretation of Godel's realism offered here - this 
then, is a picture of philosophical mathematical realism. 
2.10. Godel's Philosophical Realism 
The above explication of metaphysics will inform my reading of Godel's views in 
what follows. In particular, this explication of metaphysics goes some way to 
establishing the validity of an interpretation arguing that Godel held that 
philosophical [extra-mathematical] justification ought to be priorto extrinsic, 
mathematical justification of the sort outlined in Maddy's ten-point list, and prior 
also to internal mathematical justification in general, including practised or well 
established set-theoretic methodology. 
The argument for the priority of philosophy over mathematics or methodology, at 
least when it comes to the question of justification, leads back naturally to Godel's 
schema in [1995a] dividing possible world views up "according to the degree and 
the manner of their affinity to or, respectively, turning away from metaphysics". 
Godel outlines his schema such that "skepticism, materialism and positivism stand 
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on one side, spiritualism, idealism and theology on the other" (both quotations, p. 
375). 
In the following paragraph, Godel briefly discusses 'mixed cases', noting that the 
analysis of 'mixed cases' consists in seeking out their materialistic and spiritualistic 
elements: 
thus one would, for example, say that a priorism belongs in principle on the right hand 
and empiricism on the left side...Furthermore one sees also that optimism belongs in 
principle toward the right and pessimism toward the left. For skepticism is certainly 
pessimism with regard to knowledge. [Moreover] materialism is inclined to regard the 
world as an unordered and therefore meaningless heaps of atoms [note that meaning is 
here , once again, associated, for Godel, with the existence of an ordered, or structured 
realm] (p. 385). 
Godel then goes on to note what he sees as a general move from the right toward 
the left within philosophy since the Renaissance, adding: 
it would truly be a miracle if this (I would like to say rabid) development had not also 
begun to make itself felt in the conception of mathematics. Actually, mathematics, by its 
very nature as an a priori science, always has, in and of itself, an inclination toward the 
right, and for this reason, has long withstood the spirit of the time [Zeitgeist] that has 
ruled since the renaissance; i.e., the empiricists theory of mathematics, such as the one 
set forth by Mill, did not find much support. Indeed, mathematics has evolved into ever 
higher abstractions, away from matter and ever greater clarity in its foundations (e.g. by 
giving an exact foundation of the infinitesimal calculus [and] the complex numbers) thus, 
away from skeptisism (p. 385). 
Note that Godel does not regard the 'exact foundation' of the infinitesimal calculus 
and complex numbers referred to in the bracketed section - nor the general 
(increasing) clarity in mathematical foundations of which it is an instance - as a 
justification of those foundations. 
In fact, Godel plays down the significance of the 'antinomies of set theory' 
(contradictions included) on the one hand, and proclaims on the other that such 
antinomies "have been resolved in a manner that is completely satisfactory and, for 
everyone who understands the theory, nearly obvious" (p. 377). 
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It seems that Godel does not appear to be overly concerned with whatever 
justifications for its foundations he sees as arising from mathematics itself. Godel's 
concern - his posited problem of justification is (at least in the context of his 
schema and his perspective of the 'situation' mathematics is in) extra-
mathematical 
His arguments are directed againstthe perspective (incorrectly held, he believed, 
by many of his fellow practising mathematicians) that 
denie[s] that mathematics, as it developed previously, represents a system of truth; 
[acknowledging, rather] this only for a part of mathematics (larger or smaller, according 
to [[their]] temperament) and retain[s] the rest in a hypothetical sense - namely [[one]] 
in which the theory properly asserts only that from certain assumptions (not themselves 
to be justified), we can justifiably draw certain conclusions (p. 377). 
This opposes Maddy's Set Theoretic Naturalism. On Maddy's reading of Godel, this 
process of conclusion drawing (a primary part of the 'if-thenism' that characterises 
mathematical - especially set-theoretical - practice) is precisely where the problem 
of justification oughtto be located (and, presumably, solved). To Godel, though, 
this sort of internal, mathematical justification is not only inadequate, but irrelevant 
to the problem of justification with which he is concerned: 
[Such mathematicians described above] thereby fiattered themselves that everything 
essential has really been retained. [Since, after all, what interests the mathematician, in 
addition to drawing consequences from these assumptions, is what can be carried out] 
(p. 377, final sentence, in square brackets, Godel's own). 
It is worth continuing with Godel's own words here: 
In truth, however, mathematics becomes in this way [outlined above] an empirical 
science. For if I somehow prove from the arbitrarily postulated axioms that every natural 
number is the sum of four squares, it does not at all follow with certainty that I will 
never find a counter example to this theorem, for my axioms could after all be 
inconsistent, and I can at most say that it follows with a certain high probability, because 
in spite of many deductions no contradiction has so far been discovered (p. 379). 
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2.11. The Problem of Arbitrariness 
Godel makes an implication here - that the fundamental axioms are rendered less 
'arbitrary' when understood from a realist point of view, than when understood 
from a non-realist point of view. 
His idea, I believe, is that the axioms are somehow more grounded, more 
'foundational', if they embody facts about an independent reality, than if they are 
simply 'postulated' by mathematicians. 
Indeed, this 'non-arbitrariness' or groundedness is a strength of the realist position 
- but it is not a guaranteed one. This is because the (realists') axioms are non-
arbitrary only if the realists have got it right - that is, if the axioms really do 
embody the independent mathematical reality with which mathematicians are 
concerned. There is, of course, always the possibility that they do not. 
The potential for such radical error seems built into realist accounts, which makes 
them vulnerable to a similar charge of arbitrariness, unless the realist can come up 
with a guiding principle, or set of principles, by which we can guarantee or at least 
increase our certainty that the axioms do indeed refer to or embody (or both) 
independent mathematical reality itself. 
So the problem of justification, for the realist, now encompasses the problem of 
arbitrariness (at least insofar as the concept of arbitrariness is linked to that of 
radical error). For Godel, the claim that the axioms are 'arbitrarily postulated' is 
linked with the undesirable result of mathematics consisting of 'certain conclusions 
... not themselves to be justified'. That is, for Godel, the idea of an 'arbitrary' axiom 
is if not identical to, then closely related to, the idea of an 'unjustified' axiom. 
Recall again that Godel levelled the charge of arbitrariness against accounts offered 
in 'the (leftward) spirit of the time' [Zeitgeist]. He went on to identify Hilbert's 
program as an attempt (perhaps the first) at a middle road account: 
and thus came into being that curiously hermaphrodite thing that Hilbert's formalism 
represents, which sought to do justice both to the spirit of the time and to the 
[rightward, optimistic] nature of mathematics (p. 379). 
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Note Godel's exposition of Hilbert's attempt: 
It consists in the following: on the one hand, in conformity with the ideas prevailing in 
today's philosophy [the swing to the left: identified above], it is acknowledged that the 
truth of the axioms from which mathematics startis out cannot be justified or recognised 
in any way, and therefore the drawing of the consequences from them has meaning only 
in a hypothetical sense, whereby this drawing of consequences itself (in order to satisfy 
even further the spirit of the time) is construed as a mere game with symbols according 
to certain rules, likewise not [[supported by]] insight. 
But, on the other hand, one [Hilbert] clung to the belief, corresponding to the earlier 
"rightward" philosophy of mathematics and to the mathematicians //7S /^/7rf-[something 
different, presumably, from methodological dexterity, or internal, mathematical insight] 
that a proof for the correctness of such a proposition as the representibility of every 
number as a sum of four squares must provide a secure [extra-mathematical] grounding 
for that proposition (pp. 379-381). 
What is important to note here is that one of the ways Maddy defends her theory is 
by the claim that it can be seen as responding to what were in fact Godel's own 
concerns when he posed the problem of justification in the first place. Whether or 
not this is the case is not something she believes she needs to establish either way; 
as she points out, her theory stands separate from this particular defence, since it 
is nonetheless a response to a problem of justification, whether or not it is a 
response to Godel's proh\em of justification. What is of interest here is the spirit of 
the defence itself, and the questions it raises. Can Maddy's or anyone's theory offer 
a response to Godel's problem of justification? Exactly what are the issues it would 
have to address before it could? How does Godel's problem of justification 
compare to other renderings of the problem of justification? And how crucial is 
Godel's rendering of the problem to other ways in which it can be understood? 
In response to such questions, I will argue that the Godelian notion of justification 
underpins other renderings, just so long as those renderings can themselves be 
interpreted as philosophical. In other words, I will be arguing that a response to the 
problem of justification that does not address these of Godel's concerns, cannot 
provide a viable (philosophical) solution. 
m 
In a sense, it is indeed Godel's problem that Maddy seeks to address, just in so far 
as what she engages in is philosophy. And in that same sense, I will argue (in later 
chapters) that Maddy's response, along with other's, are viable responses to any 
problem of justification primarily to the extent that they do in fact address key 
elements of Godel's concerns. To elaborate, I believe that a full interpretation of 
Godel's problem of justification will establish that the key elements of Godel's own 
understanding of the problem of justification he posed are the key elements of 
what Godel dubs 'the rightward conception of mathematics', and that the concerns 
of this 'rightward conception of mathematics' cannot be left: unaddressed if a theory 
is to properly count as a response to any (philosophical) problem of justification at 
all. 
In the following, and in the remaining chapters, I take Maddy's response, try to 
strengthen it, and then argue that neither the original nor the strengthened 
versions can address Godel's concerns, since neither can 'increase our certainty' 
that mathematics is - or is linked to - a reality wholly other than ourselves. 
2.12. Justifying Mathematics - How Far Can we Go? 
So, just what would make the axioms that Godel refers to above less 'arbitrary', or, 
conversely, more justified? This question is addressed in the next chapter, but at 
this point I want just to outline a couple of responses that I think are worth 
considering. The first is that outlined by Maddy in [1988]. Besides her ten (ten!) 
point list of types of extrinsic evidence for set-theoretic axiom candidates, Maddy 
offers two further categories: intrinsic evidence and 'rules of thumb'. 
Under the former, she places the perception of individual objects and sets: "[the 
belief], for example, that objects do not disappear when we are not looking at 
them, and [the belief that] the number of objects in a set does not change when 
we move the objects around" (p. 759). Thus, this category covers intuitive beliefs 
and pre-linguistic experience. The sort of evidence provided here is that described 
by Godel as the axioms "[forcing] themselves upon us as being true" (p. 764). 
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Under the latter, Maddy places Comprehension principles - specifically full 
Comprehension, historically motivated by the appearance of the paradoxes of set 
theory: 
when uncritical, intuitive work with sets was interrupted by the appearance of the 
paradoxes, examination of previously unexamined practice revealed that full 
Comprehension was not in fact used. Rather, sets were thought of as being formed from 
objects already available. This led to the separation of sets from classes, and eventually 
to the development of the rule [of thumb] iterative conception (p. 759). 
Other rules of thumb whose origins are "at least partly intuitive" (p. 759) are: 
Realism, maximise and richness [all of which are] closely tied to iterative conception. 
Finally, reflection is often claimed to be intuitive, perhaps with grounds in maximise as 
well. Inexhaustibility is just a special case of reflection, and resemblance is a 
consequence (p. 751). 
Maddy's presentation of (the intuitive) rules of thumb points the way toward a 
further defence for set theoretic axioms, with which I believe her three categories 
can be augmented. 
This further defence is best presented by Bernard Linsky and Edward N. ZaIta 
[1995]. Linsky and ZaIta offer their own comprehension principle for abstract 
individuals as the key constituent of what they dub 'principled platonism'. Principled 
platonism is opposed to 'piecemeal platonism'. The latter, Linsky and ZaIta argue, 
describes traditional platonism which "typically assume[s] that their preferred 
abstract objects are "out there in a sparse way" waiting to be discovered and 
characterised by theories developed on a piecemeal basis" (pp. 532-533). 
The next chapter will focus on the question of whether or not Linsky and ZaIta have 
sufficiently addressed the problems of piecemeal platonism, specifically, whether or 
not their principled platonism, offered instead, adequately addresses the problem of 
arbitrariness for the realist. 
The general comprehension principles Linsky and ZaIta offer as the key constituent 
of a 'principled platonism' are those that "yield a plenitude of abstract objects". 
Such comprehension principles "assert that there are as many abstract objects of a 
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certain sort as there could possibly be (without logical inconsistency); that is,... 
these principles guarantee that the abstract objects in question constitute a 
plenum" (both quotations, p. 533). 
The next chapter explores in depth the addition of such a comprehension principle 
to Maddy's three categories of evidence. Taken together, the two lines of attack 
form perhaps the most solid response to Godel's problem of arbitrariness and so 
also to his problem of justification. It will turn out, though, that neither addresses 
the concerns Godel raised, and that in fact they cannot. A philosophical justification 
demands more. 
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3. Platonism and Justification 
3.1 . Arbitrary vs. Piecemeal 
This chapter takes as its starting point the supposition that one of the primary 
strengths associated with realist/platonist accounts of mathematical knowledge 
comes about by virtue of what these accounts are not: they are not 'arbitrary'. 
Accordingly, the primary aim of this chapter is to understand precisely what this 
strength is, and to understand how to incorporate this strength into a modern 
account of mathematical knowledge that seeks to draw (as modern accounts tend 
to do) from both realist and constructivist strengths. 
In order to achieve this, it is useful first to recall and establish some of the grounds 
upon which the charge of arbitrariness can be levelled against other (typically 
constructive) accounts, and thereby to negatively infer what precisely the 
mathematical realist/platonist might see in his own account as protecting it from 
the same charge. 
Obviously, to call this strength 'non-arbitrariness' is not enough. In order for an 
account to preserve any supposed strength of realist accounts, that strength needs 
identification early in the piece, especially since once an account tries to preserve 
supposed strengths associated with either realism or constructivism, the original 
perceived strengths are too often, too easily lost. It seems to me that this occurs 
particularly where a modern solution is sought for traditional realist/platonist 
problems, such as the problem of how we come to know anything at all about the 
realist's independent, abstract realm. 
Specifically, I hope to show that Edward N. ZaIta and Bernard Linsky's [1995], in an 
effort to solve this age-old problem, along with other problems traditionally 
associated with platonism, ultimately sacrifices the particular realist strength under 
scrutiny here Cnon-arbitrariness'), and in doing so loses something crucial, 
something its authors probably originally sought to retain. 
For the purposes of this chapter, and in accordance with the previous chapter, 
arbitrariness will be defined from Godel's [1995a]. Recall that in this work, Godel 
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identified the leftward 'spirit of the times' [Zeitgeist] with which he associates such 
positions as Hilbert's program, skepticism and empiricism. His interest, in that 
piece, is with the f/x/e'inclination' of mathematics and with its 'nature', with which 
he associates such positions as a belief in a priori truth, realism and idealism 
(possibly referring here to social or theological idealism - as in the attainment of 
ideals - rather than to mathematical idealism, which is leftward). These typify the 
counter-Zeitgeist, called the 'rightward Zeitgeist'. Rather than try to re-define terms 
like 'constructivism', 'realism', 'platonism' and so on, I will take on the more general 
framework suggested by the terms here. Godel's 'leftward' and 'rightward' spirits, 
or attitudes, will form (opposite ends of) the background scale into which the 
various positions discussed can fit, placed further leftward or rightward along the 
scale according to their various degrees of leftward and rightward 'spirit'. 
From among the numerous possible interpretations of this general framework, I 
take the following to establish the scale against which the accounts I discuss will be 
set: 
An account (of mathematical knowledge) is 'rightward' to the extent that it takes or 
stipulates the objects of mathematics to be independent from thinking beings, 
where 'full independence' (extreme right) takes the objects to be something(things) 
other than or different from that which thinking beings can, do or might 
comprehend. 
An account is 'leftward' to the extent that it takes or stipulates the objects of 
mathematics to be dependent on thinking beings, where 'full dependence' (extreme 
left) takes these objects to be, or to be identical to, that which thinking beings can, 
do or might comprehend. 
Where mathematical objects are taken or stipulated to Z^ethe objects of our 
comprehension (in accordance with the leftward attitude described above), one 
well-known result can be that there is no room left: for a specific concept of their 
'otherness': that which is in accordance with the rightward attitude described 
above. Another well-known problem associated with 'lefb/vard' accounts is that of 
introducing the possibility of error. Where the objects of mathematics simply are 
what we can, do or might comprehend, a story needs to be told about how we can 
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ever be in error - that is, how there can be any sort of difference between what we 
comprehend and what in fact is. 
On the other hand, where these objects are taken or stipulated to be otherthar) 
what we comprehend (a.k.a. 'rightward' accounts), a story needs to be told about 
how we can ever be correct - that is, how there can ever be any sort of 
identification between what we comprehend and what in fact is (if it is, indeed, 
something essentially other than what we comprehend). In this case, the question 
is: how can the difference (or a stipulated difference) between what we 
comprehend and what is, ever be overcome, and how can we tell when and if this 
difference is overcome?^ 
This, in fact, is just another rendering of the realists' problem of justification - the 
problem of how to show or ensure that mathematics is grounded by independent 
fact or, put another way, the problem of how to show or ensure that mathematical 
formalisms represent the (independent) truth. According to Godel, this is the very 
'nature' of mathematics itself - a rightward incline away from the leftward Zeitgeist, 
or from anything that "[denies] that mathematics...represents a system of truths" 
(p. 377). 
Incorporating this idea with the framework suggested above gives an interpretation 
of the framework given, wherein it is 'the representation of a system of truths' itself 
that is the rightward 'nature' and 'inclination' of mathematics (away from which the 
leftward Zeitgeist inclines). And so, within the specific leftward/rightward 
interpretation offered here, the belief that in essence mathematics is 'a 
representation of a system of truths' is likewise to be regarded as essential to a 
rightward philosophy of mathematics. 
To reiterate, an essential strength of realist, platonist, and accounts belonging to 
the 'rightward Zeitgeist' in general, according to this schema, is their association 
^ Note that at each extreme, there is a certain 'dependence' on thinking beings involved. It Is the thinking 
beings, after all, who 'take' or stipulate to varying extents, the objects of mathematics to be other than or 
identical to the objects we comprehend. This kind of'dependence' I take on board as a necessary evil. Where 
an object is taken to be other than what It is taken to be, there is at least a recognition that it may or may 
not Z)e(able to be somehow identified with) what we take it to be. This is the most independence we can 
hope for, I fear, aside from remaining quiet on the issue altogether. 
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with the 'essential nature' of mathematics, which in turn is identifled as the 
representation of a system of truths. 
According to Godel's schema, the rightward Zeitgeist is the context within which 
this essential nature of mathematics as the representation of a system of truths is 
to be understood. Godel introduces the view that the nature of mathematics is that 
which /s denied by the leftward Zeitgeist and embraced by the right. I take the 
same stance. The context I offer is specific, and is not here attributed to Godel. 
But, following Godel, the rightward Zeitgeist as I have interpreted it above is the 
context within which I mean the idea of'mathematics as the representation of a 
system of truths' to be understood. That is, the extent to which an account takes 
the objects of mathematics to be other than what we comprehend is, according to 
my interpretation, the same as the extent to which an account takes mathematics 
itself as 'a representation of a system of truths', understood in this specific context. 
On Godel's schema, the leftward Zeitgeist acknowledges that mathematics 
represents a system of truths for a part of mathematics only - namely those 
assumptions which are "not themselves to be justified" (p. 377) - the fundamental 
axioms. According to Godel, the focus of the leftward Zeitgeist is on the drawing of 
conclusions from the fundamental axioms rather than on the fundamental axioms 
themselves. The fundamental axioms are not, according to some of the programs 
belonging to the leftward Zeitgeist, (e.g. conventionalism) the sorts of things that 
need justification. They are not the sort of thing that requires it. Rather, they are 
more like a framework within which the main focus - the process of conclusion 
drawing - is understood. 
Likewise, according to Godel, in the context of the leftward Zeitgeist, the idea that 
mathematics (or part of mathematics) is 'a system of truths', demands or requires 
no justification. By contrast, in the context of the rightward Zeitgeist, the idea that 
mathematics is 'a system of truths' demands a very specific justification - precisely 
that which arises within the context or framework provided by the rightward 
Zeitgeist itself. 
So, the meaning of Godel's phrase, 'a system of truths', alters greatly depending on 
its context, so much so that the fundamental axioms when seen in the context of 
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the leftward Zeitgeist, are called "arbitrarily postulated", but when seen in the 
context of the rightward Zeitgeist, these same axioms are called "a priori" (p. 377). 
My claim here is that the specific strength of 'non-arbitrariness' associated with 
realism, is located, not only in the realist notion (inherent to the interpretation 
given above) that mathematics is ultimately justifiable, but also in its recognition of 
the problem in the first place: that is, in its recognition that there is a specific 
yD/-oZ7/e/77of justiflcation inherent in the'essential rightward nature'of mathematics 
itself. Justification is seen within the context of this interpretation as the provision 
of a ground outside of or other than the system of truths itself. Conversely, the 
'system of truths' is rendered arbitrary within leftward conceptions of mathematics 
- typically in accounts without a problem of justification at all. That is, according to 
this particular aspect of the leftward Zeitgeist in general, no ground need be sought 
outside of the system of truths itself. The rightward Zeitgeist, on the other hand, 
according to the interpretation given above, is essentially associated with the need 
for, or at least the acknowledgment of, just this sort of outside ground. This means 
that the problem that this concept of an outside ground presents - i.e. the problem 
of seeking the ground itself - is, with all its seeming intractability and all its thorny 
consequences, nonetheless an identifiable strength of (the rightward Zeitgeist) 
realism itself (as I have construed it). Hopefully a (rightward) solution (:3X\ be 
achieved at some stage, but at this stage it is enough to identify that, at the very 
least, the problem thus formulated is itself an essential part of the rightward 
position presented here. 
Accordingly, for what follows, the trait 'arbitrariness' will be identified as a lack, 
either by (leftward) 'solution' or stipulation, of the specific rightward 'problem of 
justification' arising from the rightward Zeitgeist's understanding of mathematics as 
'the representation of a system of truths.' 'Arbitrariness' is then, for the purposes of 
this paper, a rightward realist's'groundlessness'. It is a trait identifiable - from a 
rightward context - as a (typically leftward) lack of concern for the problem of 
providing a ground - and this can include leftward solutions which seem to have 
misunderstood, or devalued the problem as it is in its rightward context. (Recall 
that Godel offers the idea that "certain assumptions [need not] themselves [be] 
justified" (p. 371) as a case in point.) 
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Specifically, this is the problem of 'how we can be correct' that was mentioned 
earlier - the problem of how mathematical objects can somehow be identified with 
what we comprehend if they are taken as or stipulated to be otherthan what we 
comprehend. An inclusion of this problem as a problem can be taken as a fairly 
reliable indication of a belief in the 'otherness' (as defined earlier) of mathematical 
objects. Conversely, the lack of a belief in the 'otherness' of mathematical objects 
corresponds with a lack of the concept of the problem of justification as a problem 
(specifically understood in the same context) for that part of mathematics which 
'represents a system of truths'. The contrary rightward trait - 'non-arbitrariness' -
will be identified as both an awareness of the problem of justification (so specified) 
for all mathematics which itself'represents a system of truths', and consequently 
the potential for the provision of the specific, rightward justification sought. (In fact 
I suspect that this particular problem must remain a problem if the 'otherness' of 
mathematical objects is to be retained in the specific sense given here, but this 
remains to be seen). 
We now have a loose definition of'arbitrariness' and 'non-arbitrariness'. This is 
enough with which to begin a comparison between arbitrariness and other 
perceived traits associated with accounts of mathematical knowledge in general. 
Of specific interest here is the distinction between the concept of'arbitrariness' as 
outlined above, and that of'piecemealness' as outlined in Linsky and Zaita's [1995]. 
The first distinction to note is that, whilst arbitrariness is here associated with 
traditional constructivist, formalist and leftward accounts in general, Linsky and 
ZaIta associate 'piecemealness' with traditional platonism - historically a rightward 
account of mathematical knowledge. 
When they come to specify the sort of thing falling under this rubric, though, ZaIta 
and Linsky offer a reading of 'traditional platonism' whose location in the general 
Zeitgeist schema is arguably further leftward than tradition would in fact place it. 
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3.2. Piecemeal Platonism 
Piecemeal platonism, as presented by Linsky and ZaIta, consists of three main 
principles that together constitute a model wherein the notion of an abstract object 
can be understood via an analogy to the notion of physical objects. 
The objectivity and mind-independence of abstract objects is thus understood by 
analogy with the following three features of physical objects: 
1. Physiral objects are subject to an appearance/reality distinction. This distinction can 
be unpacked in two ways, (a) The properties physical objects have cannot be 
immediately inferred from the way they appear, nor can those properties be known in 
advance of empirical inquiry. Rather, they have to be discovered, and in the process 
of discovering we can be surprised by what features we find. The fact that you think 
of a physical object as having certain features is no guarantee that it does, (b) There 
is more to a physical object than that presented to us by its appearances, for 
example, we assume physical objects have "back-sides". 
2. Physical objects are sparse. You can assert that they exist only after you discover 
them. This means they have to be discovered in a piecemeal fashion, and this is 
sometimes guided by direct observation, sometimes guided by theoretical need. 
3. Physical objects are complete. We simply assume that physical objects have all sorts 
of properties we may not know about (indeed, more properties than we could ever 
know about), and that they are determinate down to the last physical detail. So, 
when we have a bona fide physical object x, then for every property F, either x has F 
or x has the negation of F (p. 530). 
I believe that 1 to 3 above do form a picture of traditional platonism. I also believe, 
though, that there is another picture available - one which includes an overt 
expression of the rightward Zeitgeist presented above. This latter picture is an 
important one since it attempts to make explicit some of the original motives for 
adopting the sort of position that terms like 'traditional platonism' may have stood 
for in Godel's schema, before the current debate and confusion over just what a 
traditional platonist looks like. So the latter picture will be put forward as a way of 
presenting a rightward position, as Godel might have perceived it, and to do justice 
in a modern account to the possible real strengths associated with such traditional 
'rightward' positions generally. 
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3.3. Piecemeal Platonism Revised 
My revised piecemeal platonism, then, consists of the three principles above along 
with two more: 
4. Statements about (real) physical objects are (relevantly) meaningful to the 
extent that they are about objects whose existence is independent of the 
statements themselves. For example, '(real) elephants are grey'; and 
(relevantly) meaningless to the extent that the statements themselves 
constitute/invent or imagine their own subject matter - for example, 'flying 
elephants are pink'. 
5. The problem of how to justify principle 4 is a real problem. That is, there is or 
needs to be a justifled connection between independent reality and the 
meaningful statements about that reality. 
1 to 5, taken together, provide revised piecemeal platonism's physical model for 
abstract objects. To understand how 4 and 5 place revised piecemeal platonism 
further 'rightward' than its unrevised counterpart, recall the interpretation of 
Godel's schema above. According to this interpretation, traditional platonism is 
rightward just in so far as it essentially mwoWes the problem (and potential solution 
of the same) of justiflcation, understood in the context of the rightward Zeitgeist. 
Indeed, according to my version of a traditional platonist (at least, perhaps, to 
Godel) mathematical statements are meaning/es5 without such a justification (see 
quotations on pages 57 and 74 of this text). 
On the other hand, with such a (rightward) justification, "a proof must provide a 
secure grounding for a proposition and every precisely formulated yes-or-no 
question in mathematics must have a clear answer" (p.379). 
In these passages, Godel appears to be presenting the idea that mathematics as 
'the representation of a system of truths' has an opposite counterpart: a (literally) 
meaningless game with symbols. This idea, coupled with the idea that a rightward 
philosophy of mathematics essentially involves the independence of mathematical 
reality - i.e. that mathematical objects are other than what we can, do or might 
comprehend - introduces an interesting problem. 
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If we grant both that mathematics has meaning only insofar as it is a 
representation of a system of truths (as opposed to being a system of truths in and 
of itself) and is without meaning insofar as it represents nothing outside itself (i.e. 
- seeks no 'ground' or represents no justifiable, recognisable truth), then where 
does mathematical meaning reside? Not, it appears, in mathematics itself. This is 
because the representation of a system of truths (mathematics itself) is excluded as 
a possible (permanent) residence of meaning, since, according to the rightward 
interpretation, this same representation can be with or without meaning, depending 
on the provision or lack of a 'ground'. 
This means that the fundamental axioms, the process of drawing consequences, 
and mathematical symbols are all excluded as possible locations for mathematical 
meaning, since all are surely part of'mathematics itself. In fact, all of what we 
could imagine to be part of 'mathematics itself Cthe formalism'), is excluded as a 
possible source or residence of mathematical meaning (on this reading of Godel). 
Interpreting Godel's use of 'mathematical formalism' in this way serves two 
purposes. It not only coheres with the interpretation I've given of the rightward 
Zeitgeist as essentially involving the independence of mathematical objects from 
what we can, do or might comprehend, it also leads naturally to a possible solution 
to the problem of justification. 
It does this via the idea that meaning does not, according to this revised platonism, 
reside anywhere in mathematics itself, but in mathematical reality, which is 
independent of anything that we might want to call mathematics itself (or in 
anything we can, do or might mathematically comprehend).^ In this way, we have 
introduced the concept of a fully comprehended, but possibly meaningless 
formalism, to which we will return in the following sections. 
^ I extend the use of the term 'the formalism' to cover all of mathematics itself on the basis that 
'mathematical formalism' can and has been used (most notably by Godel throughout [1995]) to refer to that 
which may or may not be mathematically meaningful Cthe formalism' is also occasionally used 
interchangeably with the symbols', which are similarly rendered meaningless without a ground). 
81 
3.4. Piecemeal versus Arbitrary 
For now, I argue that 1 to 3, without 4 and 5, form a platonism that is open to both 
the 'piecemeal' and 'arbitrary' charges, but that 'revised piecemeal platonism' forms 
a model for a mathematical realism (my own interpretation of a 'rightward 
platonism') that is open to only the former, and this turns out - once the latter is 
answered - not to be such a problem.^  
To anticipate, I argue that what is missing from the Zaita/Linsky account is a 
specified dependence of the comprehended object on an entirely 'other' reality. 
Without this dependence, the difference between a meaningless formalism and a 
meaningful formalism is at best undefinable, and at worst, absent altogether. 
The point is that there should, in a realist account, be an (at least) theoretical 
difference between an empty formalism (one unattached to, or not dependent in 
any way on mathematical reality) and its meaningful counterpart. Something 
should distinguish between the mathematicians having 'got it right', and, say, an 
entirely fictitious mathematical formalism. 
If there is to be any hope of incorporating such an idea into a realist account, 
though, the relationship between what we do, can or might comprehend, and what 
is, cannot be a strict identity. The two cannot, at least not simply or only, be one 
and the same thing, even when we are correct. If they are, then there is no way, 
not even in theory, of distinguishing between meaningful and meaningless 
mathematics. Or, to put it in terms of the 'other' reality with which realism is 
concerned, then there is no way of distinguishing between mathematics that is 
reality-dependent, and mathematics that is radically divorced from reality. 
We need an alternative to the simple (or isolated) identification of mathematics 
itself (literally, mathematics as we know it) - i.e. mathematical practice, or 
comprehension, or whatever - with mathematical reality. The alternative I suggest 
here is analogous to Husserl's filled and empty intentions: that is, that what we 
^ Whether or not this reading constitutes 'traditional platonism' (historically speaking) is beside the point. 
Instead, I propose that if it does, then traditional platonism has been misunderstood. If it does not, then my 
reading is offered as a theory that seeks to preserve the original spirit of a platonism regarding mathematical 
objects. 
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comprehend is rendered an 'empty (or, using Godel's term 'meaningless') 
formalism' unless the object 'intended' or comprehended is present In this case, it 
seems that what holds between the comprehended object and the object itself is 
not an ordinary, or not only, an identity relation, but neither is it a relationship of 
representation. 
Nonetheless, the closest analytic interpretation of this relation is in fact identity, 
just so long as we add some important provisos. The first proviso would have to be 
a specific notion stipulating the comprehended object's dependence (if it is to be 
anything more than an empty formalism) upon an entirely other reality. That is, 
when mathematicians are correct, then the comprehended object and the 'other' 
reality are identical in the sense provided by Husserl - there is not only the "full 
agreement of what is comprehended with what is present", but also the 
'"sameness' of the two being a theme of awareness in its own right" (Miller [1982, 
36]). 
This 'theme of awareness' is possible within the context provided by a 'rightward' 
traditional platonism, but it is not possible so long as Linsky and Zaita's 
comprehension principle, designed to supersede the traditional platonism they 
present, is left unamended. 
ZaIta and Linsky's [1995] comprehension principle'* (principle (1) below) states that: 
an abstract object encodes exactly the properties used to specify it... [and that] no 
matter what properties one brings to mind to conceive of a thing, there is something 
that encodes just the properties involved in that conception ... [which means that] there 
are as many abstract objects as there could possibly be (p. 536). 
This is an existence claim "yielding" (p. 533) a plenitude of abstract objects. 
Encoding is presented as a "mode of predication" (p. 536) and contrasted with 
exemplification. So an object can either encode or exemplify (or both) a property 
'' I use the term 'comprehension' throughout this work, and the way in which I use it should not be confused 
with ZaIta and Unsk/s 'comprehension principle'. For me, comprehension, or comprehended objects refers to 
what we can grasp - literally, what we comprehend (or are capable of comprehending). While ZaIta and 
Linsky's principle does have something to do with the way in which abstract objects are known or 
comprehended, it is not about comprehension as I use the term. It is about what exists and what does not 
(although, in the case of abstract objects - its point is that nothing does not exist). 
88 
'F'. If an object exemplifies 'F', we can say 'x is F'. With exemplification, we can be 
right about this, or wrong. That is, either 'x is F' or 'x is not F'. Encoding, on the 
other hand, transforms every possible property of x into a necessary property of x 
(see principle (2) below). The idea is that when we read ordinary mathematical 
statements like '2 is prime' as '2 encodes primeness', we are "provide[d] with a 
sense in which the ordinary sentence expresses a mathematical truth", and "given 
this reading, we can explain the necessity of ordinary mathematical statements by 
the fact that the encoding claims that provide the sense in which they are true are 
necessary" (p. 541). In their explanation of the notion of encoding, ZaIta and Linsky 
highlight (as "most important" (p. 536)) the following three principles: 
(1) For every condition on properties, there is an abstract individual that encodes exactiy 
the properties satisfying the condition: 
3x(A!x & VF(xf^0)), where x is not free in 0 
(2) If X possibly encodes a property F, it does so necessarily. 
OxF -> DxF 
(3) If x and y are abstract individuals, then they are identical if and only if they encode 
the same properties. 
A!x & A!y ^ (x= y ^ VF(xF = yF)) (p. 536). 
The problem with encoding is that it is hard to see how we could identify an 
abstract object that does not, or may not in fact exist. Indeed, according to this 
account even a round square exists (or "may" exist), as "the abstract object that 
encodes just being round and being square" (p. 537, footnote 52). 
But I argue that it is just this possibility that needs to remain open if the 'sameness 
or otherness' of a fully comprehended abstract object with the independent object 
itself is to remain a 'theme of awareness' in its own right. Without this theme of 
awareness, an account is rendered arbitrary in precisely the way identified earlier -
that is, it is cut off from an outside (an other) ground, upon the presence of which 
every comprehended mathematical object depends if it is to be something more 
than an empty (meaningless) formalism. A 'formalism' (comprehended object) 
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without the presence of an 'other' reality is arbitrary in just this specific sense: it 
has no ground independent of that which we do, can or might comprehend. 
Traditional platonism as construed by ZaIta and Linsky - i.e. 1 to 3, lies further to 
the left: than traditional platonism as construed by myself (and possibly Godel) - i.e. 
1 to 5. This being the case, it is arguable that 'piecemealness' is somewhat less of a 
problematic trait to the traditional platonist (as I have construed him) than ZaIta 
and Linsky would have it, and it is the specific sort of arbitrariness given above 
which is, aft:er all, the real problem. 
A traditional platonist, as I have construed him, might reason thus: if ZaIta and 
Linsky's traditional platonist is 'piecemeal', then so be it. Aft:er all, if it does not 
incorporate the primary strengths of the traditional platonist account (as I have 
construed it), then negative traits are to be expected. If it does incorporate these 
strengths, then perhaps 'piecemealness' is not such a negative trait aftier all. 
Especially if, as I argue here, arbitrariness is of greater concern. 
I hope to show that ZaIta and Linsky's own account, although it may not be 
'piecemeal', does nonetheless suffer from the trait identified here as arbitrariness. 
Further, I hope to show that the inclusion of this trait in their account undermines 
their attempt to incorporate one of the essential strengths traditionally associated 
with platonism. 
3.5. Arbitrary Platonism 
Note that Godel's conception of arbitrariness is formed via the opposition of internal 
and external mathematical 'truth'. For instance, Godel [1995a] writes: 
...many or most mathematicians den[y] that mathematics, as it had developed previously 
[in accordance with the original rightward Zeitgeist] represents a system of truths; 
rather, they acknowledged this for only a part: of mathematics (larger or smaller 
according to their temperament) and retained the rest at best in a hypothetical sense -
namely one in which the theory property asserts only that from certain assumptions (not 
themselves to be justified), we can justifiably draw certain conclusions. They thereby 
flatt[er] themselves that everything essential ha[s] really been retained. (Since, aflier all. 
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what interests the mathematician, in addition to drawing these consequences from these 
assumptions, is what can be carried out) (p.377). 
Godel acknowledges here that the interest of most mathematicians is 'internal' -
i.e. in the mathematical system itself, rather than in a system of truths which 
mathematics represents. This particular interest, though, is primarily practical, and 
accordingly its philosophical relevance is primarily to the mathematical system 
itself, rather than to anything outside it. 
Godel's idea here, I believe, is that the extent to which a mathematical system is 
arbitrary is closely related to the extent to which it refers only to itself. In 
accordance with this idea, the extent to which a system is relevant will be defined 
here as the extent to which it refers to something outside or strictly other than 
itself. The same idea is also applied here to accounts or philosophies of 
mathematics: the extent to which a given account is arbitrary is the extent to which 
it privileges what we comprehend over what is other than that which our 
comprehension grasps. The extent to which it is relevant is the extent to which it 
privileges what is external to our comprehension - the thing in itself, rather than 
the thing as we understand it. 
Since, on Linsky and Zaita's account, one cannot specify a group of properties 
without thereby identifying an abstract object, the abstract object thereby identified 
cannot be mis-identified provided its properties are specified. That is, on Linsky and 
Zaita's account, specification 'gives' encoding, and encoding 'gives' what is 
comprehended or known, which is in itself the abstract object. The comprehended 
object simply is the real (abstract) object itself. 
ZaIta and Linsky do attempt to provide some room for error - specifically for the 
notion of error relative to a theory. Their case is that: 
[t]he mathematical objects of a theory encode the properties that genuinely follow from 
that theory. [And so] It is possible to make a mistake about the propertiies that a 
mathematical object encodes by making a mistake about what properties follow from the 
theory (p. 544). 
Their conclusion follows: 
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[s]o we allow for error - a mistake about the objects of a theory is nota successful 
discovery of a truth about some different objects. Similarly, we allow for ignorance -
mathematicians can form new judgments of the form 'In T,x'\sF without thereby 
thinking of objects of a different theory" (p. 544), 
But the comprehension principle ZaIta and Linsky offer and this conclusion are 
incompatible. It seems to me that they cannot be reconciled. The comprehension 
principle grants that for any group of properties there is an abstract object that 
encodes them. Restricting this plenum by adding that the group of properties must 
follow from a (presumably respectable mathematical) theory either changes the 
comprehension principle itself, or directly contradicts it. 
It remains that, according to Linsky and Zaita's [1995] account, nothing is external 
to what we comprehend. Or, put another way, there is nothing beside or beyond 
what is comprehended. In this case, what we comprehend depends on nothing 
other than what we comprehend. 
ZaIta and Linsky's account does have practical relevance. In other words, it is 
relevant internally. But any account will automatically to some extent, perhaps even 
primarily, be relevant internally, given that (even where it is a strong realist 
account, attributing complete independence to the abstract realm with which it 
deals) it is still o^raccount of of/rrelationship with an independent reality. In this 
sense, even if an account has some sort of external relevance, such relevance is 
part of the account itself and so to that extent is internal also. My argument runs as 
follows: the best that any account can do, in terms of incorporating external 
relevance, is to indicate, or to leave room for, what is outside itself. And perhaps 
the only way of doing this is to include an incompleteness clause of some sort -
stating that the account itself is not the whole story, or, going one better, is not the 
primary story. 
In other words, an account can acknowledge its debts, which in this case can be 
done by indicating (as opposed to representing, or including) something beside 
itself upon which the account, and its degree of success in providing a correct 
description of the relationship between thinking beings and mathematical reality, 
depends. 
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ZaIta and Linsky's conception of the existence of abstract objects depends only on 
itself rather than on something altogether other than what is given by that 
conception. And there is no room, in ZaIta and Linsky's account, to indicate away 
from the account itself - to anything externally relevant to what is comprehended, 
since what is comprehended, on their account, is the whole story. 
It is at precisely this point that the charge of arbitrariness can be levelled against 
their principled platonism. 
Widening the scope of Godel's accusation against the formalists whose fundamental 
assumptions or axioms are 'not themselves to be justified', I would include as 
another of its targets the assumption inherent in ZaIta and Linsky's account that 
there is an abstract object for every group of properties, and thatobyetii (the 
comprehended object - complete or incomplete, with respect to exemplification 
and encoding) is identical to the abstract object in and of itself. As mentioned 
earlier, this means that the two objects, according to ZaIta and Linsky's account, 
are in fact not two at all. There is only one object in play and that is the 
comprehended object; and this object is an object whose relevance to a reality 
external to any system or philosophy is 'not itself to be justified', and whose 
existence is grounded on principles internal to the account itself. 
This assumption may perhaps be able to be read such that it does leave room for 
abstract objects existing independent of our comprehension itself - leaving room 
for a problem of justification whereby the ground that is sought is extra-
mathematical and so is external to the formalism (thereby answering Godel's 
original objection). But it does not leave room for abstract objects existing 
independently of thinking beings entirely. Nor does it leave room for the 
dependence of thinking beings, and the possibility of constructing any sort of 
account at all on an independent reality whose nature cannot be wholly captured or 
circumscribed by that account. That is, no room is left: for a problem of justification 
whereby the ground that is sought is different from anything to do with us 
whatsoever: one in which the ground sought is strictly external - outside our 
comprehension. 
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A quick note: the foregoing is not meant to be an argument for a sort of 
representational realism. I believe a positive account can leave room for the literal 
identification (though not only identification) of what we comprehend with what 
independently is. An account can be given wherein the two are equivalent or 
equated when we are 'correct', but nonetheless remain separate - i.e. they remain 
two. (This matter is taken up in the final few chapters of this work). This sort of 
account, I believe, would preserve the realist intuition that mathematical reality and 
the nature of mathematical reality, are entirely independent of what we 
comprehend, even when what we comprehend is mathematical reality. To 
paraphrase Kevin Hart [1989] 'the two are the same, yet different'. 
3.6. Principled Platonism 
My argument here will be that there are two different kinds of principled platonism: 
one which seeks to overcome the problem of 'piecemealness' (of which Linsky and 
Zaita's is one), the other seeking to overcome the problem of arbitrariness (of 
which mine is one). The two aims are not necessarily incompatible, but nor are 
they identical. Addressing the one problem does not guarantee that the other is 
solved. 
The first kind of principled platonism (from Linsky and Zaita's [1995]) has the 
assertion of the existence of a plenum of abstract objects in accordance with the 
comprehension principle "(1) For every condition on properties, there is an abstract 
individual that encodes exactly the properties satisfying the condition" (p. 537). 
The second principled platonism has the assert:ion of the existence of abstract 
objects in accordance with themselves only, and this existence is something strictly 
outside of the existence asserted by any existence claim, or by any knowable or 
humanly accessible existence whatsoever. 
The first entails that successful reference to abstract objects is determinate (i.e. 
what we refer to just is what exists^), the second has it that whatever it is we 
^ Specifically: "reference to abstract objects is ultimately based on descriptions alone ... [the comprehension 
principle and encoding] introduces abstract objects that may be incomplete with respect to the properties 
they encode, and this, together with the identity principle, ensures that incomplete descriptions will 
successfully refer" (Linsky and ZaIta [1995, 546]). 
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ourselves access, it is not simply or not only the objects in themselves. The objects 
in themselves are something entirely other. 
In fact, according to the second principled platonism, the formulation of the (or any 
kind of) comprehension principle itself depends on the independent reality of the 
abstract objects. That is, the fact that the abstract objects, in reality, are not what 
we comprehend is the fad: that enables the formulation of any kind of access, or 
existence claims. 
This does not mean that what is accessed by our comprehension cannot be 
identical with the objects (or reality) in themselves. Rather, it means that whatever 
identity we discover between the two must nonetheless also include or account for 
the difference between the two. 
Note that these two principled platonisms both have the existence of abstract 
objects in some sense tied to our comprehension of them. The first sense (Linsky 
and Zaita's) is that what indeed whatsoever we comprehend is identical with what 
exists (abstractly). The second sense (mine) is that what we comprehend is strictly 
other than what exists (abstractly), although the two can be equated in a positive 
account, perhaps in accordance with a dependence principle which might read: the 
two can only be equated in accordance with a relation of dependence, such that 
whatever is comprehended depends on whatever exists independently. 
In other words, I want to disagree with the claim that "an abstract object encodes 
exactly the properties used to specify it" (p. 537), which is a way of guaranteeing 
the existence of an abstract object with those specified properties. On the other 
hand, perhaps something like Linsky and Zaita's principle that "no matter what 
properties one brings to mind to conceive of a thing, there is something that 
encodes just the properties involved in that conception" (p. 536) can be upheld, 
provided the copula is rendered ambiguous (something like - the thing encoding 
the properties both is and is not what one brings to mind to conceive of that thing. 
But, again, there will be more on this later). I hope to argue my case by appealing 
to the notion of relevance. I argue that this notion and the idea of an independent 
'other', are two important reasons why a Godelian realism can accommodate the 
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idea that one can specify a group of properties and still mis-identify an abstract 
object. 
Put another way, specification does not 'give' encoding (it could, of course, if the 
concept of encoding was pulled back from a claim about the object itself, to a claim 
about what we grasp of that object. But, on ZaIta and Linsky's account, what an 
object encodes is necessarily predicated of that object itself). Once again, this boils 
down to the import:ance of the order of dependence. Whereas Linsky and ZaIta 
argue that: 
the comprehension principle [which I ultimately uphold - at least in a certain sense] and 
the logic in which it is framed are required for the proper analysis of natural language in 
general and mathematical language in particular" (p. 535). 
I argue that the comprehension principle is required for the possibility of natural 
language itself, and that in particular the mathematical realm is required for the 
possibility of forming the comprehension principle itself. 
3.7. Specification vs. Encoding 
Recall that Linsky and ZaIta begin their account of mathematical knowledge with 
the introduction of the primitive notion of encoding and that this contrasts with the 
"traditional exemplification mode of predication" (p. 536). 
Just as there are (at least) two ways to understand 'traditional platonism', there are 
two ways of understanding the exemplification mode of predication. 
The first is with an emphasis on perception. That is, exemplification may be 
understood as the logical distillation of the process of human cognition and 
perception, of the process by which we understand the world. Predicating a 
property of an object is indicative of the way we see that object, as well as of our 
own make-up. For example, from the perspective that, say, Poincare's conventions 
(for an account of these, see Poincare [1913a]) alone adequately describe the 
nature of thinking beings, the exemplification mode of predication could be 
understood as one logical distillation of the nature of thinking beings. From the 
perspective that Wittgenstein's rules alone adequately describes the nature of the 
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language of thinking beings, the exemplification mode of predication could be 
understood as one logical distillation of the nature of the language of thinking 
beings. 
That is, where the emphasis is placed upon perception in a given general 
background philosophical theory, there the exemplification mode of predication can 
(and probably will) be 'read' with the same emphasis. Forgetting for a moment the 
background philosophical theories likely to motivate different readings, and 
focusing on the particular understanding of exemplification thus motivated, notice 
that an understanding of exemplification can emphasize a thinking being's action 
upon the world, or the world's action upon thinking beings. That is, 'x exemplifies F 
(Fx)' can be read as 'there is a property F which x, in fact, has', or there is a 
property F with which one of the properties x in fact has, can be equated'. 
The first reading has the existence of an x with the property F simply implied. The 
second has the property F's existence implied, but the existence of an x with that 
property as a further, separate problem. This is one way of formalising the position 
outlined earlier. That is, the notion that mathematical reality exists entirely separate 
from whatsoever we comprehend is specifically expressed in the second 
formulation of exemplification above. 
The idea that the properties x has or does not have is an existence problem not 
immediately solved by the implied existence of an x exemplifying F, leads to the 
idea that encoding can be similarly understood. That is, it can be argued that 
exemplification itself entails a burden to show that the properties x has, 
independent of what we comprehend, are just those that we do comprehend, and 
so predicate of x. In much the same way, encoding can be understood as giving 
abstract objects themselves just in so far as the identification of the 'given' abstract 
object and the independent abstract object remains a problem. For instance, the 
encoded object is 'the same' as the object itself only if the object itself is in fact 
present. Where the presence or absence of the object itself as something other 
than the object encoded or specified \s in this way a theme of awareness in itself, 
there is the possibility of a non-arbitrary account of mathematical knowledge. 
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3.8. Some Thoughts on the Equivalence Relationship 
Formalising the concept 'other than, yet identifiable with' within a philosophy of 
mathematics is difficult. Nonetheless, I don't believe it is impossible. Below is just a 
sketch of some of what my own attempt will entail. 
Taking Husserl's lead, I begin with the concepts of filled and empty intentions. One 
way to understand these concepts is via a formal equivalence relationship like that 
offered by Shapiro [1997] with his "sub-language procedure" (pp. 120-126): 
Imagine a mathematician who decides to speak an impoverished language that cannot 
distinguish two integers if their difference is divisible by 7 (or, equivalently, if the 
numbers produce the same remainder when divided by 7). On her behalf, we make the 
indicated identifications: 2 is identified with 9, 16, -5, and so forth, whereas 3 is 
identified with 10. We interpret our mathematician as saying that 5+4=2. Of course, 
5+4=9 as well, because in her system, 2 and 9 are indiscernible and thus identical (pp. 
121-122). 
As Shapiro goes on to note, this sort of equivalence relationship can be understood 
with Putnam's "conceptual relativity" in mind. It is worth quoting a large portion of 
this section: 
[this sort of equivalence relationship can be understood such that] the device of 
reinterpretation ... recognises that one person's existence claim might be another 
person's something else ... that in going from framework to framework, we are 
reinterpreting the /o^/ca/terminology, the identity sign and the existence quantifier in 
part:icular... the notions of object and existence are not treated as sacrosanct, as having 
just one possible use ... the existence quantifier can be used in different ways - ways 
consonant with the rules of formal logic ... the point is that when we interpret one 
discourse in another framework, the 'translation' of the logical terminology is not 
homophonic. One person's identity is another's equivalence. The equivalence relationship 
has the logic of identity in the sub-language [only] because the equivalence is a 
congruence there (p. 128, italics mine). 
For Putnam, this means that singling out one part:icular use of the existence 
quantifier "as the only metaphysically serious one" (p. 128), is a mistake. Whereas 
I take the same thing to mean that an account of mathematical knowledge can 
retain the concept of an original ontology and recognise this identity, (rendered 
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here as something like a 'layered', or aware identity) as the relationship between its 
objects and the objects comprehended. And I argue that such an account is to be 
preferred over the same thing without this 'theme of awareness'. Without this 
theme of awareness, Shapiro's mathematician, for example, 'knows' that 2 is 9, 
without any awareness that there is (or even might be) more to the story. The 
person able to make the identifications in the first place, the one in possession of 
the (knowledge of) the full background ontology, is in a preferable position. 
The possibility or impossibility of attaining this preferable position is, of course, 
another important issue. In the case of mathematics as we know it, perhaps the 
best we can do is remain aware that the object within the scope of our 
comprehension is not the end of the story, even when our identification of any 
given mathematical object is in fact correct in the full realist sense outlined above -
that is, even when the comprehended object is in fact equated with an external 
reality. 
Against Putnam, Linsky and ZaIta, I propose that where the presence or absence of 
(an) original ontology is not a theme of awareness, the comprehended 
mathematical object is at worst an empty formalism. At best, an account of 
mathematical knowledge minus this theme of awareness is vulnerable to the charge 
that it is arbitrary. Certainly, the term 'arbitrary' is here given a very specific 
meaning. But I don't think it is such a stretch to take this specific sense as 
consonant with Godel's complaint against accounts without such an awareness. 
Recall Godel's [1995a]: 
[against the result that] mathematicians [are denying that] mathematics represents a 
system of truths [aside from] only a part of mathematics (larger or smaller according to 
temperament) and retain[ing] the rest at best in a hypothetical sense - namely one in 
which the theory property asserts only that from certain assumptions (not themselves to 
be justified), we can justifiably draw certain conclusions. [It is this that renders the 
axioms] arbitrarily postulated. ... If one wishes to justify [mathematical assertions] with 
any certainty, a certain part of mathematics must be acknowledged as true In the sense 
of the old rightward philosophy {p. 377, italics mine). 
The inclusion of an awareness of the need (or even of the possible need) for at 
least a certain part of mathematics to be 'justified' in a specific way, is what, 
99 
according to Godel, saves an account from being rendered 'arbitrary'. I argue that 
the inclusion of a specific awareness at least begins to save an account in the way 
Godel probably had in mind when he wrote the above, namely that the inclusion of 
the awareness that the objects within the scope of our comprehension are not 
themselves the end of the story. 
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4. On the Attainability of Objectivity 
4 .1 . Introduction 
This chapter discusses Janet Folina's Poincarean philosophy of mathematics. 
Although this is the last of the programs other than my own touched on in this 
work, the set of programs addressed is not in any way supposed to round out an 
exhaustive list of programs relevant to my account. There are a number of clearly 
relevant yet overiooked programs (mentioned in the introduction). Nonetheless, 
since each of the programs discussed thus far has been chosen in order to highlight 
various subtle manifestations, appropriations and interpretations of the realist 
desiderata under scrutiny, Folina's account suggests itself as an appropriate final 
foil. This is because her account - or, more correctly, the basis or framework upon 
which her account is built - is (transparently) representative of a widely employed 
general approach to the host of realist and anti-realist desiderata. And this general 
approach is, I believe, itself a specific interpretation of these desiderata, and as 
such deserves further analysis. 
In her [1993-4] paper, Folina offers a solution to a problem widely understood to 
be, if not the greatest problem realism (and, on its flip side, constructivism) faces, 
then one of the big ones. The problem itself is engendered by the opposition 
between a widely accepted, yet very specific conception of the 'greatest strength' 
and 'greatest weakness' of realism, and of the 'greatest strength' and 'greatest 
weakness' of constructivism. 
The solution she proposes to the problem thereby engendered is, I believe, one of 
the best available - but in what follows, I argue that no solution to this particular 
problem can gain an advance over the traditional realist response upon which such 
solutions are designed to improve. The traditional response can be summed up 
thus: 'we don't know'. This chapter shows that modern attempts to improve on this 
must ultimately fail. 
4.2. Folina's Poincarean account 
Folina's account addresses what she sees as a "fundamental dilemma" (p. 202), for 
philosophers of mathematics hoping to choose between realism and anti-realism. 
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Of course, her particular perception of this dilemma informs her perceptions of just 
what might constitute its solution. As such, attention will be given, in what follows, 
not only to the 'fundamental dilemma' itself, but to Folina's particular setting up of 
that dilemma. 
Folina begins by opposing platonism: "a theory about the literal nature of 
mathematical statements and the reality of mathematical objects" (p. 202), to that 
group of constructive theories, "according to which mathematical objects are 
constructions in the minds of mathematicians" (p. 202). She then argues that 
platonism's main strength is in its account of mathematical truth - namely a 
correspondence theory enabling 
a picture of mathematical truth as completely objective ... because the mathematical 
facts (which true mathematical propositions reflect) are (mind-) independent; and the 
facts are independent because mathematical objects (which constitute the facts) are also 
(mind-) independent (p. 203). 
For Folina, the most crucial aspect of this picture of mathematical truth is the 
"difference, or gap" (p. 203) between the independent facts of mathematics and 
our understanding of those facts. It is this gap, according to Folina, that enables 
platonists to claim that theirs is an account of objective mathematical truth and 
knowledge. Folina also identifies a set of primary problems for the platonist. These 
are the same, primarily epistemological concerns identified earlier (chapter 1). 
In turn, the primary strengths of constructivist accounts, according to Folina, is 
their "appealing epistemology" (p. 202) and relative lack of metaphysical mystery. 
Constructivist accounts typically claim to incorporate a tenable explanation for how 
we know mathematics. One of the most common forms that this explanation takes 
is: "we know mathematics just by knowing how to construct mathematical objects 
and proofs" (p. 203). The idea that we construct or create mathematical objects, 
though, also gives rise to constructivism's main problem; i.e. the apparent lack of a 
gap between the facts of mathematics and our understanding of those facts. 
Folina summarises the situation as follows: 
102 
In general, lack of an epistemological gap is both what is attractive and what is 
problematic about constructivism; and the existence of an epistemological gap is both 
what is attractive and what is problematic about platonism (p. 204). 
Folina's own account, which she hopes will be a middle road between realist and 
anti-realist philosophies of mathematics, is primarily informed by this initial 
conception of the nature of the divide she hopes her account will bridge between 
these opposing views. 
It is her initial conception of the problems and strengths of the opposing views that 
will come under scrutiny here. This is not only because it forms the basis upon 
which the rest of her account is built, but also because any outline of the divide 
between realism and anti-realism is open to be misconstrued and potential 
misunderstandings, especially given that the titles involved - realism, platonism, 
constructivism, anti-realism, idealism, etc. - are now, in effect, up for grabs thanks 
to years of overuse. 
Any judgment concerning whether or not an account has managed to run a 
successful middle road between realist and anti-realist philosophies of mathematics 
will depend on what is first specifically identified as realism and anti-realism and, 
specifically, as their associated strengths and weaknesses. 
One of the things I hope to show in this chapter is that some of the disagreements 
over the definition of terms like 'realism', 'anti-realism', etc. are themselves based, 
at least in part, on still more fundamental confusions whose reach extends across 
philosophical discourse in general. In particular, at the fundamental level the 
philosophy of mathematics utilises a host of different terms to discuss its subject -
nearly all of which can be (and have been) confused with one another. Yet what 
these different terms are taken to stand for determines, by and large, our working 
definitions of realism, anti-realism, etc. For example, just what we understand by 
'symbol', 'meaning', 'formal', 'intuitive', 'the sign', 'the signified', 'representation' and 
'presentation'; will directly inform just what we understand by 'realism' and 'anti-
realism'. And yet the precise definition of such terms is, by and large, left 
unaddressed within the philosophy of mathematics. 
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Putting it another way, note that in almost any art:iculation of a mathematical 
realism, mathematical anti-realism, etc. terms such as 'formalism', 'meaning', 
'sense' and 'real world' are used. And the way in which they are used cannot help 
but determine our perception or interpretation of the account in which they are 
used. In what follows, I will present a model of interpretation for some such terms, 
and oppose it to the model Folina offers. I hope thereby to show how the initial 
interpretation of such fundamental terms is crucial to the establishment of any 
account claiming to run a middle road between realism and anti-realism. 
In giving two models of interpretation, I hope also to show that my own model of 
interpretation more thoroughly and accurately captures the strengths of realism 
(outlined in the introduction) than Folina's model. Of course, whether or not the 
reader agrees that it does will depend on their own interpretation of the strengths 
and weaknesses of realism and anti-realism (and so also of their main problems). 
My model is offered as just one possibility, and should be understood in that spirit. 
In accordance with the method established in previous chapters, the model itself 
will come about via one possible reading of Godel's philosophical remarks.^  
4.3. Reading Godel 
Recall that when discussing the problem of giving a justification for the axioms and 
rules of inference of mathematics, Godel [1995b] says: 
And as to this question it must be said that the situation is extremely unsatisfactory. Our 
formalism works peri'ectly well and is perfectly unobjectionable as long as we consider it 
as a mere game with symbols, but as soon as we come to attach a meaning to our 
symbols, serious difficulties arise (p. 49). 
The particular reading of Godel's philosophical remarks from which my model of 
interpretation comes about, takes it that for Godel the real or objective meaning of 
the fundamental axioms of mathematics is something that existed prior to their 
conception or construction. Godel's problem of justification then, on this reading, 
was a 'pre-axiomatic' search for that which justifies the link between the formalised 
^ The aspects focused on here will be different to the aspects focused on in earlier chapters insofar as they 
address different opposing accounts. 
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concepts (the axioms themselves) and what we take them to mean, or what we 
understand them to mean. Ideally this search would find that what we understand 
the axioms, or indeed any part of mathematics, to mean (and what we understand 
mathematics to mean is what I call 'the formalism', and Frege calls the 'sense*) is 
inextricably linked to their 'real' or objective meaning. That is, the meaning /5the 
independent object, rather than something to which the independent object needs 
to be linked. So, the link required is not that between the axioms and the objects 
that exist independently of the axioms. Rather, it is that between what we think the 
axioms mean, and their objective meaning. Again recall my previously stated thesis 
that meaning is both an ontological and semantic notion for the realist presented 
here. 
I believe that Godel would not have foreseen any serious difficulty with the process 
of'attaching meaning' to our symbols if he did not take the notion of a pre-existing 
objective meaning seriously. Yet, he did foresee such difficulties, and he pinpointed 
their origins. He effectively named the realist notions of non-constructive existence 
and impredicative definition as two such origins, noting that the axioms allow us to 
talk about mathematical objects whose existence or non-existence is impossible to 
determine and that a property may be defined as follows: "an integer x shall 
possess the property p if for all properties (including p itself) some statement about 
X is true" (p. 50). 
Both of these 'serious difficulties' arise as a result of the presupposition of an 
objective realm "existing somehow independently of our knowledge and our 
definitions." Indeed, for Godel, "our axioms, if interpreted as meaningful 
statements, necessarily presuppose a kind of platonism" (both quotations p. 50). 
Recall, also, that Godel [1995a] believed 
[if] the truth of the axioms from which mathematics starts out cannot be justified or 
recognised in any way ... the drawing of consequences from them has meaning only in a 
hypothetical sense (p. 379). 
This 'recognition' of the truth of at least some axioms is in accordance with Godel's 
realist 'spirit'. This spirit incorporates both a faith in mathematics being true, and in 
the realist idea that being true essentially involves our understanding of 
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mathematics accessing a mind-independent realm. That is, Godel's realist 'spirit' 
has it that at least for some section of mathematics, what we take mathematics to 
mean is in fact what it objectively (i.e. in reality) means.^  
These brief considerations alone suggest that the possibility of error in (this 
interpretation of) Godel's realism has more to do with the 'link' between the realm 
wherein meaning resides, and the axioms as formalised concepts, than with an 
affirmation of Folina's platonist principle that what we take the facts to be is strictly 
different to what the facts objectively are. Indeed, affirmation of this latter principle 
can be seen as contrary to Godel's realist 'spirit' of mathematics. 
To see this we need to ask what Godel might have meant when he referred to the 
problem of "justifying the truth of the axioms from which mathematics starts out" 
(p. 379). For Godel, it was true that mathematics represents a system of truths and 
that 'the truth of this system of truths' can in fact be justified. In accordance with 
this idea, I interpret the problem of justification that Godel puts forward thus: that 
for Godel the fundamental axioms are in fact justified and the specific 'problem' is 
just how to demonstrate that fact. That is, he does not ask the question 'is 
mathematics justified?', but presumes that it is, then seeks to justify this 
presumption. 
I believe that it is in accordance with this strategy that much of Godel's work 
focuses on the process by which we can be said to recognise the truth of the 
axioms, as opposed to a process by which we could establish the truth of the 
axioms. (Maddy [1998, 89-92] presents a good case for this claim). 
I take it that it was his search for such a process that led Godel to conclude that 
there is no real possibility of a meaningful mathematical statement or formalism 
whose meaning discords with the way the mathematical realm objectively is. That 
is, for Godel, a formalism that is not justified is in fact meaning/ess (recall Godel's 
^ The denial that mathematics represents a system of truths, runs contrary to the realist spirit. Recall: "[anti-
realist or sceptical] mathematicians denied that mathematics, as it had developed previously, represents a 
system of truths; rather, they acknowledged this only for a part of mathematics ... and retained the rest at 
best in a hypothetical sense - namely [one] in which the theory properly asserts only that from certain 
assumptions (not themselves to be justified), we can justifiably draw certain conclusions. They thereby 
flattered themselves that everything essential had really been retained ... in truth, however, mathematics 
becomes in this way an empirical science" Godel [1995a, 377]. 
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quotation on page 74 of this text). And so it seems appropriate to suppose that for 
Godel, where there is no link between our understanding of a given formalism and 
the independent mathematical realm, there is no real meaning (only, at best, 
hypothetical meaning). On this interpretation then, meaning is closely associated 
with, if not the same as, objective truth in the independent mathematical realm. 
Compare this interpretation with Folina's. Folina has it that the possibility of error 
depends, for the platonist, on 'what we take the facts to be', a.k.a. 'the meaning of 
mathematical formalisms', being essentially different from 'what the facts are', 
a.k.a. 'what is true in the independent realm'. Her interpretation, in other words, 
strictly separates semantic truth (meaning) from objective truth (i.e., in Fregean 
terms, Frege strictly separates sense from reference). This sort of interpretation in 
general, places meaning firmly in humanity's court - at least insofar as 'what we 
(humanity) take the facts to be' is equated with the meaning of those facts. That is, 
it seems that for Folina the meaning we attach to mathematical statements and 
mathematical formalisms can be incorrect just because we can create a meaningful, 
yet factually incorrect, mathematical statement or formalism. 
My Godel-based interpretation, on the other hand, has it that this latter scenario is 
impossible. That is, I interpret Godel as holding that if an independent objective 
realm is not accessed, then mathematics is not incorrect yet meaningful. Rather it 
is, in a literal sense, meaning/ess. This is because, for Godel, the possibility of error 
depends (as, indeed, it does for Folina) on the possibility of mathematical 
statements being incorrect. But for Godel, where a mathematical formalism is 
incorrect, it is also really {or in actual fact) meaningless. That is, my interpretation 
of Godel deliberately and significantly places more emphasis on the independent 
mathematical realm itself than on what we take this realm to be. Indeed, under my 
interpretation the latter literally depends on the former (see chapter seven). 
Recall that for Folina [1993-4], mathematical realism enables a picture of 
mathematical truth as completely objective, just because true mathematical 
propositions reflect mind-independent mathematical facts, and the facts are 
independent just because mathematical objects (which constitute the facts) are 
also mind-independent: 
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Since the mathematical objects exist independently of the knowers of mathematics, 
there is a clear difference between the facts and what we take them to be. Arguably, 
some such gap is essential for a domain of objective knowledge (p. 203). 
To recap: for Folina, the difference between being r\qht and merely seeming r\qht 
depends, for the realist, upon the correspondence or discordance respectively of 
the meaning we give a mathematical statement or formalism, and the way the 
mathematical realm really is. For Godel, on the other hand, ive cannot give a 
mathematical statement (real) meaning; only independent reality and the nature of 
the mathematical realm can do that. Accordingly, we can understand a 
mathematical formalism incorrectly, but this incorrect understanding would 
constitute a failure to recognise the (true, i.e. objective) meaning of that formalism 
(along, of course, with any independent fact with which it is associated). 
4.4. Possible Confusions and Conflations 
Note that the model of interpretation presented here (Folina's) - wherein 'meaning' 
is strictly separate from our understanding (or from 'what we take the facts to be") 
- might easily be conflated with a (perhaps less contentious) model wherein a 
formal mathematical expression is separate from its relevant pre-theoretical notion. 
This division has meaning disassociated from formalism, and associated with pre-
theory or with the informal ideas a formal system expresses, rather than 
disassociated from what we understand (or from the formalism) and associated 
with the independent realm. On the face of it, the former division may seem less 
contentious than the latter. And certainly, Godel's realism can be interpreted such 
that the possibility of error depends on this former division rather than on my 
separation of meaning and what we understand. 
For example, one of the key differences between Hilbert and Godel (Godel [1995a]) 
lies in the means they believed would 'secure' the certainty of the belief that "for 
clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers" (p. 381). For 
Hilbert: the means was "proving certain propert:ies of a projection onto material 
systems" (p. 383). For Godel, the means consisted in admitting that some concepts 
cannot be formalised, and "cultivating (deepening) knowledge of the abstract 
concepts themselves, which lead to the setting up of [those systems that express 
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pre-theoretical concepts, which can be formalised]" (p. 383). In this quotation, 
Godel is quite clearly talking about the conceptual separation of pre-theoretical 
concepts from their theoretical formalisation. Preferring, or even conflating this 
particular division over the division between our understanding of a formalism and 
its meaning, is in itself instructive. 
I believe that in fact each division should properly be seen as contentious as the 
other. This will be argued for in due course. Perhaps the reason the former is more 
generally accepted is that it is confused with yet another division: that between 
physical symbols (e.g. markings on a page) and the (usually formal) concepts they 
refer to. This further possible conflation will be elaborated upon later also. In the 
meantime it will be sufficient to note that Godel's idea of "attaching meaning" (p. 
372) to formalisms remains interesting and fruitful, whether it is interpreted as 
something as (supposedly) uncontentious as establishing a connection between 
theory and pre-theory, or in accordance with the interpretation offered here. 
Once again, Leavy's preface to Derrida's [1962] provides a framework to help 
demonstrate this claim. Recall that in the preface, Leavy notes that Derrida 
distinguishes three levels of'ideal objectivity' in Husseri's analysis (p. 13). The first 
is that of the word itself, which is bound to the languages in which it 'makes sense'. 
This level can be thought of as analogous to the level of the physical mathematical 
symbol, which is bound to the language in which it 'makes sense' - namely the 
language of mathematics. The second is the level of the word's (or, analogously, of 
the symbol's) sense itself, 'theory' and 'formalism' belong on this level, wherein "the 
ideality signified (the intended content or signification of the word or symbol) is 
free 'from all factual linguistic subjectivity'" (p. 13). The third level is the only level 
upon which a conflation (or, better to describe Godel's case, a deliberate 
alignment) between what the facts are and 'what we take them to be' is possible. 
That is, it is only if it is placed on this third level that meaning can be understood 
as objective. As Derrida puts it, this is the level of "absolute ideal objectivity, such 
as the free idealities of geometry. The ideality in question here is that of 'the object 
itself.' On this level of objectivity, there is no adherence to any de facto language, 
only adherence to the possibility of language in general" (p. 14). 
109 
To further elaborate this point, recall Leavy's remark, that "Derrida has elucidated 
these three degrees in order to show that when Husseri ... does not distinguish 
between the object itself and its sense, this can only occur within the third region 
of ideal objectivity" (p. 14). 
My model takes it that when Godel does not distinguish between the independent 
mathematical realm and (real) mathematical meaning, then he expresses his faith 
that the two coincide, and this coincidence itself can only occur within the third 
region of objectivity. My interpretation has it that Godel is (correctly) most 
interested in the nature of the link between the third and the second regions, most 
specifically when it comes to the problem of justification referred to eariier. Once 
thatWnk is established and shown to be 'strong enough', a further question may 
remain about a Folina-style coincidence of our understanding of the facts and the 
facts themselves, but this latter coincidence would have to depend on the quality or 
success of the fulfilment of the initial task. Whatever other ambiguities exist in 
Godel's platonism, the centrality of the idea of a division or difference between the 
formal system and its meaning remains. And so, the possibility that Godel can be 
interpreted according to the model I offer here also remains. Specifically, it remains 
feasible to interpret the difference between a formal system and its meaning as an 
essential part of any possible solution that seeks to address this particular 
interpretation of Godel's realism. It remains to explore that division and determine 
its fruitfulness - this will occur in later chapters. 
Note that my reading of Godel need not entail that, for Godel, incorrect 
mathematical statements are incomprehensible. Insofar as comprehensibility entails 
some sort of subjective meaning, incorrect mathematical formalisms may be seen 
as having just this sort: of'meaning' (analogous to Frege's 'idea'), but this is not the 
sort: of meaning that has the possibility of being true or false within mathematics. 
(The apparent circularity of this claim can be overcome via the establishment of an 
order of dependence, set out in the next chapter). So, my claim is not that 
subjective 'meaning' or 'comprehensibility' is non-existent when there is no 
independent fact of the matter, rather that it is largely irrelevant, or not genuine. 
That is, if there is no link between the second and third levels of objectivity above, 
then there is no possibility of genuine meaning, as opposed to simple 
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comprehensibility. If, on the other hand, there is a link between the second and 
third levels, then there is the possibility of genuine meaning and hence also the 
possibility of genuine error (the nature of that error is here seen as something akin 
to poor reception on our behalf, something coming between, or corrupting the 
essential link upon which the possibility of meaning depends). In other words, on 
this interpretation, the notion of primary importance to the realist and thus to Godel 
is that meaning is inextricably bound to the existence of the independent 
mathematical realm. This theory is further fleshed out in the next few chapters. 
Note also that my interpretation does not deny a link between our subjective or 
individual understanding and the formalism, or what\Ne understand (levels one and 
two above); rather, it stipulates that such a link, if it is to be relevant, depends 
upon the first: that is, the principle stipulating the inextricability of meaning and the 
real, independent mathematical realm has priority. Literally, this principle must be 
in place priorto any other possible links between levels. 
By contrast, Folina offers a middle road account whose formulation relies on an 
interpretation of realism in which, although meaning is inextricably linked to the 
formalism, it is this\\r\k that has priority over the link between meaning and the 
real realm. That is, on Folina's interpretation, we understand what we do by virtue 
of our make-up - or the way we are - as opposed to understanding what we do by 
virtue of the way mathematics is. I claim that both of these positions are true, but 
that the second has to be, at least for the realist I am interested in, a more 
important part of their overall philosophy. For example, it should be treated (at 
least) as a more effective indicator of the nature of independent mathematical 
reality than the first. 
4.5. A Poincarean Middle Road 
Having argued that Folina's initial interpretation forms the basis of her following 
strategies, we need now to look at the middle road account she offers on that 
basis. 
The primary goal for Folina in the construction of her account, is to retain the 
attraction of the constructivist position - namely, a good explanation of 
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epistemological access, and to retain this attraction whilst overcoming the 
drawbacks of the same - namely, the (general) inability of such accounts to 
provide satisfactory accounts of mathematical truth - i.e. to provide an account of 
mathematical truth ^5 objective. 
To recap, recall that the conception of the divide between realism and anti-realism 
upon which Folina's middle road account, in her [1993-4], depends is summarised 
as follows: 
in general, lack of an epistemological gap is both what is attractive and what is 
problematic about constructions; and the existence of an epistemological gap is both 
what is attractive and what is problematic about platonism (p. 204). 
It is this conception of the divide between realism and anti-realism that I take here 
to be representative of a widely accepted and commonly employed general 
approach to the problems associated with each. 
Recall that this is opposed to my interpretation wherein such a gap is 
acknowledged as important to realism's strength, but only with the proviso that 
that strength in fact derives from the priority that realism (at least, my Godelian 
interpretation of realism) gives to the independent mathematical realm itself. That 
is, under my interpretation, even the possibility that the gap Folina discusses exists 
in actual fact - i.e. in any sense relevant to mathematical truth and mathematical 
fact - itself depends upon the existence of the real mathematical realm. 
To put the same point another way, on my reading, the meaning of the formalism 
(at level two) is only relevant - or genuine - if the mathematical realm does in fact 
exist, and exist independently. Therefore, the independent mathematical realm 
itself has ultimate priority; the dependence of the formalism's meaning upon this 
realm is secondary, and the dependence of the formalism's meaning upon 
ourselves (or on our understanding) is least important. Only once this order of 
dependence (and priority) is established can this last dependence-set be said to be 
at all relevant to the independent mathematical realm, or to the nature of that 
mathematical realm. And even then, the fact that the last dependence-set is 
relevant to the independent mathematical realm cannot determine or affect the 
nature of that realm. That is, the relevance is not a determining relevance. It is, 
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rather, a relevance of association, such that without this order of priority, the last 
dependence-set has no genuine relationship at all with any of the prior 
dependence-sets. 
So asking, as Folina does, whether or not our comprehension of a mathematical 
formalism or any kind of intersubjective meaning (a.k.a. 'what we take the facts to 
be') and the objective facts correspond\s, according to my interpretation of 
realism, rather beside the point. If, instead, the point is that there is an order of 
dependence of the former on the latter and without this order of dependence, such 
realist stalwarts (or bugbears, depending on your point of view) as correspondence 
theories, or indeed any theory built in response to Folina's realist's 'gap' identified 
by Folina as the source of strength in realist's accounts, are rendered quite literally 
irrelevant on my interpretation (there will be more on why this is so in following 
chapters). 
Nonetheless, Folina builds a strong philosophy of mathematics around the gap with 
which she begins, arguing that Poincare's philosophy of mathematics successfully 
runs a middle line through the divide she has identified between realism and anti-
realism. Particularly, she argues that Poincare's philosophy provides the 
constructivists with what was previously identified as a realist strength - namely, a 
framework capable of distinguishing between the facts themselves and what we 
take them to be. 
One question here, then, is whether or not Folina's account is successful in reaping 
the benefits of the primary strengths of realism: and, more specifically, whether or 
not her account incorporates both the strong objectivity of realism and the 
'appealing epistemology' of constructive accounts. I argue that in the end it does 
not, because it cannot, due to Folina's initial conception of the realist's problematic 
divide as that between the facts and our understanding of them. On my 
interpretation, the divide (if it can be called a divide) needing to be bridged in order 
to incorporate the strong objectivity of realism, is that between the formalisms and 
independent meaning. 
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4.6. Poincare 
Poincare's ideas though, and Folina's interpretation of them, take us further toward 
'the other' than the other accounts discussed so far. This is because, although 
transcendentalism is primarily about the way we are, it leaves room for the notion 
that the way we are is a result of the way (transcendent) reality is. The difference 
between a transcendental and a phenomenological account of our relationship to 
an 'other' could fill another thesis. My own stance, though, is that a 
phenomenological account is more capable of an overt and optimistic 'space' for the 
other as a knowable reality, whereas transcendental accounts retain their mystery 
at the expense of the possibility of acquaintance. Nonetheless, given that they 
engender a solution to the problem of access which does not seek to incorporate, 
reach or demystify the 'other', it is wort:h looking at those of Poincare's ideas that 
are most central to Folina's program. 
Poincare offered a Kantian philosophy of mathematics, specifically one which took 
Kant's original ideas and sought to strengthen them against the logicist program. A 
fundamental motivation undertying both Poincare's and Kant's philosophies - and 
one which, it could be argued, underiies transcendental arguments in general - is 
the belief that certain aspects of our human experience are to be explained by 
broadening our idea of what it is to be human. The thought is that a description of 
our five senses alone (and, indeed, of whatever faculties it is generally accepted 
that humans posses) cannot account for what we know. In fact, Kant argued that 
this sort of approach cannot even account for our most basic experience of the 
wortd. So rather than attempt to explain the apparently unarguable fact that we 
posses something we want to call 'mathematical knowledge' with the resources 
afforded by widely accepted accounts of knowledge acquisition (based mainly on 
sense perception and causal theories), the Kantian picture proposes an explanation 
based on a more detailed and broader examination of what being human 
necessarily involves. It is this sort: of consideration that drives both Poincare and 
Kant to posit a faculty of mathematical intuition to explain mathematical knowledge 
acquisition. The existence of this mathematical intuition is then defended via more 
thorough accounts of what it (necessarily) is to be human, or to have the 'form of 
experience' that all humanity shares. 
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Poincare's account of what it is to be human is broader than Kanfs and therefore, 
Folina argues, offers a stronger objectivity (strong enough to compare favourably 
with that of a more traditional realism) for mathematical truth. This is because 
Poincare describes a set of necessary preconditions for what it is to be a finite 
thinking being, and for finite thinking beings collectively, whereas Kant focuses on 
humankind in particular. For Kant, experience has an a priori form, and that form is 
spatio-temporality, whereas for Poincare, intuitions are the a priori form of 
experience. 
To see this, note that it was against the Leibnitzian theory that space is a mere 
system of relations and therefore a mere concept (like, for example, the relation 
'larger than') that Kant set his theory that space is an (a priori) intuition. The 
concept of space, for Kant, is an instantiated one; space is an 'actual individual', a 
thing in itself, rather than a concept relating things. Kant reasoned thus: geometry 
is a science, which determines the properties of space synthetically, and yet its 
truths seem a priori. What then must our representation of space be in order that 
such knowledge of it is possible? He concluded that it must in its origin be intuition 
since, according to Kant, no propositions can be derived from a mere concept 
which go beyond the concept itself, as happens in geometry, unless that concept is 
an instantiated one. 
Similarly, the intuition Poincare posits is an 'intuition-of something true, rather than 
an 'intuition-that' something is true. Note too that Poincare offers arguments similar 
to Kant's from the existence of science to the existence of something else 
(arguments taking as given a certain 'way of being' which scientific thought 
embodies or is based on). An example is Poincare's argument for the existence of a 
coherent hierarchy of facts: "scientists believe that there is a hierarchy of facts, and 
that a judicious selection can be made. They are right, for otherwise there would 
be no science, and science does exist." (Poincare [1982, 363]). And again, 
Poincare's argument for the 'intuition of indefinite iteration' follows Kant's 
transcendentalism: "[the mind is] capable of conceiving the indefinite repetition of 
the same act when once this act is possible. The mind has a direct intuition of this 
power, and experience only can give occasion for using it and thereby becoming 
conscious of it" (Folina [1996, 421], quoting Poincare). Indeed, for Poincare the 
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intuitions necessary for "coherent, conceptualisable experience" (Folina [1996, 
418]) are the intuition of indefinite iteration and the intuition of continuity. The 
latter, for Poincare, is "the awareness that we posses [the] faculty" (Folina [1996, 
421], quoting Poincare) of constructing a physical and mathematical continuum. 
These two intuitions in particular, Poincare argues, are essential for both logic and 
mathematics. Note that Poincare's point is that mathematical knowledge is 
inexplicable without the positing of intuitions. The logicist's claim that a knowledge 
of logic, even if it is coupled with an account of the role of sense-perception in the 
acquisition of mathematical knowledge cannot, according to Poincare, account for 
mathematical knowledge. 
For example, Poincare argues that the principle of induction cannot be explained by 
reduction to logic nor by our experience of the worid. It is from this that he arrives 
at the conclusion that induction is synthetic a priori. 
Folina clarifies Poincare's position as follows: "for Poincare, induction is a truth 
about a priori intuition. The judgment that induction is true is synthetic since it 
requires synthesis via the intuition of indefinite iteration" (p. 423). This kind of 
argument - for the indispensability of the intuitions for mathematical/logical 
thought and, in the final analysis, for any kind of thought at all - is typical of 
Poincare's general strategy. 
4.7. Folina on Poincare 
To examine Folina's claim that Poincare's philosophy of mathematics steers a safe 
course between the problems she identifies for both mathematical realism and anti-
realism, we need now to highlight the main attraction of Poincare's arguments. To 
do this we initially need to revisit Folina's summary of these problems as, 
respectively, the problem of an epistemological 'gap' between what we 'take to be 
true' and what in fact is true, and the lack of any such gap. To elaborate furt:her on 
the motivation of her account, we need to explore the merits of the perspective 
from which Folina builds her case. 
Note again that the realist's gap, according to Folina, is introduced by the positing 
of mind-independent objects, or an abstract mathematical realm, and enables a 
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picture of mathematical truth which, in some important sense, satisfactorily 
expresses the standard of objectivity we commonly associate with mathematical 
statements. This is widely accepted to be the main attraction of realist 
philosophies: their ability to thus capture the instinctual or natural thought that 
mathematical statements are true or false, despite or 'outside of, what we believe 
about them, and that there are, therefore, as yet undiscovered mathematical 
truths, even undiscovered (even undiscoverable) axiomatic truths. So let's now 
suppose that it is indeed this gap that presents the largest obstacle for realist 
programs, regarding the question of how we come to know about the abstract 
realm. The problem now before the platonists is how to give an account of 
knowledge-acquisition that similarly satisfies our instincts - how can we picture 
ourselves learning about a realm so mysterious and seemingly inaccessible? 
It is not enough for platonism to say that we 'just do' have access to this realm, or 
that we 'just do' intuit the objects within it. What is required is an account of how 
we, as finite thinking beings, interact at all with a realm that we cannot see, touch, 
taste, hear or smell. A satisfactory account of (mathematical) knowledge acquisition 
would include viable descriptions of the working of our minds and an explanation of 
the link between these workings and the facts we came to know. But there is, to 
date, no clear or obvious candidate account able to provide this. The objectivity of 
platonism, it seems, is gained only at the cost of opening an epistemic mystery, 
one whose various resolutions do not seem to fit naturally with any intuitive or pre-
theoretical beliefs we have regarding knowledge acquisition. 
So, one of the issues here is whether Poincare's (or anyone's) philosophy offers a 
better account of knowledge acquisition (by the standards set forth here) than 
platonism has traditionally done (i.e. the 'we just do' response, and variations of it), 
since each program can be seen as offering an account that appeals primarily to 
the way we 'just are'. A possible response to this is to note that the transcendental 
philosophy put forward by Kant and Poincare maintains a strong tie to empirical 
knowledge, and to experience. Derk Pereboom [1990] addresses precisely this 
point. Pereboom argues that according to Kant, transcendental philosophy is 
justified a priori in the sense that the only empirical information needed for its 
justification can be derived from any possible human experience (p. 25). According 
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to Pereboom, Kant's restrictions on what kind of knowledge the transcendental 
point of view can provide ensure that the kind of objectivity transcendental 
philosophy provides is neither beyond human capacity nor illusory. That is, Kant's 
restriction on the transcendental point of view involves the notion of'stepping 
back'. And, in one sense, to take this point of view is indeed to take a step back 
from the empirical. This step involves 
not only remov[ing] oneself from unreflective involvement with one's ordinary 
experiences and proceed[ing] to see them as elements in the empirical wortd, but also 
com[ing] to see the whole empirical world, including one's ordinary experiences, as 
produced by the self's organisation of sensation by the categories and the forms of 
intuition (p. 29). 
The kind of objectivity Kant's philosophy affords, then, is more inclusive of, and 
further removed from experience than that of the empirical standpoint, but 
significantly /ess removed from experience than that of platonism. But the 
transcendental point of view is "not a step back with respect to the criteria for the 
justification of knowledge" (p. 29). Rather, Kant applies the same limiting condition 
to the knowledge and cognition available from the transcendental point of view as 
to that available from the empirical standpoint; namely that no knowledge is 
possible without intuition - direct awareness or cognition of objects. So in this 
respect the transcendental point of view is, after all, nota step back from the 
empirical. 
Poincare's objectivity is relative only to the form of experience of any finite thinking 
being. Thus his defence of Kant moves a further step back from ordinary human 
experience and a further step closer to the strong objectivity of platonism. 
Nonetheless, much the same point as is made above about Kant's philosophy can 
be made about Poincare's. Poincare's transcendental knowledge is a priori because 
it is independent of particular experience or observations for its justification, but it 
is still dependent on information derivable from any possible human experience, 
insofar as our concept of any possible finite thinking being must be derived from 
our own instantiation of that concept. 
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4.8. Identity Realised 
In fact, it is just this problem that constructivism tries to get around by describing 
our ability to construct mathematical objects and proofs and linking this with the 
mathematical 'realm', simply by identifying the two: i.e. according to constructivist 
accounts, our mathematical constructions themselves constitute the mathematical 
realm. Chihara [1990], for example, proposes replacing the existential theorems of 
traditional mathematics with constructability theorems such as "where, in 
traditional mathematics it is asserted that such and such exists, in this system it will 
be asserted that such and such can be constructed" (p. 25). He then goes on to 
give an account of mathematical truth by means of the constructability quantifier, 
'C. The question of how we come to know mathematical truths is then readily 
answered by the intuitively accessible picture provided by an account of how we 
are able to construct mathematical objects and proofs via their connection to 'real 
wortd' construction. 
This, though, not only closes the gap between 'the facts' and what we 'take to be 
true' but it does so on level 1, which is at some remove from reality itself; indeed 
this constructive sort of gap closing ignores independent reality altogether, since 
here what we take to be true is given by what we could construct, and what we 
could construct precisely is the mathematical realm. The strong tie to the empirical 
is clearly evident here. But using the constructive abilities of finite thinking beings 
to close the epistemological gap can be regarded as a tactic similar to Kanfs 
proposal regarding 'intuition', and hence similar to Poincare's response to the 
problem of knowledge acquisition. Predictably, the objectivity provided by the more 
blatant constructive approaches is weaker than both Poincare's and Kanfs. In fact, 
it is better described as an 'intersubjectivity', dependent upon "actual communal 
consensus in drawing the bounds of what is objectively true" (Folina [1993-4, 
224]). There is, however, another general approach available to the constructivist. 
This involves idealising the notion of construction so that what we can construct is 
equated, or nearty so, with what is objectively true. But idealising the constructor in 
this way introduces problems normally associated with platonism, namely by raising 
the question: how can an abstract 'object' or concept explain anything? Note, 
though, that the same question can be asked of Poincares idealisation across all 
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possible finite thinking beings. Where an abstract concept is used to describe our 
ability to have knowledge of abstract concepts, the natural problem that arises is 
how we come to know anything of the former or initial abstract concept. 
Another way of characterising this impasse is as follows: closing the epistemological 
gap means that non-revisionist anti-realist programs, including Chihara's 
constructivism, struggle to provide a satisfactory account of the objectivity of 
mathematical truth. There are two reasons for this. The first is that it is at best 
hard to see how such programs can lay claim to the mathematical and logical 
notions they wish to preserve, without expressing them in terms of a background 
ontology such as that of the set theoretic hierarchy. There is a dilemma confronting 
these types of programs that can be expressed as follows.^ Either the programs 
succeed in laying claim to the language used or they do not. If success /s achieved, 
the quantifiers will have to be explicated such that the level of rigour they can 
accommodate matches that of mathematics itself. In this case, though, the 
concepts - either of constructability or of possibility - will have had to have come 
loose from their epistemologically graspable moorings. From being everyday 
concepts whose workings we can understand, they will have become technical 
notions whose relationship to the real wortd and hence to easily understandable or 
everyday processes of knowledge acquisition is at best strained and, more 
probably, lost altogether. But perhaps the more serious worry here is that this kind 
of success can only ever be an illusion, achieved by sleight of hand. Shapiro's 
[1997] argument against constructivism is easily adapted to modalism and to 
mathematical anti-realism in general: 
we only understand how the constructibility locution works in Chihara's application to 
mathematics because we have a well-developed theory of logical possibility, satisfiability 
etc. and, again, this well-developed explication is not primitive or pre-theoretic. The 
art:iculated understanding is rooted in set theory, via model theory. Set theory is the 
source of the precision we bring to the modal locutions (p. 25). 
As we have seen, Shapiro goes on to offer another angle on the dilemma, via the 
principle of inter-translatability. He shows that each of the anti-realist programs he 
^ The dilemma is a version of Bob Hale's two-horned dilemma confronting Blackburn's Quasi-realism. To read 
about this, see Blackburn [1993]. 
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addresses is intertranslatable with classical logic, or traditional mathematics 
complete with its realist commitments. He then argues that the problems 
associated with each program are intertranslatable also. So constructivism, for 
instance, ends up saddled with the same problems regarding epistemological 
access as traditional realism. This is all due to the fact that each non-revisionist 
anti-realist program has to posit abstracts or use the notion of'possibility' in a 
semi-concrete sense. The point here is that Poincare's philosophy, although 
perhaps not intertranslatable in the same way, is vulnerable to the same, or at least 
to a similar point. The fundamental problems associated with positing the abstract 
objects of traditional realism are surely present when all possible finite thinking 
beings are under consideration. Interestingly, this concern itself can be addressed 
transcendentally, by supposing that the ability to run through possible worids is 
another part of the preconditions for a finite thinking being - along with the 
Poincarean preconditions - or is explicable by reference to these. But at this point, 
we reach another impasse, insofar as platonism could adopt a similar approach to 
justify the necessity of realistic thinking in general. 
The second reason anti-realist programs have trouble giving a satisfactory picture 
of mathematical objectivity is that in order to close the epistemological gap, these 
accounts seek to show that mathematics depends somehow upon us and our 
creative abilities (Folina [1993-4, 223]). But if this is the case, it is hard to see how 
mathematical truths could be necessary, rather than conventional or linguistic. With 
talk of intersubjectivity or "shared standards of admissibility and error" (p. 223) the 
gap between what the facts are and what we take them to be is forced open a 
little, but not enough to guarantee the sort of objectivity we would like. The 
necessity of mathematical truth is an intrinsic part of our understanding of its 
objectivity, and so accounts of mathematical truth upon which we can still conceive 
of finite thinking beings, other human beings, or other 'possible communities' for 
whom these primitives are not foundational to, or even intrinsic to, mathematical 
thought, falls short of the necessity requirement. 
Recall the question at hand: given Folina's initial characterisation of the respective 
strengths and weaknesses of realism and constructivism, can there be an account 
of mathematics which preserves the gap between the facts and what we take them 
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to be without failing the necessity requirement (inherent in our conception of 
objectivity) and without being impaled on either horn of Hale's dilemma, or 
something like it? 
Poincare's philosophy does seem promising. It seeks to explicate the concept of 
mathematical intuition in such a way as to answer epistemological concerns, and to 
demonstrate how we need not look to any abstract realm beyond ourselves, or at 
least beyond our understanding of'finite thinking being' in order to accommodate 
the sort of objectivity we require of mathematical truth. It also seems (given the 
brief considerations two paragraphs above) that Poincare's philosophy could have a 
transcendental solution - albeit a self-referential one - to Hale's dilemma. Further, 
the dilemma is activated by those anti-realist programs which seek to show some 
undertying 'deep structure' behind mathematical language by providing, to take the 
current examples, a constructive or modal 'backdrop' and arguing that this is prior 
to the 'surface' semantics, or to the form of mathematical language itself. Although 
Poincare's philosophy does run up against a hybrid of the dilemma, it nonetheless 
incorporates no such program. 
The Kantian method of obtaining the sort of objectivity we require of mathematics 
is to argue that mathematical truth is universally (or potentially universally) 
intersubjective. Poincare expands Kanfs universe and so strengthens the 
transcendental claim to objectivity, but at what cost? Is Poincare's advance over 
constructivism any less expensive in the long run than the platonisfs? Specifically, 
does Poincare's account have any great advantage over the proposed realist 
desiderata that real meaning is located on the objective level? More generally, how 
do the philosophical systems in which intuition and transcendental arguments play 
a key role compare with philosophical systems in which an abstract mathematical 
realm provides the main foundation? It seems that any good account of how we 
come to know mathematics - including Poincare's intuition and strengthened 
version of objectivity - must, in the end, be at least as mysterious as the platonisfs 
independent realm. 
In fact, I think that Poincare's positing of intuition does provide a good account of 
knowledge acquisition, and manages, too, to incorporate a strong degree of 
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objectivity. But the issues raised as a result still need a great deal of attention 
before Poincare's philosophy can be said to have made significant gains over either 
constructivism or platonism. In the end, Poincare's intuitions are no less mysterious 
than the idea of a fully independent mathematical reality, and do less justificatory 
or grounding work. The idea of an independent ground is (for a good many realists 
at least) a powerful, perhaps inescapable intuition in itself. Attempts to circumvent 
it seem only to replace mystery with mystery. Doing away with the mystery of an 
'other', though, does away with the most potent expression of necessary 
mathematical truth and objectivity that we can hope to imagine - namely, the idea 
of a relationship between us and an 'other', of a ground, and of the notion that we 
'discovef rather than create mathematics. 
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5. Dependence 
5.1 . Abstract Objects/Ordinary Objects 
The previous chapters have gone over various different perceptions of, ways to 
model, and perceived associated problems with, the strengths and weaknesses of 
realism and anti-realism in general. I have sought to show that each of the 
formulations discussed falls short: in some way of attaining either the realist 
desiderata outlined in the introduction, or the authors' own realist ideals, or both. 
In these final few chapters, I attempt to capture and fully express the ideals of a 
full-blown realism, incorporating, undistilled, the set of desiderata with which we 
began. How the resulting position compares to those discussed so far remains to be 
seen. The principal task at hand is not to compete with the accounts presented but 
to articulate a realism which does not undermine or sacrifice any of the ideals 
outlined, and so to discover precisely what is retained, what is lost and exactly 
which problems remain for a realist account with this particular agenda. Hopefully, 
it will become apparent that the realism I arrive at is no more problematic than 
those discussed so far, and perhaps it has an advantage over them simply by being 
to a certain extent, an ideal version of them - at least insofar as it retains some of 
the more crucial components of the stated principles and/or beliefs of realism in 
general. 
5.2. By Contrast 
The realist accounts touched on so far have all attempted, in one way or another, 
to overcome a set of identified problems for realism. And this attempt has been, for 
each, a principal task. It seems to me that the full expression of the realist 
principles or ideals underlying this attempt is thus relegated to a secondary task, or 
is balanced against the principal task so that each is forced to accommodate the 
other. My method takes its inspiration from this observation, and reverses the order 
of importance of the tasks at hand. That is, my initial and primary aim is to come 
up with a realism that retains, as completely as possible, the set of desiderata 
outlined, and to see what problems remain. I then turn, as a secondary 
consideration, to the question of whether those problems can be addressed or 
solved and, finally, to whether they undermine my account any more than the 
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problems left outstanding in the other accounts discussed. In the final chapter, I 
make use of some ideas from phenomenology to argue that my mathematical 
realism is no more problematic than an analogous physical realism, which in turn is 
no more problematic than our relationship to the physical world itself, even 
accounting for the best of our scientific theories and the vast reach of our 
experience. 
I begin, then, by retreading ground already laid down in the discussions of some of 
the accounts represented thus far. Recall some of the problems motivating realist 
accounts in general: what are abstract objects? Are they real, and in what sense? If 
they exist at all, then how? And, given that we cannot see, taste, touch, smell or 
hear them, how do we come to know anything at all about them? 
These questions, and more like them, are classically the bane of realist philosophy 
across the board. It seems that just as soon as one adopts the belief - and wishes 
to articulate this belief sensibly - that the abstract is as real as the ordinary (or at 
least, as real as the physical is commonly presumed to be), one immediately takes 
on the burden of providing answers to questions such as these. 
But, rather than form my own expression of this realist belief (applying in particular 
to the abstract objects of mathematics) around an attempt to address such 
questions, what I am proposing is, essentially, a new set of questions with which to 
begin - one which shifl:s the emphasis away from ourselves and on, instead, to the 
abstract itself, at least in much the same way as an emphasis is often already 
placed upon the objects themselves when we come to inquire after ordinary 
objects. 
Rather than ask regarding a thing that we cannot receive via our five senses how 
then we come to know anything about it, or have anything at all to do with it I 
propose that we look at the sort of underlying assumptions that drive us to ask 
these sorts of questions before ar\y others. The classical problems (e.g. those given 
above as the problems motivating realist accounts, and also in Benaceraffs [1965]) 
need not, I think, come first'm our investigations. I think that our inclination to give 
priority to such questions is initially more attractive than prioritising other, perhaps 
equally important questions, only because of an initial priority given to an 
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immediate disanalogy between abstract and ordinary objects: namely that ordinary 
objects are accessible via our five senses and abstract ones are not. 
Instead of beginning with this ofeanalogy (and others), and with the classical 
questions it inspires, my expression of the belief in the reality of abstract objects 
begins with a scrutiny of the nature of, and our relationship to, ordinary objects. In 
this way I hope to have possible analogous features of the two sorts of things 
brought to our attention before their admittedly compelling disanalogous features. I 
will take my lead from the questions that arise as a result of this strategy, and 
accordingly form my own expression of the belief in the reality of abstract objects 
around these, rather than the classical questions. 
This approach is, prima facie, a kind of naturalism, in so far as it appears to use 
only our more established (scientific, psychological and experience-based) theories 
about the worid and from there to answer questions about the mathematical realm 
using these tools of inquiry. But what I am proposing is in fact akin to naturalistic 
approaches only insofar as it adopts a kind of blanket attitude to physical and 
abstract objects alike. Contra naturalism, though, this is less because I believe 
abstract objects are like physical objects, and more the other way around. Physical 
objects, in their fundamentally (metaphysically) inscrutable nature, their 
unknowableness and their mysteriousness, share a list of important features with 
abstract objects. To ask of abstract objects, but not of physical objects (whose 
nature is presumed to be eternal, unchanging, acausal etc.) just what they are, 
how we come to know anything at all about them, etc., is to approach the general 
problem of knowledge acquisition with a bias already firmly in place - one that 
assumes that such questions have already been resolved, or are at least less 
pertinent for physical objects. I hope to show (via a phenomenological approach to 
physical objects) that such questions have not been resolved for physical objects -
so to demand they be resolved for abstract objects is inappropriate, and is equally 
as futile (or fruitful, according to your part:icular degree of optimism) an exercise as 
trying to prove that anything whatsoever exists besides, or external to ourselves. 
My project, then, reasons that the main problem for a realism regarding physical 
objects is not the problem of access. (We presume that problem is solved with the 
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descriptions of how our five senses access reality.) The main problem for a physical 
realism is, rather, the problem of how the accessed reality is (or is the same as a 
reality which is) independent of that access. Put another way, the problem is one of 
access on another level: how does the accessed object relate to (or access) 
independent reality? So, even if the story we told of just how we access 
mathematical objects was as satisfactory as that which we tell of how we access 
physical objects (i.e. even if mathematical intuition, or our mathematical 
comprehension was as clear and as acceptable a method of knowledge acquisition 
as the five senses), even then, a fundamental realist problem remains. And this 
problem - that presented by the gap between what we access and what 
independently is - is no less a problem for physical reality than it is for 
mathematical reality. Our senses 'give' something we call physical reality. Our 
mathematical comprehension 'gives' something we call mathematical reality. No 
matter how effective or satisfactory a story we can tell about just how these 
realities are given, this further, seemingly intractable, problem still remains, at least 
for the realist. Put another way, the realist still has to ask just how the something 
that is 'given' is independent of ourselves and our methods of access. This amounts 
to asking how what the senses or our intuition gives is also other than what our 
senses or intuition gives. This is the problem that unites physical and abstract 
entities, and so it is the problem that occupies this author. That there remains the 
classic problem of access is granted. But since the solution to this problem gets us 
only as far as it gets the physical realist, which is no further than the problem of 
independence, the former and not the latter problem is the primary focus of this 
work. 
It is probably already clear that of the features of ordinary objects upon which I 
hope to focus, I want primarily to focus on our attitudes toward them. In particular 
I want to focus on the way we tend initially to emphasise the objects themselves, 
rather than any set of problems surrounding them. That is, we tend, in our inquiries 
regarding ordinary objects, to direct our attention toward the objects themselves as 
the source, or at least a primary source from which a solution ought to be 
informed. Science, after all, ofl:en seeks to eliminate the observer and aims to direct 
attention to the observable objects themselves. What if our initial approach toward 
abstract objects was no different? Answering this question means beginning my 
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own expression of realism regarding (mathematical) abstract objects with an 
emphasis similar to that with which our investigations of the ordinary begins. And 
this means, initially, focusing on the objects themselves rather than on the observer 
- ourselves. 
With the objects themselves as my start:ing and focal point, I will, I hope, come up 
with some interesting new solutions to the questions with which this chapter 
began: i.e. those classically provoked by the articulation of realist philosophy in 
general. I will also show that one of the results of this approach is that many such 
problems can be, or ought to be, avoided by means of highlighting their 
inappropriateness and, finally, even their inapplicability to the realist position I 
present. 
5.3. A New Approach 
Grant, then, that a primary motivation for the set of problems that classically ar\^ 
for the realist regarding the abstract is the initial idea that there is a stark 
disanalogy (beginning with that already touched upon - the accessibility of the 
ordinary versus the inaccessibility of the abstract via our five senses) between the 
(proposed) real abstract things and real ordinary or material things. So compelling 
is this immediate disanalogy that the term 'real', uniting the two kinds of things just 
as much as it does, can seem entirely misappropriated when applied to abstract 
objects. Abstract objects can seem to be not 'real' at all, not at least in any way 
similar to the way in which ordinary objects are. 
One response that a realist regarding the abstract can make to this train of thought 
is to try to make the abstract seem more ordinary. Maddy's Set Theoretic 
Naturalism is a case in point, as is Shapiro's Structuralism. Another possible 
response for such a realist is to grant that the abstract and the ordinary are indeed 
two different sorts of things, but then to argue that this does not mean that 
abstract things are any less deserving of being called 'real' than ordinary things are. 
ZaIta and Linsky's 'principled platonism' makes this response. 
My own approach, broadly stated, is the reverse of the first. I do not attempt to 
overcome the immediate dissimilarities between the two sort:s of things, or attempt 
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to make the abstract seem more ordinary. That is, I do not begin with the abstract 
realm and search there for ways in which that sort of thing, or our relationship to it, 
is, aft:er all, similar to the ordinary. Instead, I begin with the ordinary and try to 
form judgments as to the possible analogous and disanalogous aspects of the 
abstract and the ordinary, via a close/phenomenological analysis of ordinarythmgs 
and our relationship with them. In particular, I propose that we re-examine our 
relationship to ordinary things and the nature of the existence of ordinary things 
themselves, and search there for features from which analogies can be drawn with 
our relationship to, and the nature of, the existence of abstract things. 
I begin, then, with an immediate consideration of the ordinary, and move to a 
consideration of the possible analogous aspects of the ordinary and the abstract. 
After all, the question 'in which ways, if any, are the abstract and the ordinary 
analogous?' offers as interesting a place to start as its perhaps more obvious, 
inverted twin. This move is not new. It is, in fact, this sort of move that can get a 
realist about the abstract into trouble in the first place, principally by (once again) 
inviting the contrary consideration. What is new is the call back to the prior 
consideration of the analogous aspects of the ordinary and the abstract, based on 
an investigation of the ordinary and our relationship to it, rather than on an initial 
attempt to overcome the obvious problematic features of the abstract. Also new is 
the particular analogy between the ordinary and the abstract that I propose. 
5.4. How Are Ordinary Objects Analogous to Abstract Objects? 
One of the ways in which the abstract and the ordinary are analogous is that they 
are both able to be spoken of. The most obvious instance of this is just that they 
can be compared. This is an assumption of both the considerations tabled above. 
That is, consideration of the possible disanalogous aspects of the ordinary and the 
abstract, and consideration of the possible analogous aspects of the two, both 
admit this much. There would be literally nothing to speak of if this were not the 
case. 
This immediate similarity between the two suggests a line of investigation along 
which many more such (immediately linguistic) similarities appear. Of both abstract 
and ordinary objects we are able to speak. About both we are able sensibly to ask 
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similar sorts of questions. Crucially, of our relationship to both we can ask how 
much of what we understand (the things themselves to be, and of the things 
themselves) is somehow received from the things themselves, and how much we 
ourselves have somehow created, or constituted. This question is applicable both to 
the abstract and to the ordinary, and ought, therefore, to be among the first 
focused upon, in accordance with the strategy outlined above. 
Certainly, when asked of our relationship to the ordinary, this is not a vacuous 
question. Consider for a moment the legitimacy or otherwise of our assumptions 
regarding the ordinary. Is there reason to suppose that ordinary objects exist 
independently of us - or our creations, definitions, constructions etc. - so that our 
understanding of these objects is somehow more received than created? And, if 
there is reason, how much? 
Godel suggests that it is precisely here, at the applicability of this question to both, 
that the ordinary and the abstract are in fact the same, or at least analogous: "It 
seems to me [Godel] that the assumption of such [abstract] objects is quite as 
legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason 
to believe in their existence", (Maddy [1998, 92], quoting Godel) and "the objects 
and theorems of mathematics are as objective and independent of our free choice 
and our creative acts as is the physical wortd" (Maddy [1998, 89], quoting Godel). 
I think that Godel's point could be put this way: in as much as we have reason to 
believe in the existence of the ordinary, we have reason to believe in the existence 
of the abstract. And this point can be argued by trying to show something stronger: 
that we have as much reason to believe in the independentexxstence of abstract 
objects as we do to believe in the independentex\ster]ce of ordinary objects. 
This approach works from our beliefs regarding the ordinary, and attempts to show 
that our opinions regarding the reasonableness or otherwise of these beliefs can 
quite legitimately be mapped without too significant a change onto our opinions 
regarding the reasonableness or otherwise of our beliefs regarding the abstract. 
Again, rather than making the abstract seem more ordinary, such an approach can 
make the ordinary seem more abstract. But that is no bad thing, or at least it ought 
not be assumed to be a bad thing at the outset without some further argument. 
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5.5. Understanding Ordinary (and Abstract) Objects 
That it is not a bad thing is, in fact, the approach I wish to adopt, specifically in 
response to the question touched on eariier, regarding the independence or 
othenA/ise of abstract objects. This sort of inquiry into the independence or 
otherwise of abstract objects can itself be refined or represented to reveal further 
analogous features of the ordinary and the abstract. To be more specific, we can 
ask, 'upon what does our understanding of such things (both abstract and ordinary) 
depend?' - or, (put another way) 'what are the preconditions of our 
understanding?' Note that this question can be put in terms of our apprehension, 
our perception, and even our consciousness of, abstract and ordinary things alike 
(for now I use the term 'understanding' to cover all of the former concepts, and do 
so to encapsulate a broader scope of our approach to, and acquaintance with, 
objects in general). 
When applied to the ordinary, this is a compelling, problematic and complex 
question. Again, in accordance with the strategy outlined, I will try to show what 
happens when we suppose that this question is at least as compelling, problematic 
and complex when applied to the abstract, and that it is so in just the same (or 
isomorphic) ways. To anticipate (and reiterate), what happens is that we arrive at 
an expression of realism about abstract objects that is able to cast a new light on 
the 'classic' sorts of problems raised earlier. 
Consider the host of possible factors upon which our understanding of the ordinary, 
material world might depend. The presence or existence of the ordinary itself is a 
possible factor, or at least our reception of something that looks, feels, tastes, 
sounds or smells like the ordinary. This is the factor I will concentrate on in what 
follows. I hope to show that the way in which our understanding of ordinary things 
depends upon the existence of those things themselves, is very much like the way 
in which our understanding of mathematical things depends upon mathematical 
things themselves. The realism thereby constructed will, hopefully, fulfil the 
desiderata for realism outlined eariier. Other possible factors might be our 
upbringing, or the social constructs that seem to inform our perception. The list 
goes on. 
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In order to more fully articulate the first factor (that of the presence or absence of 
the objects themselves) and in order to further explore the questions posed, I focus 
on one particular response to such questions - the phenomenological response. 
That is, I plan to use phenomenology as a vehicle for my own ideas. I do not plan 
to give an exposition of the phenomenological approach, per se. Rather, I offer an 
outline of my own interpretation of those sections of phenomenological theory that 
seem to aid expression of my own theory. Phenomenology, then, is largely treated 
as a framework upon which to hang my account. The same approach is taken 
toward ideas dubbed 'Fregean'. Again, these ideas are not supposed to be an 
exposition of Frege's philosophy. In sum, I use the terms 'phenomenology', or 
'Husserlian', or 'Fregean' simply to acknowledge the inspiration for the ideas 
presented, and the authors whose original ideas I am reinterpreting, and nothing 
more. 
Returning now to the question 'upon what does our understanding of ordinary 
objects depend?', phenomenology's short answer is 'consciousness'. Everything, 
according to Husseri, depends on our individual consciousness, or on our own 
undeniable ego. Before examining phenomenology's longer answer, note again that 
I will not be following the theory of phenomenology as a whole or per se. For a 
start, phenomenology treats abstract and ordinary objects differently.^ By contrast, 
I want to map the phenomenological approach regarding ordinary objects onto a 
realist approach to abstract objects. Note that my argument will not seek initially 
(or perhaps even primarily) to show that the phenomenological approach to 
ordinary objects /sin fact directly applicable to abstract objects (and, in accordance 
with this, that that approach is an analogous 'feature' of the ordinary with the 
abstract), but just that it is at least as reasonable as it is not to start with an initial 
supposition that it is, and if\Ne suppose it is, then we arrive at an expression of a 
realist belief (or at least a belief that abstract objects are as real as ordinary ones) 
that avoids some of the problems outlined eariier, classically associated with realist 
positions in general. 
^ For a good explication and defence of this claim, see Tieszen's "l^lathematics". In Smith [1995, 438-463], 
specifically pp. 447-449. 
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5.6. A Phenomenological/Fregean Approach 
Now for phenomenology's longer answer. Ordinary material things (physical reality, 
all of 'nature', etc) are, according to this theory, 'given to' consciousness, and so, in 
a certain sense depend on consciousness for their 'being'. There is a distinction to 
be drawn here between our consciousness that is part of nature (or tied to ordinary 
material things such as our brain and body) and the consciousness which 
phenomenology studies. The latter is independent of nature. It is, according to 
Levinas, [1998], "philosophy's starting point", and it starts by "exclud[ing] all 
propositions which have nature for their object" (p. 20), or which have anything 
other than this pure, transcendental consciousness as their object. 
The place to begin then, according to Husseri, is with consciousness. In particular, 
with its aspect of being "the relationship to an object", the aspect called 
"intentionality" (p. 20). And yet, considering intentionality itself as the object of 
study brings into play almost every other factor upon which we might suppose our 
understanding of ordinary things to depend: 
Intention, the relation of consciousness to the object, is not an empty look upon the 
object whose sole function is to supply that object... in order to study how the object is 
given to consciousness it does not suffice to study this 'empty look' (p. 20). 
The factor now drawn into play that I'm particularly interested in is that of the 
presence of the ordinary thing itself. If 'relation to an objecf is the primitive 
phenomenon that phenomenology studies, then so is the object of this relation. 
This is made clearer when we consider the 'empty look': that aspect of the relation 
consisting of the various attitudes we, the ego, might have toward the object. If 
this aspect were all there was to the relation, then joy, desire, judgment, 
perception, representation and the like would be the only possible factors 
phenomenology introduces as candidates upon which our comprehension of the 
object might depend. But these attitudes, according to Husseri, all have "the 
function of giving the object" and "it is precisely for this reason that the problem of 
knowledge - the study of the relationship to the object - opens up an infinite field 
of research" (all quotations p. 21). 
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Husserl goes on to say that the 'giving of the objecf in a complex of intentions 
gives rise to such 'constitutional problems' as "how these intentions are bound 
together when the object constituted by them is given as existing, as known with 
reason, and what the acts are that give it as pure appearance" (p. 21). Here 
Husseri makes a point similar to one Frege (from Coffa [1991]) made eariier: "that 
while understanding does involve "giving" the object in question, it need not 
necessarily be "given" in the mode of acquaintance" (p. 81). Husseri's similar point 
is that there is a distinction between objects given as existing, and objects given as 
'pure appearance'. This distinction invites a problem: which are the acts that 
transcend themselves and reach their object? The problem Frege faces, on the 
other hand (and put in Fregean terms) is: "under what circumstances does 
understanding take place (or how do we distinguish apparent propositional 
understanding from the real thing)!" (p. 81). 
Frege, in his solution to the latter problem, assumes the independent existence of 
the 'real wortd' of ordinary material objects, and then asks how this existing worid 
is related to what we understand: that is, he offers an exploration that emphasises 
the importance of the (assumed) existing obiecX. to a 'real' understanding of it. 
Husseri, in his solution to the former problem, examines the ways in which the 'real 
wortd' of ordinary material objects is given to consciousness as existing. That is, he 
offers an analysis of the nature of the existence assumption itself. So, Husseri's 
theory seeks to establish just when the Fregean assumption is justified. 
I take Husseri's solution to the first problem as a foundation for Frege's solution to 
the second. It is possible thereby to construct the theory that real (or successful) 
understanding of an ordinary object depends on (at least) two things: (1) the 
assumption of an object whose existence is independent of our understanding, and 
(2) the accuracy of that assumption, i.e. upon the ob]&± justifiablybe\r\q given to 
consciousness 55 existing independent of our understanding. According to my 
theory, then, understanding depends on there being a link of some sort: between 
our understanding of something and that part:icular thing itself. If this link is to be a 
link between two different things (ourselves and reality) rather than a link between 
ourselves and the constructions of our own minds - a kind of metamorphosis of 
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ourselves into another reality -then the link itself has to depend on the thing 
actually being there, actually existing independently; even of its role in the forgoing 
relationship as 'the thing itself. 
There are two relationships present in the foregoing proposition. To see this, recall 
that I have previously talked of'levels', outlining (Derrida's) three levels: (1) 'the 
word's ideal objectivity' (the recognisable physical word or mathematical symbol); 
(2) 'the word's sense' (the meaning, or what I call the mathematical formalism) and 
(3) 'independent idealities' (what I have called independent reality). The two 
relationships to which I now (and from now on) refer are those between levels (2) 
and (3), and between (3) and 'the other'. In what follows, the 'first level', or 'level 
1' is the place wherein the first of these relationships occurs, and the 'second level' 
or 'level 2' is the place for the second. 
That (3) and 'the other' are two separate things can be grasped, at least intuitively, 
by noting that what we call or perceive as independent reality is not necessarily 
'what is out there' at all. We have to assume at some point (if we're realist), that 
there is independent reality, and that we can name, perceive or relate to it - but I 
argue that we should not suppose that 'independent reality' simply is reality itself, 
as it exists apart from us. What is truly 'other' than us cannot be contained in our 
own assumptions. And yet, of course, those assumptions are vital to any realist 
philosophy, and indeed to our ability to exist in a worid containing 'others' at all; 
and so I affirm both that the 'other' cannot be contained in our assumptions nor 
grasped by our comprehension, and that it must be. 
There is, on the first level, a relationship between what is accessed by our 
understanding and the thing itself. But there is a second level, occupied by the 
relationship between the thing itself ofthe relationship on the first level and the 
thing itself, simpliciter- i.e. between the assumed or circumscribed existing object 
and the independent, actual existing object. I will argue that successful or real 
understanding and, by extension, understanding in general, depends on the 
possibility of the relationships on both levels being identity relationships (with some 
important provisos). That is, I will argue that successful understanding takes place 
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when our understanding of a thing is identical to the thing itself, and the thing itself 
is identical to the assumed 'thing itself of the previous identity. 
Derrida's Three Levels 
1: Mathematical 
Word / Symbol 
I 
2: Word's Sense 
3: Independent 
Idealities 
My Interpretation 
...expresses... 
FORMALISM ^^\A^J (or Word's meaning) JK ^y\ 
identical to / different from 
INDEPENDENT O T H E R V / ' ^ 7 
(or object the Word jL ^y\ 
refers to) ^ ^ / NTx \ 
identical to / different from"* 
TRUE OTHER 
(Uncircumscribable) 
My Focus 
Level 1 
Level 2 
(Recall that 'formalism' can be seen as Frege's 'thought', and 'the independent 
other' can be seen as Frege's 'referenf - provided, in the latter case, that one 
reads Frege as ascribing independence to the referent.) 
5.7. Identity 
Phenomenology goes some way toward clarifying these prospective identities. 
Although the phenomenological reduction (of which more will be said in later 
chapters) initially excludes ordinary things as the object of study and focuses 
instead on consciousness, the things themselves are "recovered" in the 
phenomenological "attitude" ^5 whatever they were for consciousness. Their 
specific "way of being an object" (all quotations Levinas [1998, 22]) now properly 
becomes the focus of study. The object as perceived, judged, desired etc. is called 
the noema. The noema is both different from, as well as inseparable from, the act 
of consciousness (called the noesis) in which it is given. This idea, of the co-
136 
existence of difference and identity at this level - the first level - is important to my 
theory. In part:icular, I apply the idea on the second level as well, to clarify the 
phrase 'the independent existence of the objecf. That is, I take the phrase 'the 
independent existence of the objecf, when applied to abstract objects, to mean 
much the same thing as 'the object pole of intention' when (phenomenologically) 
applied to ordinary objects. The 'object pole of intention' is different from, and yet 
in an important sense, identical to the noema. According to phenomenology, the 
way ordinary objects are given as existing is both the same as and different from 
the existing object itself. This is at the level of the object. But in order to 
understand the co-existence of identity and difference, or the idea 'same yet 
different' at the level of the object, we need to briefly look again at the same idea 
as it appears at the first level - the level of consciousness, or of the object as 
perceived. 
Levinas [1998] puts it this way: 
The worid, the objects of the natural sciences and ontologies, excluded by "reduction", 
reappear - "in quotes" as Hussert puts it - within the immanent sphere of 
consciousness, where they are studied as noemata... But this means that the study of 
consciousness permits us to grasp the way of being of each category of objects in 
consciousness, and thus to study the meaning of the existence of things....Everywhere 
the noesis Is given with Its Intentional correlate, the noema: the noesis of desire with the 
noema ''the desired as desired", the noesis of willing with the noema "the willed as 
willed" etc. A study ofthe nature of consciousness shows a rigorous parallelism between 
the noemata and the noesis in all the domains of consciousness (pp. 22-23, italics mine, 
apart from those undertined). 
Levinas' ideas offer a position from which to further clarify the term 'understanding' 
and to separate it from the elements upon which it might depend. I take 
'understanding' to be the 'act of consciousness' itself - the noesis of the quotation 
above. But that is not the end of the story. Recall that the phenomenological theory 
is here being taken only as a foundation. The framework takes its lead from Frege, 
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and as such it already assumes what phenomenology seeks to establish - the 
existence of an independent reality. ^ 
That is, phenomenological theory has established that there is 'a rigorous 
parallelism' between our 'understanding' of ordinary objects (noesis) and the way in 
which these objects are given to consciousness. I add a Fregean framework to this 
result by supposing that there are ordinary objects already existing. I also suppose 
that the existence of these ordinary objects is what produces th\s 'rigorous 
parallelism' and that this occurs by dint of the fact that their existence is 
independent of the existence that is given to consciousness (that which I call the 
mathematical formalism - and Husserl calls 'noemata'). 
5.8. The Bare Bones 
According to my account, then, the 'rigorous parallelism' between noemata and 
noesis occurs when there is a yor/oridentity relation between the noemata and the 
independently existing object - i.e. when the noemata /5the independent object 
itself. In other words, my approach takes the focus off what is given to 
consciousness (the 'constituted' object) and shifts it, instead, onto the object itself. 
The object is taken as existing independently of the 'constituted objecf given to 
consciousness, but (when successful understanding takes place) being identical 
with it. Although this is a move that phenomenology in some sense disallows, it is 
phenomenology that provides the means by which such a move can be best 
described and justified. And it is upon the assumption that this move is justified 
that my theory can be built. 
Returning, then, to the (now foundational) level of the object simpliciter. Note that 
the predicates that form the noemata's 'nucleus' (that which is common to different 
acts of consciousness directed to the same object) are necessarily predicates of 
something. This something phenomenology introduces as "the object simply" - that 
which "cannot be omitted by a description that would be exact" (p. 25). It is 
^ Specifically, my theory is only Fregean insofar as it is a theory of how rea/understanding depends on the 
object's rea/existence itself. This is not to say that, for Frege, sense depends on reference, but that his sense 
fixes a referent - that there is, for Frege 'a thing meant: "The regular connection between a sign, its sense, 
and what it means is of such a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and to that In turn a 
definite thing meant" (Frege [1984,159]). 
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specifically this - the object simply - that is called the "object pole of intention" (p. 
26). 
I take phenomenology's 'object pole of intention' to be the independent object 
itself. So the independent other can be thought of as the object of the predicates 
forming the noemata's (or the formalism's) nucleus. And it is this 'independent 
objecf that can be identical to that which is given to consciousness - the formalism 
- (although this identity has provisos, and the identification itself needs to be 
justified - more of this later). Put another way, the independent object can be 
identified with - i.e. literally identical to - the noemata (more specifically, the 
noemata's nucleus). And it is when this identity can justifiably be drawn that further 
identities can also be drawn, using this identity as their base. The resulting account 
then has the capacity to connect the 'real worid' with our understanding of it. 
So, the pieces are now in place to develop a theory of how we understand when 
we (successfully or 'really') understand an independently existing object. 
Particulariy, we can develop a theory of how this understanding depends both upon 
the reception of the independent object itself, and our perception of it as an 
independently existing object. Real understanding, according to Husseri, "can only 
consist in the claim of not only positing [the] object as existing, but of having a 
right to do so" (p. 26). This is about reception of the independent object itself. This 
question asks when the identity relationship holds at the second level - between 
the object simpliciter (or 'the other') and the object within the grasp of our 
understanding (or the 'independent other', which is able to be identified with 'the 
formalism'). 
As Levinas puts it, "The question confronting us now is: How is the act 
characterised in which this claim is justified? In what does this right of 
consciousness to posit its object as existing consist?" (p. 26). This, in fact, is 
exactly how I have interpreted Godel's problem of justification. This interpretation 
directly determines just what counts and does not count as a solution to the 
problem, just because the problem itself can only be expressed within a framework 
that differentiates our own understanding, the thing understood (or collective 
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understanding - a.k.a. the formalism), the independent object, and the other -
(that which is uncircumscribable but also identifiable as the independent other). 
Ultimately, the problem does need to ask the question, 'does this independent 
object exist?' But I believe that the answer to such a question is something we can 
only guess at, so, in the end, we can not know or prove that a mathematical claim 
is justified. What we can reasonably present, though, is what we and the worid, 
and to a certain extent, mathematics, would look like if (most) mathematical claims 
were just that - justified. What I am interested in is the role of the assumption that 
the other exists. Phenomenology leaves a space where 'the other' might be; it 
shows us what we look like in relation to an other and of what, precisely, that 
relationship consists. It includes the other as a denizen of (our) real wortd, as well 
as excluding it from our world. It allows both that we 'access' and do not 'access' 
the other. My more Fregean sentiment simply assumes that the space is filled. And 
my more Fregean point is that if the latter sentiment is correct, then 
phenomenology is complete. From being a picture of what could be, it becomes a 
picture of what is. 
Frege (Coffa [1991]) introduced the realm of sense as a response to the two major 
problems of semantics: "what is it that we understand, and under what 
circumstances does understanding take place?" (p. 81). Sense, for Frege, was what 
we understand. So, in accordance with the above, sense is 'the noemata'. In 
opposition to the phenomenological model though, sense was also for Frege a way 
(though not necessarily an effective way) of reaching the referent, or the 'object 
itself. Sense, in Fregean terms, should ideally select the truth-relevant elements of 
'the real worid' that correspond to the grammatical units of a claim. On this sort of 
schema, when the sense of a claim does in fact correspond to its referent, then real 
understanding takes place. And this is opposed to the (^ yOyOi^ re/?/-understanding that 
takes place when the proposition's sense does not correspond to its referent. So, 
re^/understanding, Frege-wise, has more to do with the noemata than the noesis 
of phenomenology - specifically with whether the noemata is filled or empty (or, in 
my terms, with whether the independent object exists, and so can 'fill' or be 
identified with the formalism). And so recruiting Fregean notions enables the 
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retention of an emphasis on the independent object itself (with which we began), 
and in this way the importance of that independent object is reasserted. 
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6. Meaning 
6.1. Three - Tiered Identity 
The object itself is also of primary importance for the theory of meaning in my 
account. I have already gone some way toward establishing the core of the theory 
of meaning I put forward in this chapter: namely that the presence of the 
independent object is a prerequisite for the presence of real meaning. In what 
follows, this idea is elucidated and enlarged upon. 
The previous chapter put in place the relationship between the object of our 
understanding/the formalism and 'the thing itself, or 'the thing simpliciter', which, 
when it exists and is present, is also the thing that exists independently even of its 
role in the foregoing relationship i^s'the thing itself. 
In particular, the previous chapter put forward the theory that this relationship 
itself - and indeed the possibility of such a relationship - depends on the existence 
of an independent other - a thing wholly outside its role (or name) in the 
relationship. Beside 'the thing itself, names or descriptions of this role tabled thus 
far have included phrases such as 'the referenf, 'the independently existing objecf 
and 'the object pole of intention'. Furt:her phrases might be added to the list: 'the 
unnameable', 'the self-sufficient', 'that which is outside of language', and so on. 
My theory has proceeded on the supposition that despite its independence of all we 
might say or even think about it, the existence of such a thing is nonetheless a 
necessary precondition for the meaningfulness of all we might say or think about it 
- in particular, to the relationship between it and any role it might play in our 
language and our thought. 
Two levels of operation have been identified and, at each level, the possibility of a 
relationship between two separate things was established. Put briefly, there is a 
relationship at the first level between what we understand - the formalism (the 
object of our comprehension, or what we comprehend as mathematics), and the 
'thing itself. The 'thing itself here is not necessarily the (fully) independent other 
per se, but it is something like (to borrow a phrase from Shapiro) the 'office' of the 
independent other. It is the place where the thing itself is, only when the thing 
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itself in fact does occupy the office we have supposed for it, i.e. when there is, and 
we do indeed access, an independent, wholly other reality. 
And so, the second relationship (i.e. the relationship on the second level), is a 
relationship between the office ofthe thing itself and its potential occupant, the 
thing itself simpliciter. This can be thought of as the relationship between the 
assumed existing object and the actual existing object - the object whose existence 
is strictly independent, particularly of the office it can occupy. 
That is: 
• At the first level, there is a relationship between understood, or 
comprehended mathematics - the formalism - and the 'independent 
objecf. 
• At the second level, there is a relationship between the 'independent 
objecf and the (uncircumscribable) independent object. 
The formalism is the office of the independent object, and the independent object 
is the office of 'the other'. 
That is: 
[ [ [ ] ] ] = The formalism contains the independent other contains/(is the space for) the uncontainable. 
On my model, the suppositions that mathematics is correct and that mathematical 
reality is independent, taken together amount to the resolution of these two 
relationships into identities. 
The relationships are identity relationships. 
That is: 
[ ] = l(the formalism)*l(the independent object)*l(the other) 
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That is, on this interpretation, when a mathematician has 'got it right', the office 
'the thing itself, is occupied, and so just is the thing itself simpliciter. That is, the 
office just is the independent mathematical reality meant or indicated by the office. 
Furt:her, the same mathematician, if his realism is in accordance with the realism 
put fon/vard here, would also, in supposing he 'got it right', hold that his 
understanding ofthe thing itself is the same as 'the thing itself: the independent 
object fills the formalism, and the uncircumscribable 'other' fills the independent 
object. In this case, all three may be identified as 'the same', and the two pert:inent 
relationships are identities. 
Regarding this relationship, the previous chapter put forward the theory that the 
object we understand/perceive/intend, etc. might be identical to the 'independently 
existing objecf, but with the important proviso that even the possibility of this 
identity depends on the independent object's self-sufficiency. But, the possibility of 
'an identity relationship' holding between what we understand and what is 
independent of that understanding, can only arise if the identity of that relationship 
is not identity or, at least, not only identity. That is, something is needed to 
differentiate the identity proposed here from identity per se. This needs to be done, 
not by changing the ordinary notion of identity into something more palatable, but 
by saying something more.^  Generally, an identity holding between two things is 
not in fact a relationship between two separate or different things - rather, the 
situation is one of two separate names, or ways of approaching, one and the same 
thing. The mathematical realist's situation outlined above is, by contrast, that of 
three different things that can be (and, when mathematics is correct, in fact are) 
identical. Note, though, that for the realist, identity holding between them does not 
mean the three are in fact one and the same thing. So, for my mathematical realist. 
' I am using the ordinary notion of identity here, with all its standard properties - e.g. if K =G, then 
everything that holds true for K holds true for G. Watering down or tweaking identity invites representational 
and correspondence realisms into the picture, along with all the troubles therein - but, by the same token, if 
we stick only to identity as we know it, something is missed. One of the things that gets missed is the 
difference between a trivial and an interesting identification. Saying 'I am me' is not as interesting as saying 
' I am matter' - but in both cases, ordinary identity applies. I don't think that the information carried by the 
latter can be expressed simply as the provision of a new name for an old object. (Pinker [1997] gives a 
thought experiment that lends some intuitive credence to the idea that ordinary identity misses something: 
"suppose an infinite white plane contains nothing but two identical circles. One of them slides over and 
superimposes itself on the second for a few moments, then proceeds on its way. I don't think anyone has 
trouble conceiving of the circles as distinct entities even in the moments in which they are in the same place 
at the same time" (p. 116).) 
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the mathematical formalism itself (or the office of the mathematical object itself), 
the independent mathematical reality accessed by that formalism, and that reality 
as it exists in and of itself, beyond the reach of any theory or name, are always 
three ^/j^/"e/7f things, evenvihen they are identical. This is not as extraordinary or 
as radical an idea as it might at first seem, particulariy for the philosopher of 
mathematics. The '2' of the natural numbers is not simply and only identical to the 
'2' of the reals. The claim that they are identical (at least for all mathematical 
intents and purposes) is indeed true, but so is the claim that they are different 
(even if only because they inhabit different structures).^ There is also, of course, an 
entire literature covering just these sorts of problems - or 'inconsistent identity', 
under the general heading 'paraconsistency' (see, for example. Priest [2002, 287-
393]). 
To elaborate further: the thing that prevents this identity from being an identity 
only, is the same thing that gives rise to the possibility of'an identity relationship' 
between the three levels in the first place - namely, that the independent thing is 
something different from anything we can hope to contain in a name or a referring 
term. It is independent in the sense that it in itself does not exist contained within 
the confines of our understanding - even our understanding of it 
This might seem to amount to the theory that the formalism, and the independent 
object can not, after all, really be identical to the mathematical reality that exists 
independent of both these things. I believe that it is indeed possible to build a 
theory according to which we can maintain that an identity does in fact hold. But, 
due to such considerations as those above, I ultimately arrive at the conclusion that 
this identity must paradoxically be accompanied by its opposite - i.e. a statement 
that the three are different - if it is to reflect the mathematical realist's belief. This 
will be discussed furt:her in the next chapter. 
^ Although there is no determinate answer to the question of whether the '2' of the natural numbers is 
identical to the '2' of the reals, mathematicians do not habitually refer to the two '2's as different things. The 
potential difference between the '2's, and their potential sameness are both (mathematically) viable ideas. 
This is a direct and practical use of an identity paradox. 
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6.2. Two-Level led Dependence 
The idea so far is that the possibility of any sort of identity at all between the office 
of the thing itself and what exists independent of that office, itself depends on 
there being an independent object in the first place. That is, without the existence 
of independent place holders for this office, no identity can be drawn between the 
office and the existing 'other' (this is at level 2). In this section, I will explore the 
relationship between our understanding of x and the office of x (the level 1 
identity). I will then explore the idea that this (level 1) relationship is in fact an 
effective model for the (level 2) relationship between the office and the 
independently existing object. 
To anticipate, my model has is that on the second level, the office of the 
independent object depends for its existence on the existence of the independent 
object. And, on the first level, the existence of what we access when we refer (or 
intend to refer) to the thing itself - i.e. the formalism - depends on the existence 
of the office of the independent object. The formalism is empty or full (i.e. it has 
meaning or it does not) depending on whether or not it successfully refers to (or is 
identifiable with/filled by) the object itself.^  The object itself is empty or full (exists 
or does not) depending on whether or not it is identified with/filled by the 
uncircumscribable other. 
These ideas have an important corollary, one which sets them apart from similar 
previously tabled theories of their kind in the literature. It is that ultimately, our 
referential activity or statements depend for their success on the existence of 
something entirely independent even from 'the referenf, 'the thing itself, or 'the 
independent other' (i.e. independent of the thing being referred to). My proposition 
is that this corollary, as problematic as it is, need not be discarded as too 
intractable or too difficult, at least not before weighing the consequences of its 
absence against the difficulties of its presence. 
3 Note that this is where my 'meaning' differs from Frege's 'sense'. For Frege, although the sense fixes the 
reference, it is not determined by it. That is, the sense can give the reference, but the reference cannot give 
the sense. So, for Frege, whether or not a sentence has sense does not depend on whether or not it has a 
referent. (For more, see Frege [1970].) My account on the other hand, says that whether or not a formalism 
has meaning does indeed depend on whether or not it has a referent (or, in my pariance - an independent 
object) since meaning 'resides' on the level of the independent object, and not on the level of the formalism. 
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We have already touched on one of the consequences of the absence of this 
corollary, namely that mathematical realism - particularly in a modern account -
tends, under scrutiny, at best to be able to be aligned with, and at worst, to be 
indistinguishable from what are meant to be totally opposite philosophies. A 
mathematical realist account (without this sort of corollary) that sets out to defend 
or to articulate the belief that mathematical objects exist independently of our 
ability to comprehend them, can wind up virtually indistinguishable from accounts 
defending the belief that mathematical objects are dependent on our ability to 
comprehend them. The accounts previously discussed have run this risk to varying 
degrees (in fact the risk ultimately attaches to any account attempting to articulate 
the idea of an independent reality. But perhaps this is just another way of saying 
that the idea of independence is notoriously difficult to articulate). 
Tieszen's 'Intuitionism' and Wright's 'Minimalism' and 'Neo-Fregean platonism* ,^ are 
also examples of realist-sounding language which can be appropriated (to varying 
degrees) for non-realist, and even anti-realist ends. I have previously noted that 
the appropriation of mathematical realism in particular can itself be accomplished in 
much the same way as Blackburn's 'Quasi-Realism' appropriates realism in general.^ 
In fact, all realist accounts without an explicit principle highlighting the importance 
of an independent reality are vulnerable to a hybrid of'Hale's dilemma' whereby 
the absence of such a principle itself begs a question, or the account is vulnerable 
to charges normally only effective against constructive accounts.^  Put another way, 
the hybrid dilemma runs as follows: if an account is realist, then there is a problem 
caused by the positing of an independent 'other'. If there is not a problem caused 
by the independent other within an account, how can that account be realist? 
So far, I have used the phrase 'depends on' or the notion of dependence to express 
the corollary under discussion (that our referential activity depends on something 
outside the thing itself). The previous chapter goes some way toward clarifying this 
notion and this chapter will attempt to clarify it further. That is, a specific aim of 
this chapter is to set up a framework (regarding level 2) whereby the existence of 
"* Tieszen [1989], Wright [1987], Wright [1992]. 
^ Blackburn's arguments for Quasi-Realism appropriation are given in his [1993]. 
' Again, for an account of'Hale's dilemma', see Blackburn [1993]. 
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the thing itself (i.e. the o^ceof the thing itself) depends on the independent 
existence of something other than 'the thing itself, just because the two (the office 
and the independent reality) are inextricable. Likewise (regarding level 1) I aim to 
show that whether a referential statement or activity has meaning depends on the 
existence of the office of the thing itself, just because 'meaning' and this office are 
inextricable. The idea, then, is to elucidate the notion of dependence via an 
elucidation of this notion of 'inextricability', particulariy, in this section, as it pertains 
to meaning and referent (or the independent other), or in other words, to meaning 
and to what is meant. 
6.3. Inextricability 
When two things are inextricable from one another, the two may be taken together 
- indeed, in some sense, the two have to be taken together - to form a third thing 
made up of the combination of the initial two. When we speak of one part: of this 
combination, the other is in some sense, included, since one of its properties is that 
of inextricability from the other. Speaking of, identifying, referring to, indicating and 
so on, one part of the combination successfully, involves speaking of, identifying 
etc. a thing of this nature - a thing with the property of inextricability from the 
other. 
This does not mean that anything which may be said about one part of the 
combination may be said about the other. It means only what has been said, that 
each has as a fundamental part of its nature, inextricability from the other. So, 
speaking of, indicating, etc. something which (say, it turns out on furt:her inquiry) 
does not have the property of inextricability from the other, is in fact speaking of, 
indicating etc. something else altogether. The property of inextricability with 
another thing is one of the defining factors we may use to identify just what it is 
that is being spoken of. 
6.4. A Theory of Meaning 
For an example of inextricability, imagine hearing someone's voice, but not seeing 
the person calling out. If Joe stands outside my room and calls out, then I hear 
Joe's voice. I can properly say that I hear Joe just so long as he himself is 
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physically present producing his voice. In this case, hearing Joe's voice is 
inextricable from Joe himself. 
Notice, though, that Joe can extract himself from the picture. He could have set up 
a tape recording of his voice and placed that outside the room, removing himself to 
another area altogether - say, an area too far away for me to possibly hear him 
(or, having recorded his voice, he may have died). In this case, I could not say I 
was hearing Joe, at least not without further explanation. That is, the event 
'hearing Joe' depends on Joe being present outside my room - but Joe's presence 
or absence does not depend on the event 'hearing Joe'. The dependence only goes 
one way. 
To extend the example a little, note that we can only explain Joe's absence by 
some kind of trickery on his part, or mistake on my part. All things being equal, 
when someone calls me from outside my room, I will quite naturally and property 
presume that that person is indeed present, producing his voice at that moment. 
We might go so far as to say that I cannot fully understand Joe's absence without 
this initial natural presumption of his presence. If I fail to make the presumption in 
the first place, I am missing the simplest explanation of my experience of the event 
'hearing Joe'. On the other hand, if this natural presumption proves wrong, the 
event 'hearing Joe' appears to lose some of its inherent meaning. The only meaning 
left in the event is now a sort of pedantic, technical meaning, likely to frustrate 
further communication. 
Regarding mathematical objects, I suppose that the relationship between meaning 
and 'referenf is similar. The mathematical formalism, on this model, is akin to the 
event 'hearing Joe' and as such is inextricable from the office of the independent 
object, or 'the referenf, or the thing that we presume is producing the event. That 
is, my presumption that Joe is present outside my room is equated here with my 
presumption that there is an existing referent for a given mathematical formalism. 
Even in the case where Joe is not present, my experience of the event 'hearing 
Joe's voice' can property be said to have everyday or natural meaning only when 
Joe is presumed present. In the same way, a given mathematical formalism can 
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property be said to have meaning only when a referent is supposed. If, upon 
further investigation, it is discovered that no referent exists, or is not present, i.e. if 
there is in fact no independent existing mathematical reality producing the 
formalism, then the meaning ofthe mathematical formalism is changed. The 
formalism may still be said to have 50/;7e meaning, but it is no longer the natural 
meaning with which we were working, all things being equal, to begin with. In the 
case of hearing Joe's voice, the natural meaning is replaced by a more shallow or 
pedantic meaning - one needing special clarification before the event can be 
communicated effectively: "I heard Joe outside my room" no longer suffices. An 
effective communication of the event must add "but in fact it was not Joe himself 
that I was hearing". Without the addendum, the natural presumption of Joe's 
presence properly prevails. 
So while a given mathematical formalism may still be said to possess some 
meaning when there is in fact no independent object, or none present, to which it 
refers, that meaning is something different - and (so far as simple or natural 
communication is concerned) less desirable - than the meaning arising from the 
object's existence. 
To further clarify this distinction between natural and pedantic or cumbersome 
meaning, we need to look at the relationship between 'the independent objecf 
(office) and the other itself (the independently existing object). Recall that this 
relationship is to be modelled after the relationship we've just set up between (any 
kind of) meaning and 'the independent objecf. On this model, the independent 
object (office) is inextricable from the other, but the other is extricable from the 
independent object. 
Whether or not there is objective or real meaning depends on the independent 
object, but whether or not there is an independent object depends on the other. 
Part of the nature of natural or real meaning is inextricability from the independent 
object, whose nature in turn includes its inextricability from the other. And so, part 
of the nature of natural meaning itself is inextricability from the other. 
A formalism, on this account, has natural meaning (hencefort:h simply called 
'meaning') if and only if it has meaning so defined; if the 'other' exists, and so our 
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supposition that it exists is legitimate. Again, note that this makes the presence or 
absence of meaning objective. This is so because the presence or absence of 
meaning now depends (to this extent) on something entirely apart from what we 
understand. That is, something completely outside the bounds of our 
comprehension is now a contributing factor determining the presence or absence of 
meaning. The extent of its objectivity is precisely the extent to which the nature of 
meaning includes its inextricability from the independent object, which includes its 
inextricability from the other. 
This theory commits its subscriber to a robust theory of meaning without 
eliminating the possibility of a mathematical formalism possessing something like 
natural meaning, but still turning out, or discovered to be 'meaningless' (say, upon 
further investigation). And more importantly, a formalism may be 'rendered 
meaningless' by the absence of the supposition of an (entirely) independently 
existing mathematical reality upon which the formalism depends, and is assumed to 
depend. 
6.5. Frege 
This theory may seem to give meaning a role similar to that o f sense' (regarding 
proper names) in Frege's [1970]. For Frege, sense is that which lies between the 
idea and the reference (which I have called the independently existing object). To 
explain the phrase 'lies between' in this context, Frege gives the analogy of 
somebody observing the moon through a telescope. The moon itself is the 
reference, the 'real image' projected by the object glass in the interior of the 
telescope is the sense, and the retinal image of the observer is the wholly 
subjective idea. 
If indeed we take sense to be analogous to the image on the object glass in this 
example, then we take its nature to be (at least to some extent) determined by the 
reference itself (the moon itself). But, following this analogy also gives sense to be, 
to some extent, determined by us - perhaps by our conventions. That is, the 
nature of sense may be dependent on the conventions or activities of society, just 
as the image of the moon is dependent on the apparatus which 'gives' that image. 
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So, for Frege, when it comes to ideas, the constructed or conventional sense lies, 
as in the example, between a reference and our idea. For myself on the other 
hand, reference - the independent object - depends for its nature on an entirely 
'other' reality. According to my theory, sense or meaning cannot be extricated from 
reference without thereby altering the nature of that 'sense' altogether: the image 
of the moon on the telescope lens is in fact notthe image of the moon on the 
telescope lens if no moon is present, and the moon itself is in fact not only or 
simply the moon itself; it is also a mystery. To reiterate the paradox, it is also what 
it is not. In the case where the moon is not present, the image is not meaning, it is 
something of a different nature altogether - an illusion perhaps, or a construction 
alone. So sense or meaning, when it is taken apart from its reference - or, when it 
is considered extricable from its reference, is no longer natural. Just as (in the 
event of the absence of the moon) the image of the moon on the telescope 
becomes something else, so too, taken apart from the reference, natural sense or 
meaning becomes something else. 
This is not to say that sense cannot be cx/nsidered separately from reference. It is 
to say that sense cannot be considered (55 separate from reference. Sense, 
provided inextricability from reference is taken as part of its nature, can be 
considered or dealt with in isolation from the reference, just as the image of the 
moon can be considered in isolation from the moon itself. But if sense is considered 
35 extricable from the reference - by its nature - then what is under consideration 
is no longer, properly, sense at all (according to my theory). That is, my theory 
interprets Frege's example as follows: if the image of the moon on the glass is 
considered as something which by its nature is extricable from the moon itself, then 
we are either mistaken about the thing under consideration, or considering 
something which we take to be (the same as) the thing under consideration, but 
which in actual fact, isn't. To reiterate, considering the image in isolation from the 
moon is one thing, but taking the image 55 isolated from the moon is quite 
another. Just as 'hearing Joe' is one thing and taking that event as isolated from 
Joe is another. 
All this means that we can /'e/7afe/'something meaningless, which in fact has 
meaning. For instance, you could render the image of the moon meaningless, even 
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in the case where the independent moon is in fact present by, say, taking the 
image of the moon on the lens to be all there is, perhaps by supposing that no 
independent moon was present. But taking the image of the moon this way does 
not entail that the image has thereby in actuality become all there is to the moon, 
or able to be extricated meaningfully from the moon. Rather, the situation could be 
accurately described in one of (at least) two ways. 
First, it may be that the thing under consideration is indeed meaning (the moon is 
indeed present, producing its image), but that meaning is in actual fact something 
different from what we believe it to be (recall that the belief in this case is that the 
moon is not present). That is, we may have it right, but not completely right. We 
may, as it were, have meaning in our sights, but not appreciate or recognise it 
entirely for what it is. Thus, in the case of a mathematical formalism, we would 
understand the meaning of the formalism, but not the nature of that meaning. 
For example, according to one position, the Axiom of Choice means that a certain 
class exists, even though it cannot be characterised. For another, it means 
mathematical language may be identified by the inclusion (or exclusion) of the 
axiom. For yet another, it means that a certain class does not exist because it 
cannot be characterised. But for all three positions, the Axiom of Choice also means 
the following: that for an infinite family of non-empty classes, another class can be 
made up of exactly one element from each of the classes in the family. This latter 
meaning (which is in fact the formalism) potentially has 'in its sighf all of the three 
positions above. It is, I think, safe to say that this is an important but relatively 
shallow meaning of the Axiom of Choice. That is to say that the Axiom of Choice 
may be viewed, manipulated, studied and so on with only this latter meaning in 
hand. Again, with only this meaning in hand, the Axiom of Choice may be employed 
in the practice of mathematics itself - in the embarking upon of mathematics, in 
the furthering of mathematics, in the judging of it, the acquiring of its principles, 
and so on. Just as in the case of the image of the moon, that image may be 
discussed, manipulated and enlarged upon, all without necessarily appreciating its 
inextricability and dependence on the independent moon itself. So far as this point 
goes, I agree with the formalists that whatever real meaning mathematics may 
have, it can (or at least some part of it can) at least survive without. But, if indeed 
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there is an independent mathematical reality, then mathematics done without an 
appreciation of the inextricability and dependence of mathematical formalisms on 
this independent reality is drastically impoverished. Indeed it is impoverished in 
much the same way as an observation of the image in a telescope 35 the moon, is 
an impoverished observation ofthe moon. 
To further the Axiom of Choice example, we have called the mathematical definition 
of the Axiom of Choice 'the Axiom of Choice formalism'. This formalism has 
meaning (according to my account) if its objects exist independent of our 
consideration of them as its objects. So, the first interpretation of the axiom (that a 
certain class exists, even though it cannot be characterised) has, as one of its 
existing objects, an uncharacterisable class. If, outside (independent) of its role as 
the referent of that claim such an object does not, in actual fact exist, then that 
claim is, as an objective matter of fact, meaningless. The third interpretation above, 
though, renders the Axiom of Choice formalism meaningless. 
This brings us to the other possible explanation of the above scenario (wherein the 
image of the moon is taken to be all there is): it could be that the thing under 
consideration has no (relevant) meaning at all. This would be where, in actual fact, 
the image under consideration is something different from the moon's image. In 
this case, we are not 'seeing' the moon in any sense whatsoever. The thing 'in our 
sighf has blocked the possibility of meaning (perhaps, to extend the analogy even 
further, like a smear on the lens of the telescope being taken for 'the image of the 
moon'. In this case, meaning is objectively present, but not noticed or accessed by 
us. That is, the moon does in fact exist and can be viewed through a telescope). I 
think that in the case of mathematics, and in accordance with the example given 
above, the former possibility occurs in the study of, practice of, and the philosophy 
of, mathematics far more frequently than the latter. 
Indeed, that it is possible to identify a formalism's meaning, but not thereby to 
perceive or to comprehend the nature of that meaning, is an important feature of 
the theory put forward here. This is because I want my theory to accommodate the 
scenario that the widely accepted meaning (or meanings) of, say, '2' is enough to 
identify (or to 'have within our sighf) its real meaning. This is just another version 
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of the presumption that mathematics is correct most of the time. More specifically, 
mathematical formalisms are meaningful, or at least they are most of the time. 
That is, in accordance with the view that most of mathematics is correct most of 
the time, I hold that, most of the time, the formalism's objects are independently 
there. Therefore, most of the time, the formalisms are (objectively) meaningful. 
6.6. Identity Revisited 
Recall that just as I wish to say that the object we call or assume to be the 
independently existing object, can, at times, be the same as the genuinely 
independently existing object, so I wish to say that the formalism can, at times, be 
the same as the assumed independent object. When these identities hold, then the 
formalism has (objective) meaning. I have already noted that this entails that 
meaning is dependent on a genuinely independently existing object. And I have 
added that the widely accepted meaning of a given mathematical formalism is 
(more often than not) enough to identify its real or objective meaning. That is, 
even where the meaning of a given formalism is perceived or understood in a way 
entirely contrary to the theory I present here (say, for instance, a given formalism 
and its meaning is understood to stand alone, not dependent on any 'othef reality 
at all - such as my 'independently existing objecf, or 'the object pole of intention' -
or even perhaps on the referent) what is thereby accessed - the formalism - may, 
in fact, have the same meaning as I have in mind - i.e. it may nonetheless still 
possess what I have called the real or natural meaning which, according to my 
theory, obes depend on the independently existing object. All this is obvious 
enough, especially if you believe that the independent objects actually do exist. 
This is just to say that, according to my theory, there is a fact of the matter as to 
whether or not meaning is present, and that this fact is itself independent of the 
belief, or 'idea' of the perceiver - and, indeed, of the entire body of perceivers. 
Because an independent object's presence or absence is an objective matter, and 
because meaning depends on the presence or absence of the independent object, 
the meaning of a given formalism is present or absent objectively. 
There is, on this theory of meaning, still an element that is subjective. That is, 
there is an element of meaning that does depend, at least to some degree, on the 
social apparatus of perception and understanding (analogous to the telescope in 
Frege's moon example). But describing this element does not amount to 'giving' the 
independent object, any more than describing a telescope 'gives' us the moon. 
Rather, it amounts to a description of the way the object can be received, when the 
above identities in fact hold. The object itself is something other than its name or 
role in our theory, which again is something other than the comprehended object. 
The element that depends on a social apparatus - on us - is just our understanding 
of the formalism, and, to some extent, the formalism itself: i.e. the formalism, just 
like the image of the moon, is perceived as well as received. The meaning of a 
mathematical formalism is determined objectively (i.e. depending on the absence or 
presence of the independent object) but our perspective, or our own unique 
understanding of that mathematical formalism is determined by the way we are. 
Our perspective is always just that - ours. And so it is always different from 
something which is not ours - the independent object. Different, and yet when we 
are 'correct', the same. But this is, in itself, a whole separate topic, to be explored 
next. The next chapter explores how the formalism can be the independent other, 
as well as that which is outside the independent other. That is, it explores the 'level 
1' relationship outlined in the diagram on page 136 of this text. It presumes, for the 
most part, that the 'independent other' is in fact filled by the other. (That is it takes 
the 'level 2' relationship as identity. It assumes that the uncircumscribable other 
exists, and is identical to - or 'fills' - the independent other.) With this assumption 
in place, it asks how what we comprehend (the formalism) can be identified with 
what we assume to be an independent other. So, the term 'independent other', in 
what follows, includes 'other', or is identified with what it also is not. 
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7. Justification (or Mathematical Realism: The Theological 
Model) 
7.1. Introduction 
A primary aim of this chapter is, finally, to articulate and defend a particular version 
of mathematical realism. But rather than do this by further defining terms or 
elaborating on the various versions of realism already offered, I will characterise 
the realism I am interested in defending by defining and hopefully also beginning to 
solve one of the central problems such a realism encounters. This problem, already 
encountered in various places throughout this work, is (loosely) called 'The Problem 
of Justification'. 
It seems to me that this particular problem itself almost entirely constitutes the 
realism I am interested in. This, I believe, is partly because so long as someone 
holds this realism, we can be quite certain that they will encounter this particular 
problem. 
The problem itself can be outlined as follows: first, by stating three suppositions 
that generate the problem. These (in barest outline) are: 
1. That there is an abstract mathematical realm that is wholly independent of 
us - i.e. independent of our beliefs, sensory perceptions, even of our 
comprehension or our understanding of this realm. 
2. That this realm's reality is at least as robust as the physical worid's. 
3. That we can access this realm (despite 1) and that most of, or correct 
mathematics (assuming that most of mathematics is correct) is the result 
of this access. 
It is upon the assumption of these three suppositions that the problem of 
justification arises. Simply put, the problem is the question "what then, (given 1-3), 
is the precise nature of our relationship with this mathematical realm?" 
The problem is a problem of justification because a good answer will (ideally) show 
that it is this relationship that justifies our mathematical knowledge (given 1-3) -
i.e. a good answer will show that or how our mathematical knowledge is correct 
and true. Note that I do not claim that a good answer will decide whether or not 
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our mathematical knowledge is justified, but that it will show that it is. Recall that, 
along with Shapiro [1997], I take it "as 'data' that most contemporary mathematics 
is correct" (p. 4). 
If we cast the same problem in terms of physical reality, an ideal solution (and one 
that is analogous to the ideal solution for abstract mathematical reality) would 
demonstrate that there is a relationship between us and physical reality such that 
our perceptions (by and large, most of the time) are of what is really, 
independently there (which itself means that what we perceive is also received 
from something other than us). That is, an ideal solution to the problem of 
justification for physical reality would show that our physical perceptions are correct 
and true. 
So, the problem I am interested in involves this particular analogy between 
mathematical and physical reality, the most important feature of which is the idea 
that mathematical and physical objects are both types of objects to which the 
problem of justification can apply. One reason for the universal applicability of this 
problem is the universal applicability of the notion that there are things, not just 
things in an abstract realm, but in the physical realm as well, that are independent 
of our experience of them. This is the notion that there is a dichotomy between the 
objects within the scope of our experience and the grasp of our comprehension and 
the objects as they exist in themselves - namely, whatever it was that existed 
before our consciousness came into being, and that will exist after our 
consciousness has gone. 
This dichotomy can be applied to both physical and abstract reality and the fact 
that it can, unites these realities. This common ground is an important part of the 
solution I propose in what follows and, as such, it deserves a closer look now. 
7.2. Physical and Abstract Independence 
So long as one does acknowledge something of the former preamble, and that the 
mathematical realism which includes the part:icular problem of justification outlined 
is an important, or indeed even just an interesting problem, one implicitly 
acknowledges a number of further points. Or, more pert:inently, I believe that these 
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furt:her points are implicitly entailed in such an acknowledgment and that they 
ought to be made explicit. This 'oughf is, in fact, in aid of the original stated aim of 
this chapter - to ensure the articulation and defence of the particular version of 
realism I am interested in. 
The first of these further points is simply an elaboration of supposition 1 - it states 
that the reality posited, or indicated, is indeed independent. Recall that the 
attribute of independence supposed by this particular version of mathematical 
realism, according to supposition 1, is such that the independent reality is indeed 
not circumscribable by any theory. Such a degree of independence means that the 
reality cannot simply be 'the object of our comprehension', nor simply 'the referenf, 
nor even simply 'the other'. 
It cannot be any such thing, just because the independence supposed is complete. 
In terms of the dichotomy drawn above, the point here is that one of the important 
generators ofthe problem of justification (supposition 1) disallows a certain move, 
at least at the outset, or as an early unsupported supposition. This move is the 
simple identification as precisely one and the same thing, of what is accessible (by 
our consciousness, our understanding or whatever) with what exists before and 
after that access. The independent mathematical reality supposed here must, if 
indeed it must be anything at all, be a mystery. 
To reiterate the point, supposition 1 states that just what the reality that 
mathematics describes is, is literally beyond our comprehension, and so is, in this 
sense, a mystery. 
This point, of course, raises another: what of supposition 3? That is, we need to 
address just what this extreme degree of independence means regarding 
mathematics as we do know it - i.e. the mathematical reality which /5the object of 
our comprehension. For a start, supposition 1 means we can never suppose that 
what we comprehend or see or know of mathematics (supposition 3) itself simply is 
the independent mathematical realm, end of story. 
Nonetheless, given supposition 3 - and the presumption that most of mathematics 
is correct - 1 suppose that direct comprehension of that which we have just stated 
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is beyond our comprehension, must in fact be possible. Direct comprehension is the 
most obvious (perhaps the only) scenario able to fulfil supposition 3, given 
supposition 1 - since neither can be sacrificed in favour of the other (because both 
are generators of the problem posed). That is, supposition 3 suggests that there is 
no 'problem of access' (because access is assumed), so a correspondence-type 
theory, or indeed any theory seeking to 5/7C»M a^ccess, is not an option here. 
Supposition 1, on the other hand, precludes any kind of constructive account, 
wherein the problem of access is solved, but only by undermining this first 
supposition. Direct comprehension of an independent reality (which, at this stage 
we need only think of as some kind of 'seeing', analogous to physical perception, 
but which, later, I will argue amounts to a phenomenological reception of reality) 
enables that reality to remain independent and also to be, in some sense at least, 
'the object of our comprehension'. But for the reasons outlined above, the sense in 
which this would be true must always preclude the comprehended, seen, perceived 
or intuited reality itself being (or being strictly identical to) the independent rea\\t>/ 
that happens, in this case, to be comprehended, seen, perceived or intuited. 
And so it appears that, in order to maintain both 1 and 3, even direct access must 
always be conditional. In fact the situation amounts to this: the precluding of a 
strict identity between what is perceived/comprehended/etc. and what exists 
independently, is a condition that needs to be met before the independent reality 
supposed or indicated can, in any sense, be claimed to be directly comprehended 
or accessed. Or, put another way, we can say that what we comprehend just is 
what is independently there, only if we also maintain that it is not. 
Perhaps independent reality can be comprehended reality for the part:icular realist 
who holds 1-3, just in case, and only after, the problem of justification is entirely 
solved - i.e. after 1 and 3 are reconciled. But exactly what sort: of a scenario would 
constitute a solution to the problem generated by 1-3? Perhaps a scenario whereby 
direct access of independent reality was proved. But, even then, such a scenario 
could constitute a solution to the problem o/?//provided more was said. That is, the 
problem in its original form - most notably supposition 1 - cannot be sustained 
against an isolated statement or solution that what we see or comprehend 
mathematical reality to be /5 itself the supposed independent mathematical realm. 
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even if this statement or solution was proved true. This is because by itself or with 
no more to the story, such a solution automatically undermines the very 
suppositions that generate the problem it is meant to solve - which ultimately 
makes the problem solved different from the problem posed, which is no help at all. 
A brief exploration of this conundrum irresistibly yields the following possibility for 
the mathematical realist holding 1-3: that the mathematical reality that we do 
see/comprehend/perceive/intuit can itself be said to be identical with or the same 
as independent mathematical reality just in case the independent mathematical 
reality is notthe thing that we see/comprehend/perceive/intuit - i.e., just in case 
mathematical reality is still always irreducibly otherthan f/7e object(s) of our 
comprehension/perception, etc. 
This is a paradox.^  But it is a paradox which serves to highlight the point from 
which it leads - namely that a realist for whom mathematical reality is wholly 
independent of us and entirely as real as we are, just /5committed - at least to 
some extent - to maintaining the mysteriousness of mathematical reality. 
Rather than 'mysterious', though, which can imply necessary inaccessibility, or even 
irrelevancy, I adopt the term 'theological' for the sort of reality with which, it so far 
appears, suppositions 1-3 demand that we deal. So, for this chapter, a 
'theological' reality or object is one capable of being both within and without our 
comprehension at the same time. A theological reality or object is whatever it is 
that the above paradox indicates. It is something we can 
see/perceive/comprehend, etc. just in case it is also otherthan what we 
see/perceive/comprehend, etc. 
Theology, after all, typically deals with just these kinds of objects and this kind of 
reality all the time. God/theological reality is an object outside our comprehension 
as the beginning and the end, "the first other", "the other par excellence", "the 
absolutely other" and "the limit". But at the same time, God/theological reality is 
within our comprehension as "the core of the world's reality", the word, life itself 
and as the creator. (All quotations from Hart: [2002, 165-166].) 
The paradox can be seen as a 'reductio ad absurdum' ofthe realist beliefs put fonward. 
161 
In fact, theology often grounds its accounts on just this kind of reality - just as 
mathematical realism is wont to ground its accounts on an independent, abstract 
mathematical realm. And, as the foregoing chapters have sought to show, as a 
fundamental foundation, mathematical reality has no distinct advantage over that 
proposed by faith. The two 'realities' are (at least in view of the particular angle I 
am taking here) equally paradoxical. To understand more fully just why this is so, it 
is helpful to look again at Derrida's work (as will be done presently). Derrida 
comprehensively argues that the fundamental foundations of a/?/philosophical 
account are also equally paradoxical -just so long as the account posits an 
independent 'other' at all. 
An immediate response to all this might be to suggest that the paradox is perhaps 
not as alarming as it at first appears, that perhaps we can soften it by adding terms 
like 'aspect' and 'only' - e.g. 'what we comprehend is an aspect of mathematical 
reality just in case mathematical reality is not only what we comprehend.' Or 
alternatively, 'there is more to mathematical reality than meets the eye'. But such 
softened versions do not, it seems to me, adequately convey the other as really 
other - i.e. the other as strictly separable from whatever it is that we do 
comprehend. 
It seems that what is needed to solve the problem of justification is a framework 
which can encompass both the mysteriousness of the other, as well as its potential 
'knowability' (its potential to Z^ethat which is the object of our comprehension). 
What is needed, in other words, is a framework to accommodate the paradox as it 
stands in its most severe form - a framework able to include an entirely 'other' 
(therefore fundamentally mysterious) reality that is also accessible. 
An ideal solution then to the problem as posed is one which explains our 
relationship to mathematical objects as theologicalobjeOs, and one (if the kind of 
realism described here is to be defended) which is as good as the best explanations 
of that relationship currently available. 
It is in this spirit that the following solution is offered. It is given as a solution in 
which no more questions are left: unanswered than in the best philosophical 
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accounts of our relationship to any objects or reality whatsoever (in particular, to 
physical objects). 
So, how does theology relate to the philosophy of mathematics? Not too 
surprisingly, it does so via strong realist claims like the suppositions above. It has 
long been noted in the literature that realist/platonist accounts of mathematical 
objects render those objects mysterious or supernatural. Historically, realists have 
tried to defend their accounts against such charges. I propose instead to accept the 
charges, and show why they are not necessarily a liability. 
I begin by alternately offering a quotation from Derrida and my own interpretation 
of that quotation. What is not direct interpretation in what follows is an attempt to 
adapt Derrida's comments, broadly to the philosophy of mathematics in general, 
and specifically to the problem of justification I have defined above. 
7.3. A Conversation/Conversion 
Recall the first supposition above: 
1. That there is an abstract realm that is wholly independent of us, our beliefs, 
our sensory perceptions, even of our comprehension of it. 
This, on the whole, is a negative proposition. It supposes that there is a 
mathematical reality (a positive proposition), but adds that it is strictly beyond our 
comprehension (a negative proposition). 
Now Derrida [1962] notes (and I agree), that "From the moment a proposition 
takes a negative form, the negativity that manifests itself need only be pushed to 
the limit, and it at least resembles an apophathic theology" (p. 76). 
I take this to mean something like 'a negative statement can also positively outline 
what it denies.' So, the statement that mathematical reality is beyond our 
comprehension is also the statement that there /5 a mathematical reality, and at 
least this (albeit negative) thing can be said about it. Our comprehension forms a 
border outside of which mathematical reality itself must be. 
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I am, in following this line of thought, opening up the possibility of asking positive 
questions of such a mathematical reality, such as what this reality is, rather than 
focusing simply on what it is not. Positively considering a reality that is stipulated to 
be outside the grasp of our comprehension amounts, I believe, to engaging in a 
theological-like activity. 
Derrida says: 
Everytime I say: X is neither this nor that, neither contrary of this nor of that, neither the 
simple neutralisation of this nor that with which it has nothing in common, being 
absolutely heterogeneous to or incommensurable with them, I would start to speak of 
God, under this name or another (p. 76). 
My interpretation of this is as follows: I can say of mathematical reality that it is not 
the object of our comprehension, but I can also say that mathematical reality is not 
not that\Nh\ch is the object of our comprehension (the mathematical formalism). 
Put another way, the formalism, or that which we comprehend as 'mathematics 
itself, can be equated with mathematical reality. For instance, the two can coincide 
and in fact be identified with one another. This means there is at least the 
possibility of a sense in which I can say that the formalism is independent 
mathematical reality. Such, as I believe, is indeed the case. But this sense is 
precisely the sense in which the two are the same, yet different. 
According to my account, mathematical reality is certainly not the 'neutralisation' of 
the formalism, although it is absolutely heterogeneous and can be (but is not 
necessarily) incommensurable with the formalism. 
I have begun then, according to Derrida, to speak of God. 
Actually, I believe that to say I am 'speaking of God' is a little too strong in this 
case. Nonetheless, I do still contend that the way 'mathematical reality' functions in 
a realist's account (that includes 1-3) is analogous to the way 'God' functions in 
some theological accounts of divine reality. So while I am talking of mathematics, 
not God, my account being realist and stipulating supposition 1, can nonetheless be 
seen as a type of theology. 
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This is simply because my account introduces as an article for consideration 
something strictly outside consideration - something always different from what 
our comprehension can grasp. For the sake of comparison, note that accounts that 
include incomprehensibility or mysteriousness as a feature of mathematical reality, 
can go in a few directions, different to that which I'm taking here. They can, for 
instance, be driven back a step toward what /5 within the grasp of our 
comprehension, say by adopting a version of direct realism (e.g. stating that what 
we comprehend simply /5the independent mathematical reality and that that is the 
end of the story). On the other hand, such an acknowledgment might prompt 
resignation - an idea, for example, that what is 'outside' comprehension is also 
beyond the scope of any philosophy, rendered irrelevant. 
I hope in my response to avoid both of the above positions, and to do so while 
retaining the ideas with which this thesis began - specifically supposition 1: the 
notion of an entirely independent reality - and so to explore the relationship 
between mathematical reality and our comprehension of it when 'mathematical 
reality' and the object of our comprehension' are defined by 1-3, and left 
unamended. The theological model offers what I believe is the most illuminating 
account of this relationship, under just these circumstances. 
The theological problem of our relationship to God, and the mathematical problem 
of our relationship to mathematical reality do share a number of important 
features. They both can ascribe independence to the reality they consider. That 
reality is, in both cases, abstract. Both can include some version of supposition 3 -
i.e. the assumption that there is a relationship between our comprehension of the 
reality, and the reality itself. And, in fact, both often do begin thus, and cite the 
prima facie value or truth of their formal systems of belief as a reason to do so. 
Derrida again: 
God's name would then be the hyperbolic effect of that negativity or all negativity that is 
consistent in its discourse. God's name would suit everything that may not be broached, 
approached, or designated, except in an indirect and negative manner. Every negative 
sentence would then be haunted by God or by the name of God, the distinction between 
God and God's name opening up the very space of this enigma (p. 76). 
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What I am claiming, then, is that the 'very space of this enigma' for theology is 
analogous to the space that the problem of justification opens up for mathematical 
realism. Equally, though, the distinction between mathematical reality and our 
comprehension of it (i.e. the formalism) 'opens the space' of the problem of 
justification as it has been defined here. Simply put - there is a gap between God 
and our comprehension of God which theology seeks to overcome, understand, or 
perhaps simply to describe. This gap resembles the gap between mathematical 
reality and our comprehension of it which the philosophy of mathematics 
(particulariy realist philosophies of mathematics) seeks to overcome. I do not 
expect here to overcome the gap - especially given the nature of suppositions 1-3 
- but I hope to understand it better, and perhaps to describe it. I hope also that 
this will clarify a particular realist position within the philosophy of mathematics, 
and that such a clarification will itself present an argument for the importance of 
the position thereby described, at least insofar as it will show that the position is 
too interesting to do away with, or to ignore. 
Back to Derrida: "If there is a work of negativity in discourse and predication, it will 
produce divinity" (p. 76). 
This point can be read as a summary of the ideas presented so far. It states that if 
you wish to retain supposition 1 - i.e. if your account maintains that mathematical 
reality is something different from what we comprehend - then your account has in 
some sense 'produced' a divinity. You are not thereby committed to equating 
mathematical reality with divine reality, but the way 'mathematical reality' functions 
in your account is analogous to the way 'God' functions in theological accounts. 
A 'produced divinity', though, is not what most mathematical realists have in mind 
when they posit mathematical reality. Divinity aside, the mathematical realist's 
reality is not produced at all. It is independent. This independence includes 
independence from anything we ourselves are able to produce, including the idea 
or name of an independent reality and, more obviously, the formalism (our own 
understanding of mathematics, given that it is ours and so to some extent 
'produced by us', or at least produced as a result of us) - assuming supposition 1 is 
just one way of stipulating precisely that degree of independence. But before 
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relegating the theological model to the list of accounts fated to an incorporation or 
sublimation of the other, there is another move to make within this model, which 
may save it as an expression of this particular realism. 
Derrida: "I t would then suffice to change a sign (or rather to show, something easy 
and classical enough, that this inversion has always already taken place, that it is 
the essential movement of thought) in order to say that divinity is not produced but 
productive" (p. 76). 
This is the move I make in the preceding two chapters, and in what follows. 
According to my account, then, independent or mathematical reality itself is 
different from comprehendible mathematical reality, and part of the difference 
between the two lies in the fact that the former is, to some extent, responsible for 
the production of the latter. The relationship between the two, then, begins with 
production. The first produces the second. How? Primarily, I would hazard, by 
being the way it is. That is, mathematical reality produces mathematical formalisms 
in some way analogous to the way that physical reality produces our 
comprehension of physical reality. This is not to deny that we also produce our 
comprehension, and that our comprehension of a thing might in fact be far 
removed from the way that thing is in and of itself. It is just to say that there is 
production both ways. And the primary producer, so to speak, is the independent 
reality, not us. 
Back to Derrida: 
infinitely productive, Hegel would say, for example. God would be not merely the end, 
but the origin of this work of the negative. Not only would atheism not be the truth of 
negative theology; rather, God would be the truth of all negativity. One would thus 
arrive at a kind of proof of God - not a proof of the existence of God, but a proof of God 
by His effects, or more precisely a proof of what one calls God... (p. 76). 
Mathematical reality itself, according to this account, has an effect on us. 
Mathematics is the result of this effect. But of course, this idea - that mathematical 
reality is productive and effective, rather than a constructed or a passive recipient 
of our own interpretations - is notoriously difficult to present in a clear and 
comprehensive manner, let alone to argue for. 
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My account uses deconstruction and theology primarily in order to address precisely 
this difficulty. Deconstruction, in making metaphysics its foil, tends to describe, 
painstakingly, as part: of its project, just what is involved in taking a metaphysical 
stance. Derrida's work does this. And it is this painstaking description I want to use 
- albeit for an entirely different purpose than the one Derrida probably had in mind. 
Indeed, any attempt, including Derrida's, to capture the essence of metaphysics 
can be taken as an argument to the effect that metaphysics and theology share 
many features. These features can be stated very generally, so that each in fact 
includes a broad spectrum of beliefs, ranging from anti-realism and constructivism 
through to strong realism - in other words, ranging over most, if not all, of 
philosophy. After all, for Derrida 'philosophy' and 'metaphysics' are practically 
interchangeable terms. 
The features themselves include: 
1. The idea that there is something external to our own understanding of a given 
subject (most often, this is the subject itself, or a 'presence' of some kind - not 
necessarily a fully independent reality) upon which our understanding is based. 
This idea can take the form of a division between sense and referent, word and 
object, form and content or formalism and reality. Also within the scope of this 
feature is the strong realist belief I'm putting forward: that there is, 
somewhere, somehow, an external reality, unconstructed and ultimately 
unaffected by our own ideas - a reality (or a 'presence') that is what it is quite 
apart from, or despite, what we perceive it to be. 
2. The idea is that our 'sign system' - e.g. words, symbols, mathematical 
formalisms etc. - is a kind of 'passage' between us and the 'reality' or 'presence' 
upon which it is based. The phrase 'sign system' can cover a great deal here. It 
includes written and spoken words, concepts, ideas and thoughts. It also 
includes 'text' - a term covering not only writing, but consciousness, an epoch 
or a society. In fact, 'text' covers knowledge in general. Essentially, this feature 
of metaphysics is the admission of fallibility: the idea that what we know, see or 
comprehend may fail to be what really is the case, really is present or really 
exists. But it is also, import:antly, the idea that we can 'get it right'. The idea 
168 
that, given the 'right sign system', we can see, know, etc. what really exists and 
what really is the case. 
3. The idea that a sign's meaning can be given only by referring to something 
external to the sign, or sign system. 
4. The idea that the 'something external'/ reality/ presence/ concept/ thought/ 
consciousness, etc. forms the ground upon which signs and sign systems are 
based. 
5. The prioritising of the 'something external' over the sign or sign system as a 
result of the preceding points. 
These features do not form an exhaustive account of the nature of 'metaphysics' 
and 'theology', nor does a given philosophy have to include all, or even most of 
them to come within the scope of either term. Instead, taken together, they serve 
to illustrate the common tendency of metaphysics and theology to privilege, seek, 
or to secure a ground for the systems of knowledge they consider. The function of 
such a ground can vary - e.g. at one end of the spectrum it might have a 
justificatory function, and at the other its function might be simply explanatory. 
Regardless, the idea of a ground is the main similarity between metaphysics and 
theology. 
Certainly, my account includes the idea of a ground. But Derrida's point is that 
most of philosophy to date does as well. Indeed, realist philosophies of 
mathematics in general are probably some of the most obvious or notorious 
examples of philosophies that include the idea of a ground. But, it is when it comes 
to the explication of this idea that mathematical realism, also notoriously, often 
flounders. 
In theology, though, we have a host of possible explications of just what it is to 
have this idea. What is a ground? Taking our cue from theology, we could answer 
with what was outlined earlier: a ground is a first principle, a totalising force, the 
beginning and the end, etc. Moreover, recall that we could also speak of this 
other's role in life or ordinary reality with such ideas as: the ground is the 
immanent transcendent, the "very core of the worid's reality" (Hart [2002, 166]), 
the word and the creator. 
169 
"For a limit is both within and without an event, and its uncertain status requires us 
to think 'experience of God' as a flaring of what is outside human understanding as 
well as within it" (Hart: [2002, 166]). 
The 'ground' in my account is the mathematical realm itself. The notion (now 
revealed as 'theologicaO that this ground is both outside and inside human 
understanding, knowledge, perception, etc. is a crucial component of my proposed 
(theological) solution to the problem of justification. Another crucial notion for my 
solution that can be clearly categorised as theological is that of responding to the 
mathematical realm (as opposed to constituting or constructing it) or receiving the 
mathematical realm (as opposed to perceiving it only). The notion of reception thus 
coalesces with the idea that the independent realm is a productive one. 
In theology, such notions legitimately serve as (full or part) explanations or 
descriptions of our relationship to theological phenomena. But a simple substitution 
from talk of theological objects to talk of mathematical objects will not, I think, 
suffice. In order to justify my proposed employment of theological notions to 
describe or explain our relationship with mathematical objects, I need to show a 
number of things. 
First, I need to show that the theological notions I wish to employ to explain our 
relationship to mathematical objects are at least as good as the best explanations 
of that relationship currently available. Second, I need to show that theological 
notions 'work' as a solution to the problem of justification - i.e. as a tenable, 
literally 'workable' explanation of the relationship between us and mathematical 
objects. Third, and finally, I need to show that the employment of theological 
notions genuinely enhances or improves upon our current understanding of that 
relationship. 
7.4. 'At Least as Good as' 
To address each in turn; to show the first point, I appeal to the foregoing 
conversation/conversion, which, I believe, establishes that: 
a) philosophy itself is theological and consequently philosophical accounts of our 
relationship to anything whatsoever already entail most if not all of the 
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mysteries and intractable open questions inherent to theology. This 
particularly, or more obviously, applies to philosophical realism and so my 
task here is made easier just because I am focusing on this part of 
philosophy. 
There is a related argument, (b), highlighted eariier, some of which can be seen as 
a consequence of (a), (b), then, is the argument that: 
b) no more questions are left unanswered in my account than in the best 
philosophical account of our relationship to physical objects. I take it as given 
that the best explanation of our relationship to abstract/mathematical objects 
is one which explains this relationship as well as the best explanation of our 
relationship to physical objects explains that relationship. 
I have used Derrida's work in order to establish (a) in the preceding comments, 
and I will use phenomenology ,^ specifically Husseri's 'epistemological reduction', to 
establish (b) (or the bits of (b) that don't follow straightforwardly from (a)) in what 
follows. 
Note that I have employed Derrida's work only insofar as it helps to establish the 
fundamental similarities between theology and philosophy, but not much further. 
For instance Derrida argues, and I agree, that acknowledging that certain 
components of my solution are theological amounts only (or 'ultimately', depending 
on which way you view it) to acknowledging that my solution is properly a part of 
philosophy. Derrida also argues, but here I do not agree, that this means my 
account can never address the problems it seeks to address. That is, Derrida 
believes that the tasks philosophy sets for itself - the problem of justification 
included - are unachievable. I do not - at least no more than are any of the tasks 
we undertake as humans trying to understand what is not us (although I do believe 
that the unachievable is written in to realist accounts. It is when the idea of 
unachievability is thought to imply futility, or a complete lack of progress, that I 
disagree.) This brings us back to (b), and to phenomenology. 
^ What I hope to show, though, is that it does not undermine those beliefs. I use phenomenology as a 
framework only, upon which to hang my own ideas. In other words, Husserl's ideas enable me to speak my 
own - the latter are in no way intended to be attributed to Husserl himself. 
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7.5. 'These Notions Work' 
Recall that the specific aspect of phenomenology I wish to employ in order to 
establish (b) is what Husseri calls 'the epistemological reduction'. Note also that 
while (b) addresses the first point above, it also addresses the second. Indeed, my 
method will be to focus, initially, on the second problem listed above. That is, in 
arguing (b) I will be giving my proposed workable solution. I will then defend that 
solution by revisiting the first and, finally, the third point. 
To establish the second point, then - (namely) that theological notions 'work' as a 
solution to the problem of justification - I look again at what is involved in any 
account of our relationship to any thing, in having that thing as an 'other', i.e., in 
differentiating that thing from ourselves, or from anything that can be reduced to 
ourselves. 
We have seen that including an 'other' in such an account can be achieved in a 
number of ways. For example, the 'other' can simply be named or stipulated 'other'. 
Call this approach 'Fregean'. Frege gives the problem of access short shrift and has 
the 'other' (the referent) as a theoretically definable, knowable, as well as real and 
independent object - simply (or primarily) by stipulation. Coffa [1991] notes that 
for Frege the situation is obvious: "Objective representations can be divided into 
concepts and objects" (p. 67). Objects, although they are 'other' than ourselves, 
are, as Coffa puts it, "no problem for Frege - they are the tables and chairs of 
everyday experience, the numbers and classes of mathematical knowledge, the 
truth-values of his logic, and so on" (p. 67). 
At the opposite end of the scale, the 'other' can be interpreted as essentially 
inaccessible, even impossible. In this case, the other can only be brought into an 
account of our relationship to a thing as a boundary or a limit of that relationship -
what lies beyond. Call this approach 'Wittgensteinian' or 'Kantian'. Wittgenstein, for 
example, (according to Coffa [1991]) "banishes to the ghetto of suspect notions" 
anything, including the notion of an 'object', "intended to apply to things out there 
in the world". All reference to the 'real worid' is "studiously avoided" (both 
quotations p. 242). This treatment of'other' amounts to ruling it out altogether. 
The idea here is that we can never transcend experience. So, if there is an 'other' 
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separate to our experience of it, it is impossible to 'reach'. Talk about such a thing 
is in fact talk about our experience, and so not about an 'other' at all. Essentially, 
this position holds that "the world we live in is the world of sense-data; but the 
world we talk about is the worid of physical objects". That is, "mind and matter is a 
division in experience" (both quotations p. 245). 
There are well known problems with both these positions, but of specific interest to 
me are those problems that a realist might identify for each position. Bear in mind 
that the 'realist' here is one whose position incorporates the three suppositions 
given at the beginning of this chapter (similar arguments could be given regarding 
a realist holding something akin or derivative of the same three suppositions), and 
for whom the problem of justification arising as a result of these suppositions is a 
real, if not essential, question. 
Such a realist might have some problems with the positions outlined above. One 
important problem they might have with the former position - i.e. with taking the 
'other' as a Fregean-type referent - is that in this case not enough 'space' is left in 
the account for a genuinely mysterious, foreign, or theological object. A literally 
commonsense approach is taken to tell the whole story. Conversely, the problem 
with a Wittgenstienien/Kantian exclusion of the 'other' is that this position attributes 
too much mysteriousness to the other - so much so that the 'other' remains 
entirely unknowable, completely outside our grasp and so impossible to 'relate to' 
at all. This renders all of theology/metaphysics/philosophy as positive endeavours 
to describe our relationship with the other, impossible. 
I take Hussert's phenomenology to be an account of our relationship to pure 
phenomena which both includes a space (or, putting it another way, leaves room 
for) the mysteriousness of the 'other', and tells a story of just how our 
comprehension or perception can accommodate this mystery. 
What I have been calling 'other', Hussert [1983] calls "transcendent", "objective 
reality", "the objectivity of the object", "spatial actuality" and "real reality" (pp. 365-
367). The realm that this variety of names refers to encompasses anything in 
objective reality (including ordinary physical objects), anything in an ego (including 
'psychological objects' such as thinking, feeling, willing, etc.) and anything in the 
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temporal worid (including physical and psychological objects). Anything, that is, 
whose objective or independent existence we can doubt (via his 'epistemological 
reduction*). 
The way in which Husserl makes room in his account for this 'other' is, first of all, 
by ruling it out. That is, Husseri [1970] begins by aiming his account not at any 
kind of actual phenomena (where actual phenomena includes ordinary physical 
things and 'external' reality in general) but at "the descriptive character of the 
phenomena, as experienced by us". The 'pure phenomena' Husserl targets, though, 
are not the objects of individual experience, nor of any sort of experience belonging 
to an 'ego' or a self. They are not the objects of perception, or cognition or any 
psychological fact "in objective time, belonging to the experiencing ego, the ego 
that is in the worid, and endures for a time" (both quotations p. 856). 
Rather, the pure phenomena Hussert [1964] studies are arrived at by 
plac[ing] the ego and the worid and the experience of the ego as such in question, then 
[by] reflection upon what is given in the apperception of the relevant experience, upon 
my ego - a reflection that simply 'sees' - [this] yields the phenomenon of this 
apperception: the phenomenon, roughly, of "perception apprehended as my perception 
(p. 14). 
Because this 'apperception' still involves the ego (i.e. it is perception apprehended 
as /77/perception), there is one further step to take before we arrive at just what it 
is that phenomenology studies. According to Husseri [1964], the objects of 
phenomenology - 'pure phenomena' - are arrived at by "ignoring its [the 
apperception's] relation to the ego, or abstracting from that relation". 
The point of this entire procedure (called 'the phenomenological reduction') is to 
somehow get at objects that are 'absolutely given' as opposed to transcendent or 
psychological: "Thus to every psychological experience [including the experience of 
transcendent reality] there corresponds, by way of the phenomenological reduction, 
a pure phenomenon that exhibits its essence ... as an absolute giveness". 
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It is only at this stage that the 'othef as described above, is 'ruled ouf: "All positing 
of a "non-immanent reality", a reality not contained in the phenomenon and 
therefore not given ... is shut off" (all quotations above p. 34) 
But it is precisely this 'shutting off or ruling out of the 'othef that also rules it in. 
Here's how. According to Husseri [1983], the phenomenological reduction as 
described above, i.e. "the description on essential lines of the nature of 
consciousness ... leads us back to the corresponding description ofthe object 
consciously known" (p. 359). Acknowledging this point leads in turn to the following 
question (and related questions): "what [does] the "claim" of consciousness to be 
really "related to" an objective, to have an objective "reference", properly come 
to?" (p. 360). 
There are a number of different characterisations of Husseri's answer to this 
question, in his own writings as well as in the work of his readers. I will give my 
own interpretation taken from two such characterisations, the answer as given by 
the later Hussert, and the answer as given by the eartier Husseri, both of which, I 
believe, express the same idea. 
7.6. Noetic and Noematic 
The main difference between the two characterisations is simply that the later 
Husseri employs special terms such as 'noesis', 'noemata' and 'the object pole of 
intention', while the eartier Hussert does not. 
Using the later terminology, the answer Husseri [1983] gives is built around a 
"cleavage between two radically opposed and yet essentially interrelated regions of 
Being ... [i.e. between] real and intentional, [or] noetic and noematic analysis" (p. 
359). 
His beginning point is just this. When we come to exploring 'intentionally', i.e. the 
nature of consciousness, specifically the relation of consciousness to an object, we 
find that the 'pure phenomena' of intentionality itself has two sides. There is a 
persistent 'parallelism' between the act of consciousness, and the object of 
consciousness. The former, called 'noesis' and the latter, called 'noema', 
correspond. That is, (Husserl says) "the essences, noema and noesis, are mutually 
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inseparable: every lowest difference on the noematic side points ... back to lowest 
differences of the noetic" (p. 359). Or (Husseri [1999]) "corresponding in every 
case to the multiplicity of Data pertaining to the really inherent noetic content, 
there is a multiplicity of Data, demonstrable in actual pure intuition, in a correlative 
^^noetic content' or, in short, in the "^noema'" (p. 88). 
The 'parallelism' can also be expressed as 'coincidence' (Husserl [1970]): 
In the ideal limiting case of adequate perception, this self - presenting sensed content 
coincides with the perceived object. ... [that is] If we may conceive of a percept put into 
a relation of fulfilment to the adequate percept that would offer us the object itself, in 
the ideally strict and most authentic sense, then we may say that a percept so intends 
its object that this ideal synthesis would have the character of a part:ial coincidence of 
the purely perceptual contents of intending and fulfilling acts, and also the character of 
complete coincidence of both complete perceptual intentions (p. 713). 
The difference between perceptual contents and perceptual intentions here can, I 
believe, be stated in the following way. First note that 'adequate perception' is the 
case in which it is correct to describe a given perception of an object to be a 
perception of that object as it really is, in and of itself. In other words, adequate 
perception is where what we see /5the object that exists independent of our 
perceiving it. 
In the case of adequate perception, the perceptual content of the intending act and 
the perceptual content of the fulfilling act partially c6\nc\de. Hussert's 'partial 
coincidence' and parallelism describes the same feature of adequate perception 
that I have been describing with the idea that the two contents, in this case, are 
'the same but different'. Hussert is highlighting just this - that the two contents are 
the same, indeed identical, but are also, and equally importantly, not the same. 
One of the part:ially coinciding contents is the noema - what my consciousness 
brings to the object or what I perceive - the other is what the object brings to my 
consciousness or what I receive. According to Husserl, what I receive can only ever 
partially coincide with what I perceive because (i.e. the two contents are not the 
same inasmuch as) a given perception cannot completely encompass every aspect 
of the object itself that there is to receive. Nonetheless the coincidence is still a 
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true coincidence because (i.e. the two contents are the same inasmuch as) an 
adequate perception of an object necessarily entails that object itself. If this were 
not so, we could never identify anything we perceive, we could only perceive 
disparate sensory events belonging to no unified self-identical thing. 
In short, Hussert seems to be saying that when I perceive an object I am only, 
property speaking, perceiving an aspect of the object. Nonetheless, I can still 
properly claim that I am perceiving thatobied., by which I mean the object in its 
entirety. Therefore in adequate perception, the content of what I perceive and the 
content of what I receive are essentially the same but also essentially different. 
This discussion is touching a deeper distinction - namely that between the content 
of what I receive from the object and the independent object itself. So far in this 
chapter I have been discussing the 'level 1' relationship between the formalism and 
the independent object (see diagram on page 136 of this text) and speaking of the 
independent object as though it were both the assumed existing object and the 
actual existing object (i.e. I have been assuming that the office 'independent 
objecf is filled). I now consider the 'level 2' relationship between the 'independent 
objecf nameable or circumscribable in a theory, and the other itself - the mystery. 
Hussert's distinction above introduces yet another nucleus within the layers of 
consciousness already delineated, namely the thing Hussert [1983] calls the 
"content of the object-nucleus of the noema" or the "predicate calculus" (p. 365 
and p. 366 respectively). 
Now, even before exploring this last nucleus further, we have a picture of just how 
'the othef can be something like the theological objects examined and duly 
admitted eartier - that is, the other can be at once inside and outside our 
comprehension. As such, phenomenology is one philosophicalsysterr\ in which such 
objects can be properly accommodated - where a philosophical system is a system 
wherein 'the othef can be separated from 'the object of consciousness', and a 
system that involves the positing of'a ground'. Objects, both physical and 
mathematical, are admitted to be theological just as, according to Derrida and 
deconstruction, the objects of any philosophical account must be. Nonetheless, 
phenomenology provides a lucid and straightforward description of how we come 
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to grasp the objects in question. It offers an epistemological solution to the 
problem of access for any theological/philosophical objects whatsoever. In fact the 
phenomenological solution covers all objects or reality not entirely given in or given 
by our own access. 
More specific to the realism I am exploring, there is nothing in phenomenology that 
excludes the reading ofthe othef as something quite beyond the processes of our 
consciousness - but at the same time, phenomenology does allow the 'other', in 
some crucial sense, to Z7ethe object of our comprehension. To elaborate this point, 
more needs to be said about the 'content of the object-nucleus of the noema' itself. 
This last nucleus is the group of properties property 'belonging' to the object itself. I 
take it that this last 'object itself is comparable to the uncircumscribable 'other'. 
Hussert [1970] writes: "[the object itself, or this last nucleus is] the synthesis of 
identical thinghood [wherein] the thing establishes itself through its very self, in so 
far as it shows itself from varying sides while remaining one and the same" (p. 
712). 
Elsewhere (Husseri [1983)] he says: 
A fully dependable object is marked off in every noema. Every consciousness has its 
"that"... and means its objective: it is evident in the case of every such consciousness 
we must be able as a matter of principle to carry out a noematic description of this same 
objective "exactly as it is meant", through development and conceptual apprehension of 
our data we acquire a definite system of predicates either form or material, determined 
in the positive form or left 'indeterminate' - and these predicates in their modified 
conceptual sense determine the "content" of a core identity (p. 364). 
And yet, this nucleus itself is still not 'the other', or the 'theological objecf I am 
proposing as 'the othef in a mathematical realist's account. It cannot be. Rather, 
Husseri adds, this nucleus has "set alongside it" or "not separable from i f or 
"belonging to it" or "disconnected from it" or "detached but not separable" that 
which can be thought of as 'the othef in a realist's account - namely "that which 
the predicates are inconceivable without and yet distinguishable from". Hussert also 
calls this - "The object" or "the objective unity" or "the self-same" or "the 
determinable subject of its possible predicates" or "the pure X in abstraction from 
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all predicates" or "the determinable which lies concealed in every nucleus and is 
consciously grasped as self-identical" or "the object pole of intention" (all 
quotations, pp. 365-367). 
7.7. ^ Getting it Righf (or. Justification - the Theological Solution) 
According to Levinas [1998], a solution to the problem of justification would, in 
Hussertian terms, be a claim of mathematical knowledge to truth - i.e. a claim that 
mathematical knowledge is true, which consists of (or even, in virtue of) "positing 
the object pole of intention <?5 existing and having a right to do so" (p. 26). 
A solution, then, could read as follows: the relationship that holds between us and 
mathematical reality when our mathematical knowledge is true or correct (i.e. when 
we are 'seeing correctly' or 'getting it righf) consists both in (our) positing the 
object pole of intention a5 existing, and in our having a right to do so. 
The former can be characterised as our role in the relationship, and the latter as 
'the reality's' role in the relationship. It can be characterised this way because we 
"have a right" to posit the object pole of intention as existing, just when it in fact 
exists. In accordance with the mysteriousness of the reality concerned, the 
relationship between it and us goes both ways: mathematical knowledge is justified 
when both the constitutive and the receptive components of that relationship are 
fulfilled. More simply put, mathematical knowledge is justified when what we see is 
what is there. A realist (along with most if not all practising mathematicians) sees 
mathematical reality as a set, a number, a structure etc. and as an independently 
existing reality. When what is seen as a set is in fact a set, and does in fact exist 
independently (especially of this fact), then mathematical knowledge of this 
particular set is justified. And so on. Just as with physical objects. Physical or 
perceptual knowledge of a tree is justified just when what we see as a tree is in 
fact an independently existing tree and not an illusion. 
Now, if we simply assume that the 'group of predicates'/'pure x'/'the 
uncircumscribable othef is in fact filling the office 'the independent othef (given 
the framework we have in place identifying this independent other with the 
formalism) then we have an account of exactly what 'having a right to do so' 
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involves. It involves the existence of this particular other, upon which the 
'independent other' (of the foregoing theory) depends, upon which, in turn, the 
formalism depends. Mathematics is justified when these three items are identical -
only provided they are also different. We know now that what we can know is also 
what we cannot. 
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8. Conclusion 
My account of mathematical realism includes the idea that mathematical reality can be 
both independent and knowable only if it can be both within and outside of our 
consciousness at the same time. 
I have argued that certain fundamental realist premises (1 to 3 of the preceding 
chapter) entail this paradox and that if the paradox is resolved, the premises 
themselves collapse. In other words, the paradox must be retained in order to retain 
the premises. 
I have presented an account of how we come to know mathematical reality that 
leaves room for the unknowableness of that same reality. I have done this using a 
phenomenology-inspired description of what is involved in our seeing that reality as it 
is - given both that mysteriousness is part of its nature, and that its separateness 
from ourselves needs to remain a 'theme of awareness' even when that separateness 
appears to be overcome (in other words, even when we can confidently say that what 
we understand is identical to what independently is). 
8.1 . Recapping Chapters 1 - 4 
The idea of independence is built into my account, and is a fundamental part of it, 
rather than an added or stipulated Cad hoc') part. In fact independence is included 
foundationally - it is a ground and, as such, everything depends on it, even 
including the account itself. 
This notion is built in without its perpetual bugbear - the burden to provide a link 
between the independent reality and mathematics as we know and do it. This is 
because I have argued that the independent entity or reality is in fact identical with 
what we do know - via the phenomenological/Fregean theories I've appropriated 
for the purpose. Arguing that what is independent is the same as what we know is 
not new. The theories I've covered have all made a move of a similar sort (with 
varying degrees of identity, and of the burden to show a link). My own theory, 
though, is notably different, not only because the identity is recognised and made 
overt, but also because of its recognition of the paradox that must result from this 
identification. The paradox is inherent - where a realist identifies what we know 
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with independent reality, he must also (at least in order to retain the fundamental 
realist notions mentioned above) maintain their separateness. In particular, the 
expression of a fully independent reality is compromised unless this paradox is 
accommodated. 
I have also argued that mathematics is metaphysical if it is realist and that 
therefore metaphysics can provide its ground. Or, put another way, the very notion 
of a ground is metaphysical, so arguing that an external or 'othef reality grounds 
an account moves the account no further afield than positing the notion of a 
ground in the first place. The ground I provide addresses both the problem of 
arbitrariness, and the problem of justification by showing how the fundamental 
axioms do indeed embody independent reality itself. 
Finally, I have attempted to redraw the division between 'what we take the facts to 
be' and 'what the facts are', associating meaning with the latter rather than the 
former. I have argued that, as a result, establishing a correspondence of objective 
fact with intersubjective meaning is not the principal problem for the realist. 
Instead, I argue that what we know or comprehend of mathematics is meaningful 
only if it is identifiable with what independently exists. Given this, 'what we take the 
facts to be' (the formalism) is itself meaningless without this identification. So the 
primary problem for the realist is that posed by the notion of independence -
specifically, in this case, that posed by an independent reality upon which meaning 
depends. 
8.2. A Final Word 
In his [2000], Shapiro writes. 
The job of a philosopher is to give an account of mathematics and its place in our 
intellectual lives. What is the subject-matter of mathematics (ontology)? What is the 
relationship between the subject-matter of mathematics and the subject-matter of 
science which allows such extensive application and cross-fert:ilisation? How do we 
manage to do and know mathematics (epistemology)? How can mathematics be taught? 
How is mathematical language to be understood (semantics)? (pp. 15-16). 
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As a brief final defence of my view I will take each of these questions in turn, and 
look at how they are answered in the account I have offered. 
According to my account, the subject matter of mathematics is and ought to be a 
mystery, as well as being exactly what we think it is. I have contended that the 
most important feature of mathematical reality is its independence, because so long 
as it is independent, the problem of determining (everything else about) its nature 
is a problem only as much, and no more so, as the problem of determining the 
'true' nature of physical reality (supposing physical reality is also independent). And 
this problem, as Husserl shows, is as impossible and as simple as seeing what is 
really there.^ 
There is then on my account a relationship between the subject matter of 
mathematical reality and that of physical reality. The relationship is defined first of 
all by the similarities between the two, particularly the analogous ways in which we 
receive them as other than us. 
I have argued that a description of how we come to know anything, including 
physical reality, is not complete and acceptable nor provably correct just because a 
causal story can be told about how we came by that description, even if that story 
involves all of the five senses. Just what the five senses access, how they do it, and 
whether the accessed reality is reality as it is, in and of itself (independent of the 
existence of those five senses), is as complex a problem as that of defining 
mathematical intuition. Accordingly, constructing an account of how we interact 
with an 'othef is just as simple or complex a feat when it is about physical reality 
as it is when it is about abstract reality. In either case, we receive something -
stimuli, pattern, structure, data, etc. and (in acknowledgment of the notion of 
reception) we grant that it is other than us (or we do if we are realist). And so long 
as there is in actual fact an independent reality producing what we receive, all of 
^ Pinker [1997] provides a vivid illustration of the problem as it looks when applied to physical objects: "of 
course, the world cfoe5 have surfaces and chairs and rabbits and minds. They are knots and patterns and 
vortices of matter and energy that obey their own laws and ripple through the sector of space-time in which 
we spend our days. They are not social constructions, nor the bits of undigested beef that Scrooge blamed 
for his vision of l^arle/s ghost. But to a mind unequipped to find them, they might as well not exist at all. As 
the psychologist George Miller has put it, "The crowning intellectual accomplishment of the brain is the real 
world ... [A]ll [the] fundamental aspects of the real world of our experience are the adaptive interpretations 
of the really real world of physics" (p. 333, brackets Pinkefs). 
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this - including the ability to make such an acknowledgment of an 'othef - is done 
simply Z;/receiving it. Upon this reception, we believe that what we see either is in 
fact independent reality as it really is (but it still is not) or is not /e<5///independent 
reality as it is in and of itself (but it still may well be, or indeed is in the case of 
genuine reception). 
I have proposed that our confidence that there is a relationship between 'othef and 
us is justified if there is a two-way relationship between that other and us, and if 
we are justified in being confident about anything at all. 
Phenomenology, just by being a description of a two-way (rather than one-way) 
relationship between an other and ourselves, provides a good framework for the 
positing of such proposals. A phenomenological relationship can be described as a 
two-way relationship or, more exactly, as a correlation (co-relation) for a number a 
reasons. The first of these is that it describes experience. And here I echo Hart 
[2002] "what is experience if not a correlation?" (p. 165). But phenomenology can 
be described as a two-way relationship also insofar as it allows room for an 'othef 
which is both knowable and beyond knowing. 
Given that we cannot possibly say, on a given reality's behalf, just what it looks like 
or how it behaves when we are correct about it, we cannot say just what 
mathematics is or does when we see mathematics as it really is. All this is for the 
simple reason that we are not mathematics. It is not us. Which is another reason 
why the paradox outlined above is inherent in mathematical realism. It is inherent 
because we cannot turn ourselves inside out. We cannot be not us. And yet we can 
reasonably assume that we see or access what is not us, and that mathematics is 
the result of this access. And we can describe what we look like when we can 
Gustifiably) say that we are seeing mathematics as it really is. If this picture is a 
detailed and rigorous one, it will include a space for the 'other'. If we then assume 
that this space is filled, we encounter the problem of whether or not this 
assumption is justified. Justification in this case involves both our own reasons to 
assume its existence, and the actual existence of the other itself. A 
phenomenological account does give us good reason to suppose the existence of 
the other. The most obvious example of this is the fact that it opens a space for the 
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other and is a convincing account of intentionality (or the nature of our own 
consciousness), or intentional correlation - both as a perception and as a reception 
of reality. 
In short, I have argued that mathematical and physical reality are not all that 
different and that the assumption that we access physical reality via our five senses 
is analogous to the assumption that we access mathematical reality via intuition (or 
whatever) - unprovable, but reasonable. What we understand when we 'look' at 
mathematics is the formalism. The formalism is full if there is an independent 
reality it embodies (or is identical to), empty if not. Much as what we see when we 
look at physical reality is full (or identical to) what exists independently so long as 
what exists independently is in fact present. 
The teaching of mathematics is not a concern for this thesis - but in accordance 
with the account I have offered, I would suggest that mathematics ought to be 
taught as though it were not us, with discovery in mind, as opposed to 
construction. 
My theory of meaning takes its lead from the above considerations, and is built 
around the notion that whether or not a given formalism has meaning is an 
objective question. My semantic model can account for Godel's idea of a 
'meaningless' yet understandable formalism, and captures the realist's intuitive 
notion that a fully constructed mathematics has no real meaning. 
All this suggests that mathematics done without an awareness of the other another 
is drastically impoverished - similar to taking what we physically see to be all there 
is. Exploration is stunted, responsiveness is dimmed, and the search for an origin is 
stopped. 
Finally, in the interest of indicating beyond this work and toward future possible 
applications of its proposals, I include another quotation from the field into which I 
have delved for its phenomenological/theological aspects. It is followed by my own 
interpretation/appropriation. 
To resolve [the] tension in the word "experience" Levinas distinguishes "phenomena" 
from "enigma". For a phenomenologist, experience turns on the transcendental 
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reduction; transcendence is bracketed, and what remains is a phenomenon for me ... 
Unable to be brought into an intentional correlation with me, the other... cannot be an 
object of my experience. Instead I am faced with an enigma that disturbs the settled 
order of my life. It is not a permanent confrontation; for... the other... irrupts in my 
worid as sheer transcendence while retreating into the assurance of a said. ... [there is 
then] the trace of the infinite that approaches, never arrives, but summons me, in an 
unthematic manner, to responsibility. The trace signifies "beyond being," not in the 
Platonic sense, which calls for a negative theology, but beyond the metaphysics of 
knowledge implied by the transcendental reduction. "Beyond," here, indicates an 
immemorial past: the other is always and already within me, as a trace, imposing a 
meaning - responsibility for the other - that cannot be reduced to either knowing or 
being. (Hart: [2002,165]) 
This, as I understand it, vindicates my appropriation of phenomenological theory as 
a framework able to address and respond to the other, while at the same time 
ruling it out. 
The notion of responding to the other, and indeed that response itself as an article 
of consideration, has been studied for years, and has attached to it a language far 
richer than I have used in this work. Concepts like 'trace', 'summons' and 
'responsibility' all promise a discourse capable of a variety of expressions of our 
relationship with the other. And this itself indicates that perhaps the paradox need 
not remain. Perhaps whatever it is that is 'beyond the metaphysics of knowledge' 
will produce more subtle and detailed descriptions of experience and these will 
capture the same aspect of experience so far (at least in this work) captured only 
via the paradox. 
The idea of the (mathematical) other as something 'already and always within' is 
one such description, as is the idea that the (mathematical) other is irreducible to 
either being (itself) or knowing (ourselves). In a sense, both are refinements of 
what has been claimed in this work, and so both suggest possible refinements or 
reductions of the paradox. 
Note though that 'irreducible' also suggests 'unavoidable': the other as irreducibly 
other is unavoidable, at least to the realist seeking to retain (literal) responsibility 
for (and to) what is not us. 
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